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Introduction          Institutional Determinants of Voter Choice
New democracies face the crucial challenge of constructing and maintaining
strong and stable political institutions. As political parties are key components
of representative systems of government (Bryce 1921, 119; Schattschneider
1942, 1), the emergence of regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after
the fall of communism coincided with the (re)appearance of a multi-party
system in which independent and competitive actors had the opportunity to
run in elections and form governments. Their status as primary post-communist
institutional actors – with their existence prior to elections, separation of
powers, constitution drafting, and legislatures – allowed political parties to play
a major role in the regime change (e.g. the Round Table Talks1) and in initial
institutional design choices (Schopflin 1991; Kitschelt 1992; Bozoki 1993;
Berglund and Dellenbrant 1994; Elster et al. 1998). More specifically, political
parties decided upon the general framework for economic change, constitution
making, and rule of law (Pridham and Lewis 1996, 5; van Biezen 2003, 5) thus
legitimizing and shaping the processes of democratization and democratic
consolidation. As an illustrative example, Kopecky (1995, 516) argues that the
Czech post-communist designers perceived parties as the core foundation of
the democratic system. The end of the communist regime and the shift of
power in most CEE countries took place in response to bottom-up pressures
exerted by the population using street protests (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland) and violence (Romania).
However, the decisive factor was institutional (van Biezen 2003) as the
beginning of transition was marked by negotiations among political elites
grouped in proto-parties or political formations (e.g. umbrella organizations).
This top-down practice in combination with the fact that parties emerged prior
to any other political institutions guaranteed the increased importance of
parties in the political life of these countries. As a result, post-communist
politics soon became party politics (Enyedi and Toka 2007). Empirically, this
claim is substantiated by the only isolated instances in which independents
managed to secure seats in CEE legislatures. The vast majority of decision-
making processes in the most recent two decades were the result of intra- and
inter-party competition and negotiations.
1 The Round Table Talks were a series of negotiations taking place in several countries from
Central and Eastern Europe between communists and opposition. Their general aim was to set
the grounds for the first non-controlled elections.
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The prominence of parties within the political system of the new
democracies from CEE is accompanied by the long-lasting feature of electoral
volatility. The background in which post-communist political parties emerged
explains the initial difficulties they encountered in obtaining stable support
among citizens. Their birth took place on barren soil in the absence of multi-
party competition and representation for almost half a century, in the absence
of democratic experience even in the inter-war period prior to communism,
and in the context of adversarial attitudes and behaviors towards parties due
to their identification with the communist state. This unfriendly environment,
combined with ideological confusion and weak programmatic identities among
the competitors in the first post-communist elections (Kitschelt 1995; Millard
2004; Grzymala-Busse 2006) led to a situation in which voters could hardly be
expected to develop identification with and attach loyalty to particular parties
(Mair 1997). However, this inability to rely on relatively stable electorates was
not limited to the first election, but was perpetuated over time.
Previous research has indicated high levels of electoral volatility
throughout the entire post-communist period, both in absolute terms and
relative to that of the Western European countries (Rose et al. 1998; Toka 1998;
Krupavicius 1999; Lewis 2000; Birch 2001; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005). A quick look
at the governments of these countries indicates that there are only rare cases
when the same party governs in consecutive terms, and out of the few
hundred parties competing in elections over the past two decades, less than a
quarter has sustained a continuous presence in Parliament. Such evidence goes
against claims that post-communist parties and party systems have a tendency
towards consolidation and stabilization (Agh 1998; Olson 1998a; Lewis 2001a;
Casal Bertoa 2008). Moreover, citizens continue to be skeptical of parties.
Parties are the least trusted political institution in the region, and this situation
has persisted since the beginning of the transition (Rose 1995). Despite
governments’ visible success at domestic (e.g. significant economic growth,
political stability) and international levels (e.g. NATO and EU accessions),
parties are perceived negatively by citizens and instill only low levels of
confidence, rarely exceeding 15% of the population (CCEB 2001-2004; EB 2004-
2007).
How can electoral volatility in the new European democracies be
explained? The main goal of this book is to address this question by examining
the political parties that have maintained a parliamentary presence in at least
half of the national elections in six CEE countries over two decades. This study
focuses on individual political parties for three interconnected reasons: they
are the agents of representation that interact directly with citizens, demand
their support, and are directly influenced by vote shifts; there are large,
unexplained variations in terms of electoral volatility within party systems; and
other levels of analysis are not appropriate in the CEE context (see Chapter 1).
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Previous studies identify two sets of factors as the main explanations of
electoral volatility. The first set includes all those elements belonging to the
sociology of politics. This approach argues that party formation and
competition takes place along various cleavage lines ranging from age,
education or professional background, to religion, ethnicity, and social class.
The electoral loyalty of the voters is the result of their social characteristics and
their alignment along various competition lines. The particular features of the
post-communist space, described in detail in the following section, illustrate
how cleavage-related factors cannot represent valid explanations of electoral
volatility. Unlike in other regions (i.e. Western Europe in particular) and time
periods, there are fewer opportunities for the CEE political parties to reach out
to their voters on cleavage grounds. The second set of factors includes the
institutional determinants of party competition and the role of the agency in
structuring voter preferences.
Following this line of reasoning, I propose an institutionally embedded
framework to explain voters’ choice in new democracies that illustrates how
political parties can influence the electoral environment in which they are
active. The logic behind the key argument is briefly discussed in the second
section and can be summarized in a few sentences. The survival of parties on
the political scene implies that a relevant contingent of parties’ voters do not
alter their choices. To encourage such an outcome, political parties provide
their voters with incentives. However, the CEE electoral environment makes
this task quite difficult: the weak societal roots of parties do not allow for party
identification or voter alignment; the unclear patterns of competition make the
policy dimension not very relevant; and the lack of elite loyalty reduces
leadership continuity.
Post-communist political parties do not have numerous tools at hand to
mobilize the open and available electorates. As party organizations create
effective gates of communication with the electorate (Adams et al. 2005),
political parties can use them to stabilize their electorates. To this end, I argue
and test that party organization can contribute to the creation of a
recognizable label that voters can identify with over the medium to long term,
that it may favor the creation of popular networks, and can promote and rely
on recognizable candidates in consecutive elections.
In order to do so, three distinctive means are employed: intra-party
decision-making, membership rates, and re-nomination of incumbent members
of parliament (MPs). With regard to the first, the party may be better
connected with voters through its decentralized decision-making.
Decentralization of decision-making enhances the citizens’ perception that
problems are tackled at the local level and that they may have some say in the
process of representation. Second, the party can create long-term attachment
vis-à-vis member recruitment. Members build their own networks and through
4
these the party acquires easier access to broader segments within the
electorate. Third, through legislators’ re-nominations, party organization
delivers recognizable candidates who may help to reach two interrelated goals
important to the process of representation: a) the increased perception of
continuity on the part of voters; and b) the diminishing of the level of
abstraction in politics by associating candidates with party labels. In a nutshell,
the sources of electoral volatility are considered to be mainly institutional.
Therefore, party organizations can diminish volatility, and thus increase
electorates’ stability.
Why is the Story Different?
Three macro-characteristics – party formation, unstable political environments,
and non-mobilized elites – are key in demonstrating that cleavage-related
factors have little if any potential to explain the variation of volatility in the CEE
countries. Cleavage structure analysis, as put forward by Lipset and Rokkan
(1967), cannot be used as a tool to investigate party formation in the CEE
countries. The communist regimes leveled out any type of major social
differentiation using their egalitarian ideology (van Biezen 2003, 35-36).
Ethnicity, language, religion (i.e. Church isolation), and urban positioning did
not produce significant differences between citizens. With regard to
ownership, only the state benefited from this right, eliminating possible
disparities between owners and workers. As a result, the cleavage lines
common to Western European countries do not find correspondence in the
CEE space (Rivera 1996). Therefore, because parties could not appeal to
interest representation of collective identities formed on fault lines, their
formation had to have other roots. Instead, parties were created on the basis
of attitudes towards institutional aspects of regime change (van Biezen 2003,
159). That explains why in these countries, more than one anti-communist party
emerged with similar societal targets, but nuanced attitudes towards the
previous regime.
Given the general absence of cleavages, the vast majority of the CEE
parties do not have societal, but rather institutional origins. This situation made
it difficult to recognize the existence of traditional left-right axes of party
competition within the CEE region. However, the absence of cleavages
enforcing ideological and social differences does not imply that divisions
associated with the electoral choices of citizens do not exist. Thus, although
ideological differences between parties were blurry, electoral competition was
marked by debates over the specific means by which to achieve common goals
such as democratization, privatization, European accession etc. For example,
economic issues revolved around differences of opinion on growth and
distribution of resources within society: the role and intensity of state
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intervention in redistributing income, free vs. directed mechanisms of
distribution, and public vs. private property (Evans and Whitefield 1993).
The CEE electorates are open and volatile, and are rarely characterized
by party identification (Rose and Mishler 1998; Millard 2004; Gherghina 2009;
2011). Votes are generally (re)allocated to reward or punish parties’ behavior.
Frequent vote shifts imply a fragile identification of the electorate with
established parties, and indicate the availability of many voters for new
electoral alternatives. CEE represents an illustrative case of this situation.
Having emerged in an environment with strong anti-party feelings, post-
communist parties faced an initial legitimacy problem that made the existence
of stable psychological attachments among voters difficult. The non-
crystallization of identities did not allow for a clear pattern of alignment (Mair
1997, 182). Weak societal roots strengthened the reticence of voters to attach
long-time loyalty to one political competitor. The picture of low party loyalty is
complete if we add the absence of stable constituencies that may enact strong
political identities among voters (van Biezen 2003, 37), and the occurrence of
numerous small parties with no stable norms and conventions in patterns of
competition (Mair 1997). The latter render the electoral environment uncertain.
All of these factors indicate that high levels of party identification cannot and
should not be expected in CEE.
The fluidity of political support in CEE can also be demonstrated in the
context of two macro-perspectives of global trends and technological
developments. First, the CEE post-communist political parties emerged when
volatility increased in the once stable Western European party systems (Rose
and Urwin 1970; Pedersen 1983; Crewe and Denver 1985; Bartolini and Mair
1990; Franklin et al. 1992; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Therefore, even within
party systems in which preferences were stable, voters modified their
preferences. Second, these parties skipped a few phases of development (i.e.
the mass party phase and communication with the electorate via members and
local organizations), and had direct access to modern resources. They emerged
in an era of developed media with multiple channels of information, in a time at
which opinion polls are a widely used means of measuring public opinion, and
voters have greater access to higher education and develop different values
and interests compared to those of their predecessors. Apart from the
observable advantages of such a context for political parties (i.e. effectiveness
of communication, higher visibility), there are a few disadvantages that can
favor shifts in electoral preferences. Electorates have access to more
information about competitors, thereby widening their spectrum of choices,
and increasing their availability.
These contextual situations indicate that cleavage-related factors
cannot explain either the levels of or the variation in electoral volatility in CEE.
Overall, as a consequence of the communist legacy, the post-communist space
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has only very weak, if any, cleavages. The ideological fuzziness, the institutional
origins of parties, the numerous entries into and exits from the political scene,
the limited elite loyalty, and electorates’ availability either contradict or have a
logic parallel to the one implied by party competition along cleavage lines. This
is the reason for which I now turn to non-cleavage factors (i.e. institutional
determinants).
Institutional Explanations for Volatility
This section elaborates on the institutional sources of voter choice, explaining
how certain features of party organization can diminish electoral volatility.
Voters’ preferences are more than just the result of socialization or experience
(Berelson et al. 1954; Easton 1957). Politics consists of complex and
sophisticated processes. As the choice among initial alternatives is not often
accessible to ordinary voters, political parties simplify choices. In doing so, they
generate symbols of identification and loyalty (Neumann 1956; Key 1964; Borre
and Katz 1973; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000)
that can stabilize the democratic polity and create continuity in electoral
choices (Converse 1969). This process occurs if parties can create a
communication chain with the citizens (Colomer 2001, 136). Voter choice is
sensitive to the structure and positioning of competitors in the political space
(Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Following this logic, the stability of political parties
may lead to the maintenance of electoral preferences. In this context, stability
requires the sending of coherent messages, the continuous presence of parties
on the political arena, homogenous actions, and long-term perspectives for
representation (i.e. recognizable labels and candidates).
Given their institutional origins and weak linkages to society, the CEE
political parties developed two additional means of communicating with voters
in addition to their use of the media: by way of ancillary structures (e.g. youth
organizations), and/or active local party branches. The latter can establish
direct communication with voters and can mobilize them if local organizations
have autonomy in reaching decisions. To fulfill this communication task, local
organizations should be able to – or be perceived by voters as being able to –
channel societal demands and give them priority. For example, local
organizations can set salient societal issues on the party’s agenda or can
promote candidates perceived by voters as being capable of representing
them. In this respect, intense action at local level can bring parties closer to the
voter, and can increase the probability of long-term attachment.
Strong anti-party feelings in the aftermath of regime change and the
continuously low levels of trust in political parties can be partially explained by
the lack of citizen involvement in politics. Low levels of party membership
reflect this issue of involvement. At the same time, the membership
organization creates the premises for societal webs that result in a stable core
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of voters (i.e. low volatility). In this respect, complementary to the previous
argument about decision-making at the local level, party members help to build
an image of legitimacy and societal linkage. Members create social networks in
which they can spread the message of the party or even create party loyalties.
A high roster of party members sends the electorate a message of popular
legitimacy, and provides the basis of a partisan discourse of strong ties with
ordinary citizens (Scarrow 2000, 84). As a result, party membership can
influence voters’ preferences.
Similarly, the promotion of recognizable candidates on party lists can
shape citizens’ preferences.2 It does so in three ways. First, it ensures long-term
communication between candidates and voters – assuming that the candidate
does not regularly shift between local constituencies – allowing a permanent
exchange of votes for quality of representation. This communication often
occurs as a result of the free media access of the incumbent MP. Consequently,
the visibility of the candidate and of the party increases. Second, due to their
access to state resources, incumbents bring benefits to their constituencies or
at least they can always claim to do so. By adding extensive access to media
channels to this situation we acquire a picture in which incumbent MPs can
promote their image and constantly remind their voters of all the good things
they do (Fiorina 1977; Stonecash 2008). Third, the promotion of incumbents can
always bring to the fore messages of experience and professionalization of
elites that newcomers cannot use. MPs who are re-nominated do not need
time to accommodate to the workings of the legislature, understand the
problems of their constituencies, or to become aware of the solutions at hand.
These advantages can make a difference and their re-nomination may shape
voters’ preferences.
Summing up, the autonomy of local branches, membership rates, and
re-nominated candidates are useful tools that parties can use to establish a
better connection with the electorate. These variables are central to the key
theoretical arguments (see Chapter 1) that are empirically tested (Chapters 3-6)
to explain volatility in CEE. To this end, the following section briefly describes
the case selection, general methodological issues, and data employed in the
rest of the book.
Method and Data
Based on similarities in terms of former political regime, non-belonging to the
Soviet Union, and paths towards democratization, this book focuses on the six
2 The mechanism presented here complements the classic perspective according to which
political parties renominate candidates considered to be successful. In doing so, I emphasize the
supplementary benefit of voter stability that renomination can bring on top of the reelection
(electoral performance).
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former Warsaw Pact countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia. The case selection has both theoretical and
methodological underpinnings. Most studies of the post-communist space
represent either extensive single-country studies or comparisons of two
countries upon which generalizations can rarely be made (Pop-Eleches 1999;
Szczerbiak 1999; Lewis 2000; 2001b; Kopecky 2001; Moser 2001; Spirova 2007),
or broad comparisons that include general explanations, but neglect details
and variables relevant for many observed countries (Miller et al. 1998; Moser
1999; Tavits 2005).
However, occupying a middle position on the ladder of generality, there
are several relevant studies that selected a medium number of cases to provide
both an in-depth analysis of political developments and a comparative
perspective (Markowski 1997; Golosov 1998; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Lawson et al.
1999; Grzymala-Busse 2002a; Bozoki and Ishiyama 2002; van Biezen 2003). This
approach provides at least two advantages. First, it is possible to conduct a
better investigation of the processes and developments in the selected
countries. Second, due to the different nature of variables, such a design allows
for the combination of statistical and narrative comparisons based on
extensive information gathered (Mahoney 1999). Moreover, a mid-range
comparison is suitable for use in both a longitudinal and cross-country research
contexts, provides rich information, and increases the quality of comparisons
made.
By conducting an analysis that takes almost two decades into account
for all these countries, I focus on the relevant political parties. In this context,
relevance bears a different meaning than the one coined by Sartori (1976) who
refers to the coalitional and blackmail potential of a political actor. My criteria
for relevance are continuity in representation (i.e. spending a long period of
time on the political scene), and contestation in a relatively independent
manner. Accordingly, relevant political parties should be present in at least half
of the legislatures elected after the fall of communism, and their presence
there should be mainly the result of contestation on an individual basis (for
details, see Chapter 2). These criteria eliminate parties with sporadic
appearances in Parliament and those that got there due to specific
conjunctures. For example, due to the lack of an effective electoral threshold,
there were 29 parties in the 1991 Polish parliament, out of which only five
survived in the subsequent 1993 parliament (Table 1 refers to six parties for
1993, as one emerged between the two elections).
The second criterion explicitly refers to those parties that gained access
to parliament after running in various electoral alliances and coalitions. This is a
specific situation in which the parties’ appeal to voters remains a dilemma, as it
is very difficult to asses whether citizens cast votes for them or for their
partners. For example, the Christian Democratic National Peasants Party
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(PNTCD) was the leading party within the Romanian coalition government
between 1996 and 2000. However, it experienced contestation on individual
grounds only once (in 1990) with modest results (2.6% of the votes). In the
following three elections, the PNTCD formed a broad electoral coalition with
various compositions and levels of success ranging from a peak of 30.2% in 1996
to 5% in 2000. In such instances, the evaluation of electoral potential is difficult.
Given the longitudinal nature of this study, these criteria diminish
existing problems rather than create new ones. One may claim that a focus on
parliamentary parties with a continuous presence in the legislature leads to a
biased calculus of volatility. This is a valid observation for a different level of
analysis – the party system – in which every component can make a difference
in explaining vote shifts. However, when looking at individual parties, it is
highly problematic to asses the volatility of actors with little support among
citizens or with only sporadic appearances on the political scene. On the one
hand, parties that are permanently outside the legislature have a very low level
of electoral volatility, but this fact has virtually no substantive meaning. A party
obtaining around 1% of the votes in a general election will appear very stable,
but its performance makes it irrelevant in terms of the national political system.
Consequently, by leaving them out, I avoid over-estimation of their electoral
stability.
At the same time, in empirical terms, it is highly problematic to
calculate the volatility for such parties as they are often included in the “other”
category when electoral results are reported. On the other hand, neither the
extra-parliamentary parties nor those with an occasional presence in the
legislature develop the means – including the organization – to encapsulate the
preferences of voters for a longer period of time. Quite often, some political
actors gain short-term support as a result of factors such as the economic
situation, or failure of the previous government or coalition partners. To
conclude, application of the continuity and independence criteria leave minor
parties or parties with a short existence based on contextual factors for their
electoral performance outside the analysis.
The unit of observation in this study is the political party at election
time. The time-period of analysis is the beginning of the transition period (1989-
1990) until the most recent elections (Romania 2008). Table 1 presents the
selection made for each country. The last column includes the number of
parties that fulfill the selection criteria. By comparing it to the number of actors
present in the legislature after each election, we get a rough estimate of the
entries to and exits from the political scene. Bulgaria is the country with the
least continuous parties in parliament, being characterized by numerous entries
and exits into the party system (Spirova 2007). Hungary and Poland have the
highest number of parties with consistent presence in parliament since their
formation. The raw numbers hide the structural evolution of representation.
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These two party systems have different traits in terms of volatility and stability
(Lewis 2000; Bielasiak 2002; Birch 2003; Millard 2004; Sikk 2005; Webb and
White 2007; Enyedi and Casal Bertoa 2011) which are also visible at the party
level. Whereas in Hungary most of the six parties from the last column are in
the legislature throughout the entire analyzed period, until 2001 only three
Polish parties fulfilled the selection criteria. The most recent three elections
promoted three more stable parties on to the political scene.
Table 1: Representation and Continuity in the CEE Legislatures (1990-2008)
Parties represented in parliament





















Bulgaria 3 5 5 4 7 3
Czech Republic 8 6 5 5 5 4
Hungary 6 6 6 4 5 6
Poland 29 6 5 7 6 6 6
Romania 17 7 6 5 5 6 5
Slovakia 5 7 6 7 6 5
Notes: a) independents are not counted; b) The numbers refer only to parties winning
seats: reserved seats like those for the German minority in Poland or for the national
minorities in Romania are excluded; c) in Hungary, I did not include the Agrarian Union
(ASZ) in 1990 and 1994 as it obtained only a single seat.
This analysis approaches the topic of volatility from the perspective of political
parties which has two immediate conceptual and methodological
consequences. First, the concepts of electoral stability and volatility are used
interchangeably throughout the book as they are complementary: low
electoral volatility implies high electoral stability and vice versa. Second, this
study uses net volatility as a measure of aggregated vote shifts because the
primary focus lies within the mechanisms that mobilize the electorate as a
whole, and not particular individuals (see Chapter 2). The quest for sources of
electoral volatility at the party level in new democracies from CEE relies on
several arguments about the role of party organization in shaping voter
behavior. With the contextual features of the post-communist space as a basis,
the theoretical framework goes beyond the particularities of investigated party
systems and sketches unifying principles that explain longitudinal and cross-
country variations. In doing so, I construct a model to predict levels of electoral
volatility. The empirical testing is organized in two phases: a) investigation of
the bivariate relationship (i.e. correlation) between various components of
party organization and net electoral volatility and b) use of the multivariate
model (i.e. ordinary least squares regression) that includes – apart from the
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three main effects presented in the previous section – control and systemic
explanations.
Political and historical similarities were the main criteria used to select
the six countries included in my study: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The parties included in the analysis are3: BSP,
DPS, and SDS in Bulgaria, CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, and ODS in the Czech
Republic, FKGP, FIDESZ, KDNP, MDF, MSZP, and SZDSZ in Hungary, PIS, PO,
PSL, SD, and SLD in Poland, PDL, PNL, PRM, PSD, and UDMR in Romania, HZDS,
KDH, MKP, SDKU, SNS, and SDL in Slovakia. As many of these parties have
changed their labels across time and, as such, their histories are difficult to
follow, I use the most recent label for the sake of consistency. This does not
always correspond to the name of the actors involved in the political events.
For example, the Romanian PSD acquired its current label in 2001 (renamed
from PDSR), but I use this name when referring to the government period of its
predecessor from 1992-1996.
Longitudinal developments represent a key issue in my study as they
allow for the mapping of institutional effects on volatility over time within the
same country. Accordingly, all data are collected at the level corresponding to
the unit of observation (i.e. party/election). The period of investigation starts
with the first free and fair elections in Hungary (1990) and ends with the most
recent legislative elections in Romania (2008).4 For most of the countries I
account for five elections, though for Poland and Romania I account for six. As
volatility is calculated only from the second election onwards, there are four
observations for most countries, whereas Poland and Romania have five. The
total number of political parties under investigation is 29; the number of
analyzed political actors is different across countries ranging from three
political parties in Bulgaria to six in Hungary. By combining the number of
elections with that of political parties, the result is a total of 121 observations.
My analysis and argument follow a deductive model that starts with the
most general level of explanation and is gradually narrowed to the most
particular. It is organized in three layers: 1) patterns that are valid across time
and countries, 2) country specifics and differences within the same party
system, and 3) illustrations of how observed mechanisms function for
individual parties. Whereas the statistical analyses are crucial for empirical
testing at the first two layers, the mechanisms are revealed through single-case
studies. Such insights are useful to illustrate how patterns identified by means
of statistical analysis function in specific contexts.
3 The full names of the parties included in analysis can be found in the list of acronyms placed at
the front of the book.
4 Czech Republic and Slovakia organized their first free elections as independent states in 1992;
the ones in 1990 were still organized under the label of Czechoslovakia.
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Overall, I use a combination of behavioral and institutional data relative
to the conceptualization and type of variables. The dependent variable in the
analysis is net electoral volatility and is calculated as a weighted difference in
electoral performance in consecutive elections for each political party present
in at least half of the national legislatures during the investigated period (for
details, see Chapter 2). The three independent variables are centralization of
candidate selection for the national elections, size and variation of membership
organizations, and candidate re-nomination rates. The centralization of intra-
party decision-making refers to the layer of decision-making pertaining to the
list of party candidates used in national elections. Using document analysis,
data are retrieved from party statutes and constitutions (Chapter 3).
Membership rates are calculated as the percentage of party members
within the electorate as a whole. Data are collected from political parties (e.g.
party headquarters, official websites, and publications), newspaper articles,
secondary literature, and survey data. Accurate membership figures are
difficult to obtain and claimed totals should be treated with caution. Whenever
possible, I used triangulation to ensure data validity. This was particularly
important due to the fact that various sources provided different estimates of
party membership at similar moments in time. I have relied on three types of
sources: the parties’ official reports or estimates of their individual
memberships5 and secondary sources6.
Re-nomination of candidates refers to the percentage of previous MPs
that are re-nominated on the lists of candidates. The calculus of the ratio was
based on the data provided by national parliaments’ websites and on party lists
of candidates (see Chapter 5). The data used for these three main effects are
original and often complement existing figures (e.g. party membership). For
control variables (see Chapter 1), the data were collected from secondary
sources (for party system volatility), electoral databases and websites of
national elections (for turnout), and party websites or secondary literature
dealing with histories of the parties (for government incumbency). Unless
sources are explicitly specified at the bottom of tables or graphs, the data used
in this book are original. Similarly, although the results of elections are publicly
available, the electoral volatility - and related concepts such as elasticity – is
calculated on the basis of formula provided in the following chapters.
5 Parties report aggregate figures and often use suspiciously rounded numbers. They are not very
reliable sources for data on membership (Mair and van Biezen 2001) as they often augment their
number of members. I carefully handled this type of information and – whenever possible –
confronted the figures with those existing in previous studies.
6 When figures were contradictory, a choice between the alternative numbers had to be made. in
doing so, I followed the numbers provided by more independent sources.
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What is New?
Earlier research on electoral volatility has two visible shortcomings. First, there
are no studies that have tested the relationship between institutional
structures and their acceptance in society. Instead, the latter is generally
explained by exogenous factors at aggregate level (i.e. party system). Second,
many conceptualizations of party organization allow little or no replicability, as
they are based more on in-depth or contextual knowledge of the cases. There
are very few indicators to allow comparability and further investigation. This
study fills these gaps using three interrelated strategies. First, unlike previous
explanations that emphasize the effects of exogenous factors on electoral
volatility, this book focuses on the impact of endogenous factors. In this
respect, the central argument is that certain features of party organization can
explain variation in electoral volatility. At the party level, electoral volatility is
not solely the result of general processes such as democratization, economic
performance, or electoral framework (see Chapter 1). In an unstable
environment such as that of CEE in the first decade after the fall of
communism, I argue that party organization can play a crucial role in shaping
voter choice.
Second, from a methodological standpoint, this analysis combines
quantitative and qualitative techniques in an innovative design intended to
capture the substance of relationships between party organization and the
electorate. This analysis operationalizes the concept of party organization and
measures its component features to identify differences and the effects they
produce. These measurable indicators of party organization justify the
consideration of this variable in further research designs to explain other
processes related to electoral systems (e.g. the entries and exits of parties to
and from the political arena).
Apart from these contributions, this research yields three other
innovations. First, it shifts the level of analysis from party system to party level,
investigating what happens within the system. By narrowing the analytical
focus, I examine variations in volatility often disregarded by system-level
approaches. Political parties represent the basic unit of interaction and change
within a political system. They are the primary agents of representation and the
main competitors in legislative elections. Consequently, political parties are the
level at which vote shifts should be observed and explained. Second, the book
proposes a different approach to the study of the manner in which political
parties relate to their electorates. Previous studies illustrate how parties react
to existing constraints (Harmel and Janda 1982; Mair et al. 2004).
Parties are politically purposive organizations with a political ideology
(Luther and Muller-Rommel 2002, 6) that individualizes them in the electoral
space and shapes their relationships with the voters. They are dynamic
organizations that suffer changes at the structural and institutional levels (Katz
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and Mair 1992; 1994; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 4) most of the time as an
effect of the environment. This mechanism is underpinned by a two-faceted
reasoning. On one hand, parties are considered rational actors that react and
adapt to the constraints and opportunities provided by the electoral market
(Kirchheimer 1966). On the other hand, political parties are influenced in terms
of their organization, ideological positioning, membership, and policy proposals
by state organizations, the type of government (i.e. presidential vs.
parliamentary systems), the electoral system, democratic experience (Rae 1971;
Harmel and Janda 1982), and electoral law (Sartori 1976; 1997). However, my
analysis investigates whether or not this relationship is univocal. The central
argument is that political parties can also be in the position to influence the
institutional settings in which they operate.
Such an argument was earlier explored by Sartori (1969) in his
theoretical review of the differences between the sociology of politics and the
political sociology. The latter states that politics is no longer solely a reflection
of the society; it can also shape it. In particular, when investigating the
relationship between social class and political party, Sartori concludes that the
existence of political parties is not a consequence of class. On the contrary, the
political parties, through their organizational coverage and pressure, shape the
class and the ideology that accompanies (or implies) it (Sartori 1969, 84-85).
Accordingly, political parties do not only reflect the cleavages, but also produce
them. Consequently, parties activate, channel, deflect, repress, or reinforce the
cleavages, thus shaping their environment (Sartori 1969, 89).
A further example of party organizational influence on external settings
can be identified in Katz and Mair’s discussion (1995, 22) about the cartel party.
They argue that once in government, parties practically become the state,
having the capacity to influence the rules of the game and, thus, the
environment. Third, it is the first comparative study to test the relationship
between components of party organization and the electorate. By explaining
behaviors in the context of endogenous institutional features, the results can
provide an institutional explanation for the level of electoral volatility in CEE
states, and can reveal the mechanisms used by parties to influence their
environment. In this respect, this study may contribute to the institutional
theory by providing an explanation for variations in electoral volatility and by
showing that formal and structural institutionalization of political agencies
enhances further institutionalization.
The societal relevance of this study rests on two arguments. First, this
study offers an empirical test of institutional influence on behaviors of voters.
Party organization may have both a direct and indirect effect on society. The
direct effect to be investigated implies a relatively stable electorate as a result
of organizational stability. The indirect effect is based on two consecutive
steps. Initially, the organizational structure of political parties leads to an
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organizational culture shaping the values of its members. Afterwards, these
values are propagated in society through various channels of communication
and institutions (bureaucracies) to which party members have access. Second,
the existence of a nexus between party organization and electoral volatility can
illustrate specific attitudes and expectations of the voters towards electoral
competition and political actors. Voters’ long-term preferences for a certain
type of political party add new incentives in the context of electoral
competition. In doing so, parties have the capacity to indirectly influence
competition. For example, as parties depend heavily on votes, it is their interest
to converge with citizen opinion. Consequently, they are likely to be sensitive
to voters’ messages.
In addition, a policy dimension can be identified. Policy-makers and
party-strategists can use the fact that party organization has an influence on
political institutions. Parties have the tendency to expand their patterns of
organization to institutions in which they are involved. For example,
relationships between MPs and members of government belonging to the
same party are rooted in specific organizational structures created by that
party.
Plan of the Book
The book is divided into six chapters evolving from basic guidelines on
institutional explanations of electoral volatility to substantial empirical
evidence. The sections above have introduced the key concepts, logic of the
tested relationships, main determinants of electoral volatility, and
methodological approaches. I will be returning to all of these subjects in
greater detail in the first chapter of the book. This first chapter focuses on
existing explanations of electoral volatility and also provides an analysis of the
multi-layered character of the concept. The literature review and empirical
evidence reveal two interrelated situations. First, given the contextual factors
in CEE, the analytical level that makes most sense for the purposes of this study
is the individual party. Second, there exist only poor explanations of variation in
electoral volatility among these parties. Consequently, three institutional
explanations are formulated to account both individually (on a bivariate basis)
and collectively (in a multivariate model) for this variation.
Building on these premises, Chapter 2 conceptualizes and
operationalizes electoral volatility, including also an empirical description of
volatility throughout CEE. Two types of analyses are employed in order to gain
a better picture of the region: the identification of general patterns for the CEE
parties either at various moments – by introducing the time dimension – and by
accounting for extreme support (i.e. the electoral elasticity); and the focus on a
handful of cases to illustrate the evolution of their extreme volatility during the
two post-communist decades.
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Each of the following three chapters represents an empirical test of the
bivariate relationship between components of party organization and electoral
volatility: decentralization of candidate selection for the national elections
(Chapter 3), party membership (Chapter 4), and MP re-nomination rates
(Chapter 5). Their structure is similar: each chapter begins with a general
description of the analyzed organizational component, continues with the
statistical analyses, and ends with comparative cross-national and cross-party
perspectives. The results of the bivariate analyses are comprehensively
explored as they may provide relevant empirical support for each hypothesis.
Each chapter concludes with an in-depth discussion of two political parties
from different countries selected to provide an accurate representation of the
observed effect.
The last chapter brings together the main effects and investigates the
explanatory power of a multivariate model in which I introduce the control
variables outlined in Chapter 1: party system volatility, turnover rates, and
government incumbency. The chapter includes the substantive and
methodological implications of this analysis for the study of electoral politics in
new democracies in general.
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Chapter 1 Party Organization and Electoral Volatility:
An Analytical Model
Introduction
What is electoral volatility and how can it be explained? As these questions
represent the starting points of my study, the purpose of this chapter is to
provide a clear answer to both. Previous research has shown that electoral
volatility is a multi-layered concept with complex analytical and empirical
dimensions. Often calculated and analyzed at the aggregate party system level,
electoral volatility emphasizes changes that occur at different levels of
representation (Crewe 1985a, 8). Bartolini and Mair (1990, 25) distinguish
between the party system, party block, and individual parties as three distinct
levels at which volatility can be calculated. At the party system level, volatility
encompasses electoral variation as a whole and includes the sum of parties’ net
electoral gains or losses in consecutive elections. It is a reliable indicator of
relative strength and social rooting of political actors in consecutive elections
(Krupavicius 1999, 8).
With respect to the changes identified at the party block level, these
can refer either to a party family or to parties grouped along several
dimensions: left-right, old vs. new, or opposition vs. government (Pennings and
Lane 1998). We can distinguish between intra- and inter-block volatility. The
first refers to electoral changes between parties from the same block, whereas
the second captures vote swings between blocks. At the party level, electoral
volatility is a reliable indicator of the acceptance of a party in a society (Lane
and Ersson 1999, 127) and is often included in measurements of party
institutionalization. Electoral volatility at the party level provides an indication
of the number of voters gained or lost by individual parties between elections.
Calculating volatility at the party level diminishes the major shortcoming of
volatility calculated at the party system level: its blindness towards the parties
contributing to it (Sikk 2005, 408). Thus, an accurate estimation of vote shifts
between existing parties is captured best by party volatility.
Analysis of volatility at any of the three levels has a unique departure
point: the electoral performance of a political party across time. The stability of
electoral performance over time can be assessed within the broadest
framework in which the party competes (i.e. the party system), alongside
competition partners on various dimensions (party block), or at the individual
party level. In this respect, the political party is the most important unit of
analysis. This observation is also valid on theoretical grounds. In a functional
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sense, political parties are the main tools of citizen representation. Parties are
the visible actors that run in elections and are held accountable by voters for
their actions and policies. A party’s electoral performance is a function of the
interaction between this party and voters, of the exchange of votes for
policies. In this respect, it makes the most sense to analyze volatility where it
occurs in practice – at the level of the individual party.
Party system and block volatilities have analytical value, but are
constructed on the basis of behaviors observed at other levels. In this sense,
Bartolini and Mair (1990, 4) explain that “electoral instability is a phenomenon
originating at the level of individual behavior, but which acquires political
relevance only by reference to the changes which it produces in the structure
of party systems”. Block volatility is an intermediary between the party system
and individual party levels. It aggregates electoral swings on certain
dimensions: ideological, governmental etc. Although it is necessary to
understanding the dynamics within a political system, block volatility does not
provide the basis upon which substantial conclusions can be drawn about
parties’ electoral volatility, as the configuration of these blocks often changes.
In conceptual and empirical terms, of the substantive characteristics of party
blocks are rarely consistent across countries thereby limiting our ability to
compare these units across different settings. This is why this concept has been
left out of my analysis.
In light of the exclusion of block volatility from this analysis, this
chapter focuses on volatility from the standpoint of both the macro (party
system) and meso (party level) perspectives. This chapter differentiates
between these two analytical levels and explores the determinants of electoral
volatility. The first section provides an analysis of the layers of volatility and
explains the reasons for which volatility in CEE should be regarded as a function
of individual parties and not of the party system. In spite of this analytical
differentiation, the party system and party levels are interconnected. This is the
reason for which the sources of electoral volatility can have an influence on
both layers. As such, the second section of this chapter emphasizes
explanations of electoral volatility in a sequential manner, approaching then
general (party system), mixed, and individual party levels in that order.
In this section, I argue that despite theoretical reasons to expect
various institutional and behavioral factors to have an effect, most
determinants of volatility have either no variation or no explanatory potential
in the CEE context. Consequently, previously unexplored factors are considered
as possible explanations. In this sense, the third section of this chapter
proposes an institutionally-embedded explanatory framework – based on party
organization – as the key explanation of party level volatility in CEE. An idea
such as this is expressed in broad terms by Kostelecky (2002) who argued that
the organizational weakness of parties is a major factor contributing to the
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observed electoral volatility in CEE party systems. Of the many party
organization components that may influence electoral volatility, only three
have the potential to explain variation in CEE: candidate selection, party
membership, and MP re-nomination. I formulate testable hypotheses for each
of these components. The fourth section of this chapter presents my analytical
model which includes these three main effects and the control variables. This
model represents the basic skeleton of the empirical tests in Chapters 3-6.
Party System and Party Volatility
Most of the existing literature refers to the party system when analyzing
electoral volatility. However, as was shown in the introduction to this chapter,
there are theoretical and methodological reasons for favoring the party level
approach. In addition, three empirical arguments – all specific to CEE – lend
support to this idea. First, the post-communist party systems are structurally
unstable. They are characterized by a large number of entries and exits thereby
generating episodic appearances in the political space. In consecutive elections,
the format and composition of the party system are rarely similar and
methodological problems related to comparability arise. For example,
Bulgarian politics has displayed continuous change over the past two decades,
with only three parties that have successfully participated in half of the
elections (BSP, SDS, and DPS).
As a result of the fact that the same parties have not participated in all
elections, the party system measurement cannot distinguish between volatility
among stable parties and volatility created by entry and exits (Neff Powell and
Tucker 2008, 2-3). As these two types of volatility have different causes and
effects on political processes, it is crucial to isolate and calculate them
separately. By lumping them into a common measurement we create confusion
and provide results that are not only difficult to interpret, but also far removed
from reality. Moreover, previous studies (Sikk 2005) illustrated that in CEE an
index of volatility calculated at party system level ignores the parties
contributing to it. Consequently, looking at the components of the party
system and evaluating their performance from a cross-sectional and a cross-
time perspective allows for a deeper understanding of the political dynamics in
the region.
Second, only an investigation conducted at the party level is able to
answer questions related to splits, mergers, coalitions, and label modifications.
Such developments are essential to tracing the histories of political parties
which are relevant in terms of electoral performance. These decisions are elite
driven and usually rely on beliefs about voter behavior, assumed to either
influence it or to be an effect of it. Sometimes the two rationales are combined.
For example, electoral coalitions are both proactive (as the parties that decide
to join forces wish to maximize their performance in the upcoming elections)
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and reactive (as they are built on favorable signals received from the
electorate). Empirically, this interplay between political actors and their
supporters can only be fully captured if developments within parties are closely
examined. The following example illustrates this argument: Party A, running in
the elections t and t1, has a split at half the distance between the two elections.
The splitter, Party B, does not compete alone in elections, but merges with
Party C in election t1. Assuming that Party B has some electoral support, Parties
A and C will both end up with different degrees of electoral volatility. Thus,
without accounting for party dynamics, the relationship between voters and
representatives is misleading.
Finally, size is a relevant feature of political parties when considering
their societal support. Apart from the visibility of the party dimension in terms
of government functioning or in occupying positions in the political system, this
feature also differentiates parties with respect to electoral volatility. A small
party that appeals to 5-6% of the electorate and loses 2% of its usual vote share
suffers much more than a large party that gathers, on average, 20-22% of votes
and loses the same amount. Thus, without accounting for differences and
conflating the volatility scores into a single measurement at the party system
level, the gains and losses of small parties are underestimated, whereas for
large parties they are overestimated. A methodological shortcoming such as
this cannot be overcome when accounting for the effective number of parties.
The score obtained indicates a relative division of power and importance
between parties within the system at a given moment; it still does not say much
about the extent to which parties perform relative to their own position in the
system. Put simply, calculating absolute vote transfers does not provide an
accurate image of voting patterns within a party system. It provides only
comparability between countries. The longitudinal performance of parties is
best accounted for in terms of relative gains and losses.
As a consequence of all of these features, electoral volatility at the
party system level may not reflect the dynamism of relevant competitors within
the system. That is why I focus on the volatility of individual parties that are
relevant to the political system (see Introduction). However, there is a linkage
between parties and the party system that is visible in many areas from policy
drafting to electoral results. Accordingly, it is expected that a linkage will exist
between the party and party system volatility. Moreover, as they are not
always easy to separate in practice, the effect of some determinants is visible
at both levels. For this reason, the next section structures the discussion of the
determinants of electoral volatility in three separate categories. First, it refers
to the determinants (e.g. electoral system, democratization) that are visible
solely at party system level. Variations are expected to occur across time and
space.
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Second, there are some country level determinants (e.g. the number of
parties, voter turnout) that may have an influence on parties. Finally, there are
determinants (e.g. party organization, party identification) that have an
influence exclusively at the party level. These indicators are the most important
in the context of my research design. If this is the case, why then should I
account for the other factors? The determinants of party system volatility
cannot explain variation in volatility at the party level. These determinants are
constant for all of the components of a party system at a particular moment in
time. For example, political parties within a country develop in the same
democratic environment, face similar economic crises, and fight according to
the same electoral rules. Although such determinants appear irrelevant in the
context of the cross-party analyses pursued in this book, they may be valuable
in the context of longitudinal comparisons. This is the reason for which they are
approached systematically in the following section, with an explanation of both
the theoretical reasons behind the relationship with volatility and the reasons
for which they may or may not represent relevant explanations.
Determinants of Electoral Volatility
Many factors shape a voter’s decision to attach loyalty to a particular political
party. These factors range from the socio-psychological characteristics of the
voter, to institutions and the outcomes they generate. Previous research on
advanced democracies has tended to explain electoral volatility according to
three major categories of factors: cleavage structures, electoral institutions,
and economic performance. The resulting picture is complex and blurred,
characterized more by mixed evidence rather than by clearly identifiable
explanatory patterns. In general, these explanations appear to be context-
dependent, as they are often case (e.g. country or region) or time specific.
The inception of this type of explanation was prompted by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) who argued that parties mobilize voters on the basis of cleavage
structures that have existed for decades in Western European countries. Two
studies that followed sought to add nuance to Lipset and Rokkan’s theory.
First, in their attempt to explain the stability of post-1945 Western European
countries, Rose and Urwin (1970) presented refined evidence of the strong
social connections between voters and parties. Second, Pedersen (1979)
argued that electoral volatility after 1960 – within the same universe of cases
studied by Rose and Urwin – was rooted in the de-alignment of class and party.
All these studies reveal one basic conclusion: longitudinal change in electoral
preferences is a result of the transformations that take place in terms of value
and social structures (Dalton et al. 1984, 451).
Building on these two studies, the research to follow put forth yet more
explanations of electoral volatility. In his analysis of several Western European
countries, Crewe (1985b, 129) argues that ideology plays a role in voting
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behavior. The way in which people vote and change their vote can be explained
in terms of the relationship between their own positions and the perceived
party positions on major divisive issues. This emphasis on the ideological
sources of vote commitment is complemented by Bartolini and Mair’s focus
(1990) on the party system format (i.e. the number of competing parties), the
electoral system, and the political system (i.e. voter turnout). The complexity of
providing an exhaustive explanation of volatility convinced Bartolini and Mair
(1990, 282) to categorize the causes of volatility in five main groups: changes in
the electoral system, the format of the party system, cultural segmentation,
the density of organizations connected to political parties, and short-term
factors.
Lane and Ersson (1999, 198) conceptualize and operationalize this last
“short-term factors” category by breaking it down into party membership,
votes for the left, convergence on the economic right-left scale, and economic
vulnerability due to openness. Using such detailed accounts, their results
explained almost 70% of the aggregate variation in electoral volatility compared
to the less than 50% explained by Bartolini and Mair. Summing up, over the
course of three decades, the number of explanations applying to a limited
number of countries significantly increased. Similarly, the type and nature of
explanations became diversified.
Following the recent research focus on post-Communist countries
(Lewis 2000; Birch 2001; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005), a few additional causes of
electoral volatility can be put forth. These causes are depicted graphically in
Figure 1.1 and include country level (i.e. the electoral system, cleavage
structure, the number of parties, or degree of democratization), party level (i.e.
ideological polarization, incumbency, and party organization), and voter
related (i.e. party identification and turnout) determinants of electoral
volatility. In line with the discussion of the previous section, this figure suggests
a multi-layered approach. It differentiates between determinants of party
system and party level volatility. Previous research has often referred to these
two layers interchangeably. However, the separation of these two layers is
empirically necessary to avoid confusion and to illustrate the effects at the
primary level of occurrence. Accordingly, Figure 1.1 explicitly illustrates what
previous research assumed or implied: some determinants act at the system
level through individual parties.
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Figure 1.1: Determinants of Electoral Volatility for Party System and Individual Party Levels
Electoral system Degree of democratization             Ideological polarization
Number of parties PARTY SYSTEM VOLATILITY Cleavages
       PARTY VOLATILITY Voter turnout
Incumbency Party organization Party Identification
Note: The different styles of arrows7 indicate the various levels at which the effect is observed (regular arrow for party
system and dotted arrows for party).8
7 The arrow structure in the figure is simplified, without connecting all inter-dependent variables, as the goal was to illustrate how determinants
connect with volatility. Thus, clearcut relationships like the one between ideological polarization and the number of parties is not visible in the
graphic.
8 There are instances in which causality goes in the opposite direction than that which is indicated in Figure 1.1. For example, volatility can have an
influence on the level of democratization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). Such relationships are not depicted in the
graphic as they exceed the scope of this study.
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Though not depicted in the figure, these two layers are expected to be
permanently inter-connected: party level volatility influences party system
volatility and vice versa. The electoral volatility of the party system is the sum
of the vote shifts among its components. Conversely, the volatility of individual
parties can be shaped by the environment in which they develop. That is why
some explanations provided by previous studies were primarily identified at the
level of individual parties and afterwards extrapolated to the party system.
The following three sub-sections examine the relationships between
these causes and the electoral volatility at party system and party levels. The
theoretical rationales behind these linkages are complemented by empirical
results that clarify their functioning in CEE. Following these insights, the central
argument of this section is that explanations of volatility at party level are
better than those at the party system level to capture the dynamism of
electorates in general and in CEE in particular. Such an insight allows for cross-
party analysis within the party system in which large variations are observed
(see Chapter 2). Among the party level explanations, the most salient and
underexplored relationship is the one between party organization and electoral
volatility to be thoroughly examined in the second section of this chapter.
Determinants of Party System Volatility
Figure 1.1 includes four factors considered to influence electoral volatility in the
party system exclusively: the electoral system (and changes to it), the
level/degree of democratization, the party system format, and the ideological
polarization of political parties. This sub-section sheds light on the way in which
these factors function and how they apply to the CEE context.
The Electoral System
The components of the electoral system appear to make a difference with
respect to the level of party system volatility. In general, the linkage between
the stability of institutional rules and that of electoral choice is uncertain
(Bielasiak 2002). In particular, there are a few observable linkages. In their
longitudinal study of the Western European countries, Bartolini and Mair (1990,
39) explain volatility in terms of several changes in electoral institutions
(including regulations), franchise enlargement, introduction or abandonment
of compulsory voting, provisions of electoral laws, and the disproportionality of
different electoral systems. In contemporary times, most of these elements
either do not vary (i.e. the franchise) or they are no longer on the political
agenda (i.e. compulsory voting). Consequently, only the proportionality of the
system continues to be a variable that can explain variation in electoral
support. The mechanisms at work here are driven in large part by the formula
employed and the electoral laws at work specifying modifications to the
electoral threshold or district magnitude.
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Electoral setting can, thus, indirectly influence voter choice and the
stability of preferences by way of the “psychological” (complementary to the
“mechanical”9) effects of electoral systems (Duverger 1954). These effects
imply the presence of strategic incentives both for voters (who seek to avoid
wasting their votes) and politicians under different electoral rules (Blais et al.
2001; Gschwend 2007). These incentives influence the number and nature of
political choices that voters confront. For example, high explicit electoral
thresholds discourage political parties from contesting seats (Rae 1971; Lijphart
1994; van Biezen 2003; Bakke and Sitter 2005). In a situation such as this, voters
face limited choices and are encouraged to cast strategic votes for larger
parties. By discouraging the expansion of alternative vote choices, the level of
electoral volatility is likely to be reduced.
Yet none of these theoretical arguments are supported by evidence
from the CEE countries. To start with, the electoral threshold, the average total
electoral volatility calculated at the party system level (Enyedi and Casal Bertoa
2011, 134), indicates that countries with similar thresholds display stark
differences. For example, Romania and Poland have similar thresholds for
political parties (5%) and coalitions (8%)10, but the average volatility scores are
extreme in both cases: 19.1 for Romania and 34.3 for Poland. As these are also
the only countries in CEE that did not use electoral thresholds in their first free
elections – 1990 in Romania and 1991 in Poland – the likelihood that similar
volatility trends and values will be experienced in both cases increases.
Similarly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have the same 5% threshold for
political parties, but the average volatility of the former is situated around 21%,
whereas in Slovakia it is 6% higher.
Moreover, the theoretical expectation according to which countries
with higher thresholds should have lower volatility is not supported by
evidence in CEE. 176 out of the 386 seats in the Hungarian parliament are
allocated on the basis of competition in single member districts. These districts
have very high implicit thresholds. The average volatility of Hungary’s party
system is higher than that of Romania and that of the Czech Republic, both of
which have lower electoral thresholds: 19.1% and 21% respectively. In addition, a
longitudinal investigation provides supplementary evidence. Contrary to the
argument presented above, the electoral volatility of one country is
proportional to the size of the electoral threshold (e.g. when one increases, the
other increases as well). If we look at 2000 when the electoral threshold in
Romania increased to 5%, its party system volatility scored 29.1 compared to
9 They refer to the aggregation of votes into seats under different formulas.
10 The difference between the two electoral systems consists of supplementary thresholds in
Romania, depending on the number of parties within a coaltion: 9% for three parties and 10% for
four or more parties.
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14.3 in 1996 (Sikk 2005, 396). Similarly, the threshold cannot explain variation in
volatility when the threshold remains constant. For example, Hungary has had
a stable set of rules throughout the entire post-communist period, yet its
volatility varied greatly reaching a peak of 31.7 in 1998 and a minimum of 8.4
during the 2006 elections (Enyedi and Casal Bertoa 2011, 134). Summing up, the
electoral threshold appears to have no impact on volatility levels, as there is no
visible empirical pattern in their relationship.
With respect to district magnitude, the theoretical expectation is that
large magnitudes yield an increase in the number of parties and diminish
disproportionality in representation (Rae 1971; Taagepera and Shugart 1989).
High district magnitudes allow a large number of political parties to coexist and
compete, thereby expanding the breadth of choices available to voters and
increasing electoral volatility. However, the results of the study conducted for
CEE countries by Tavits (2005) indicate that magnitude is negatively related to
electoral volatility.
Regarding another component of the electoral system, earlier research
has shown how the electoral formula employed can indirectly influence
volatility. The effect of electoral formula is mediated by proportionality
(Lijphart 1994). Assuming that voters are at least minimally rational, Bartolini
and Mair (1990, 152-155) explain how strong and perceptible constraints on
voting choice lead to increased volatility. The electoral formulas that ensure
high proportionality when transforming votes into seats allow voters to
maintain partisan preferences. Extremely disproportional systems require
voters to employ strategic behavior, as they have to avoid wasting their votes.
As a result, individuals replace their potentially losing preference with the most
acceptable alternative and, as such, a greater degree of vote switching is likely
to be observed. In terms of further constraints on the voter, majority formulas
are more likely to produce higher volatility than proportional representation
(PR) formulas.
The evidence from CEE does not support this linear linkage. The
countries with a partially different formula than the rest (Hungary and Romania
as of 2008) do not display a clear pattern of higher/lower electoral volatility
compared to the rest. Moreover, they do not cluster at various moments in
time. At a general level of abstraction, the Czech Republic resides in between
the two countries, with Slovakia following Hungary closely in terms of volatility.
Moreover, the party system volatility of Romania in 2008 is considerably lower
than it was in 1996 when a PR system was used. In light of this evidence, it
appears that electoral system components are not helpful in explaining party
system volatility in CEE.
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The Degree of Democratization
A second major determinant of party system volatility is the level of
democratization. Its influence is both direct and indirect. Increased
democratization stabilizes patterns of party competition. The direct
consequence of this is the production of a low-volatility system in which the
entry of new competitors is highly unlikely. The continuous existence of parties
combined with low turnover allows voters to get used to the competitors and
start attaching their loyalty accordingly. Given the relatively low vote
fluctuations, the citizens are able to learn what these parties stand for from
one election to the next. Along these lines, a recent study of Third World
countries indicates that volatility is negatively correlated with the degree of
democratization (Lundell 2008).
Furthermore, the level of democratization has an indirect effect on
party system volatility, which is intermediated by the time factor and the
number and polarization of parties. The heterogeneity, division, and
polarization of the political spectrum in the years immediately following regime
change appear to influence the behavior of the political parties. As time passes
by, countries reached democratic performances. There was the expectation to
have more stable party systems in countries that have finished their transition
and reached democratic performance. Tavits (2005) shows that in the first
years of political transition to democracy, the level of electoral volatility was
high in post-Communist countries and that stable support emerged only after a
decade, when democratic performances were reached.
However, inspection of further evidence from the CEE countries reveals
a blurry picture. A close look at the speed of democratization in the former
Warsaw Pact countries until 199911 and their party system volatility does not
reveal any linear cross-country and/or longitudinal relationship. For example,
the Bulgarian party system (in a country that has experienced a slow
democratization process) has a smaller average party system volatility over the
first three democratic elections (20.7) compared to Hungary (28.4) or Poland
(26,4) that were forerunners of democratization in the region. Moreover,
within the same country, there is no coherent pattern to be identified. For
example, party system volatility values in the 1992 and 2000 Romanian
elections were similar; the Czech Republic registered a decrease in party
system volatility as democratization progressed (from 27 in 1996 to 15.8 in
1998); whereas Bulgaria consistently increases from 18.5 in 1991 to 24.6 in 1997.
11 This is the year in which all these countries signed on to initial EU accession negotiations, thus
receiving formal recognition of their democratic achievements.
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Summing up, there is no identifiable linkage between democratization and
party system volatility in the six studied countries.12
The Ideological Polarization
The ideological polarization of parties represents a third factor that can
influence party system volatility. The spatial models of competition illustrate
how both policy positions (Laver and Hunt 1992) and distances between these
positions can have an impact on volatility. The theoretical underpinnings of this
claim draw on Enelow and Hinich’s claim (1984) that voters cast their votes for
the parties closest to them in a political space of salient issues. Regarding the
positioning on the ideological spectrum, it is argued that parties to the left are
better able than those to the right to create local organizations and maintain a
more stable core of voters (Duverger 1954). In the post-Communist space, the
political actors of the left are mainly successor parties that inherited
organizational resources from their predecessors and experienced continuity in
their relationship with the voter (see Chapter 2).
In this particular case, institutional legacies coincide with the party’s
positioning to the left. In general, mapping the political space in CEE is
problematic. It is difficult to specify a set of non-controversial ideological
dimensions upon which to distribute parties (Bohrer II et al. 2000, 1164).
Mapping is impeded in part by the blurry cleavage structure discussed in the
following sub-section. Even if conventional axes are drawn, there is often
substantial disagreement regarding the placement of political parties on them
(Kitschelt 1992; Day et al. 1996; Bugajski 2002; Millard 2004; Vachudova and
Hooghe 2009). Given these methodological and empirical obstacles, policy
positions provide no substantive explanation for volatility in CEE.
Regarding political distance, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 38) test its
influence on the electoral mobility of voters. Bartolini and Mair (1990, 196)
argue that preferences may become stable and behavior can change according
to the choices available. However, they found no evidence to support this
relationship in the Western European democracies. In CEE, where parties lack
clearly defined competition axes and occupy loose ideological positions, such a
relationship is even more difficult to observe. Moreover, Bielasiak (2002)
presents evidence illustrating that even when voters identify party positions on
issue dimensions, there is still little attachment to political parties.
Overall, the application of the three determinants of party system
volatility appears to be problematic in the CEE context. In spite of strong
theoretical reasons to expect explanatory potential and previous evidence in
12 This conclusion does not imply only linear relationships. The matrix of the democratization
levels and electoral volatility reveals a spread of cases that does not allow for the identification
of any pattern,
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support of such explanations in other regions of the world, the relevance of
these three determinants in the post-communist landscape is limited. One
reason for this situation is the specific character of CEE (see Introduction).
There is little if any correspondence between the concepts employed for other
regions and those for CEE (e.g. the format of the party system, ideological
polarization, etc.). A second reason is the absence of variation in some
determinants (e.g. some components of the electoral system, the age of
democratization). A third reason is based on empirical evidence that either
goes against previous results or illustrates a random distribution of values (e.g.
the electoral system). On these grounds, none of the three possible causes
plays a crucial role in explaining variation in volatility between party systems.
With this in mind, let us now turn to the variables influencing both party system
and individual party volatility.
Determinants of both Party System and Party Volatility
Earlier studies have revealed the importance of the number of parties and
cleavages in shaping voter preferences. Consequently, these two variables can
also explain the variation of electoral volatility for individual parties or for a
party system.
The Number of Parties
The number of parties has been identified in previous research as playing a role
in determining party system volatility. High degrees of electoral
competitiveness and party system fragmentation coincide with high electoral
volatility (Coppedge 1998; Mainwaring 1998a; 1998b; Bielasiak 2002). When
voters have many available alternatives among the parties running in elections,
there is a general tendency towards high rates of electoral volatility. Bartolini
and Mair (1990, 136-138) present evidence from Western European countries
showing that the number of parties positively correlates with electoral
volatility. Further arguments explain why volatility is expected to be greater in
those systems in which voters have more choice in elections.
Pedersen (1979; 1983) was the first to reveal a positive relationship
between the number of parties and electoral volatility, yielding two
conclusions: more parties create more volatility and a change in the number of
parties fielding candidates increases volatility. The latter is Janus-faced as it can
mean an increase in the number of parties due to new entrants or a decrease in
this number due to erstwhile competitors dropping out. However, when voters
have fewer choices and they want to change their preference, there are
insufficient choices available to them in order to do so. However, Bartolini and
Mair (1990, 131) show that a change in the number of parties cannot explain
volatility; a change in the number of parties can also be an effect produced by
volatility not only its cause. Consequently, the number of parties remains a
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determinant of volatility. How does it influence volatility? There are two
mechanical effects at work. First, voter choice is characterized by a certain
degree of randomness. An increase in the number of competitors leads to an
increase in random choices. Accordingly, volatility increases as a result of this
randomness (Neff Powell and Tucker 2008, 12-13). Second, related to the policy
positions, Madrid (2005, 2) shows that an increase in the number of parties
decreases the policy distance between competitors (as the political space
becomes more crowded). As a result, voters have more options close to their
policy preferences and can easily shift their votes between elections. Again,
volatility is expected to go up in response.
In spite of these clear theoretical linkages, previous research has
revealed mixed empirical evidence. On one hand, Bartolini and Mair (1990),
Remmer (1991), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Birch (2001), and Birnir (2001)
report a positive correlation between party system fragmentation and
volatility. According to their results, the presence of more competitors
coincides with high volatility. On the other hand, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007)
and Neff Powell and Tucker (2008) find little or no effect of the number of
competitors on electoral volatility. In addition to these inconsistent results,
there are a few empirical problems. First, the number of parties can explain
volatility at the party system level only. This measurement captures the cross-
country differences, but fails to account for differences at the party level within
the same party system. For example, the variable cannot explain why parties
from a certain country have different levels of electoral volatility in the same
election when the number of competitors is the same. Second, the evidence
from CEE reveals one further empirical problem. Following the theory, fewer
parties should lead to a decrease in volatility. There is a relatively constant
decrease in the number of parliamentary parties in CEE elections (see Table 1 in
the Introduction), but electoral volatility is characterized by ups and downs
(see Chapter 2). Given these issues, the number of parties does not appear to
be a useful indicator of volatility in the CEE countries.
The Cleavages
The second variable relating both to party system and party level volatility is
the cleavage structure. Previous research has shown how social cleavages
stabilize electoral politics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Horowitz 1985; Bartolini and
Mair 1990). Although considered thus far exclusively in relation to the party
system, the cleavage structure relates to the social make-up of support
accruing to individual parties, not to the system. The effects of social cleavages
at the system level are registered through individual parties (Smith 1989, 351)
and are usually reflected in the ideological alignment of parties on the political
spectrum, the political identification of voters with specific parties, and the
number of political parties within the system. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue
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that societal cleavages provide anchors that stabilize mass preferences, thus
reducing volatility. The basic mechanism at work is that parties are deeply
rooted in class, religious, and other types of generative cleavages that are
institutionalized through party competition and the development of mass
parties. Once on the political agenda (i.e. by generating political conflict),
cleavages provide bases of support for parties (Dalton 1988) and structure
party competition and partisanship, allowing parties to target particular groups
with their messages (Katz 1990; Birnir 2006). Accordingly, voting is primarily an
expression of social position, values, and interests formed along cleavage lines
(Tavits 2005, 287). The presence of cleavages can solidify the ties between
parties and the electorate and can increase the predictability of political
outcomes (Lijphart et al. 1993). Well-organized social cleavages close the
electoral market (Bartolini and Mair 1990) and stabilize the preferences of the
electorate, decreasing volatility. The absence of social cleavages leads to
swings and volatility associated with personality politics and authoritarian
populism (Evans and Whitfield 1993).
Specifically, the role of cleavages in determining voter preference is
captured through electoral or partisan dealignment, referring to the eroding
ties between parties and voters (Dalton 2000). This process had a variety of
causes ranging from voters’ social modernization (Franklin et al. 1992) and
cognitive mobilization (Nie et al. 1976; Dalton 1984) to challenges faced by
political parties in fulfilling their traditional functions (Flanagan and Dalton
1984; Lawson and Merkl 1988; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). In CEE, there is no
prior alignment and political parties still search for mechanisms by which to
strengthen their bonds with the electorate. The cleavage lines common to
established democracies in the West can hardly be identified in CEE. The
communist regimes leveled out major social differentiation with their
egalitarian ideology and policies (van Biezen 2003, 35-36). For example,
communist economic policies implied public property, mass education, and lack
of wealth discrepancies, thereby inhibiting the formation of social classes
(Evans and Whitefield 1993; von Beyme 1996; Elster et al. 1998).
Although social cleavages are absent in CEE, legacies of the past can be
identified in contemporary societies in the form of divisions. Schattschneider
(1960) explains that not all social differentiation is organized into politics. A
division becomes a cleavage only when it structures people’s identities and
social actions (Gallagher et al. 1992). The absence of major cleavage lines does
not imply the homogeneity of the CEE societies or the lack of divisions.13 On the
contrary, there are a few obvious divisions that communism could not level out
13 Whitefield (2002) provides a list of social divisions for 12 East European democracies upon
which voters can align. However, these divisions did not become cleavages as neither were
parties formed along these lines nor were votes cast according to them.
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(Tucker 2002) and may have even reinforced. One such example is the divide
between the winners vs. losers of transition. The industrialization of some
countries was equivalent to urbanization, in which massive movement of
people from rural to urban areas was visible. Rural areas relied mainly on
agriculture and the dissolution of collective farms created large-scale
unemployment. During the transition to a market economy, state subsidies for
agriculture were dramatically reduced, transforming the rural population into
the losers of transition.
Based on these discrepancies between the winners and losers of
transition, which correspond to various geographical areas, a few studies
(Whitefield 2002; Tworzecki 2003) explain its impact on post-communist
electoral behavior. If alignment is made on these cleavage lines, we would
expect more agrarian parties to win seats and maintain rather stable electoral
support. Only three parties belonging to this category have enjoyed a rather
continuous presence on the political scene of their country (PSL in Poland,
PNTCD in Romania, and FKGP in Hungary), the last two parties were not able to
obtain seats in parliament starting 2000 and 2002 respectively.
Two other divisions had the potential to become cleavages in CEE:
religion and ethnicity. Posner (2005) shows how cleavages can occur when
circumstances change. The isolation of the church in most communist regimes
could create a division within society between its supporters and opponents.
As a result, we can expect societal divisions to exist in the post-communist
period. However, with the exception of Poland, the religious cleavage is not
observable in other countries. This outcome was also due to the fact that the
church was represented only by few parties during democratization (Crawford
1996; Wittenberg 2006).
The issue of ethnicity is more nuanced. In the aftermath of regime
change, one major challenge for many CEE countries was the accommodation
of ethnic minorities and their re-emerging identities. During communism,
nurturing ethnic identities was discouraged. The CEE nations were kept
together by a common identity, imposed on them by the USSR – the politics of
”one state, one nation, one population” (Linz and Stepan 1996). Three CEE
countries under scrutiny have significant minorities that reside in their
territories: the Hungarians in Romania and in Slovakia and the Turks in
Bulgaria.14 Previous research has viewed ethnic identity as a function of
contextual factors and political strategies adopted by the group leaders
(Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1998; Chandra 2004). The early years of transition set the
stage for such identities to reemerge. First, there were some clashes between
majority and minority populations in Bulgaria (in the two regions where the
14 In the Czech Republic there is a secessionist movement belonging to the Moravians. However,
they are not a distinct ethnic group, but rather have a strong regional identity.
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Turks represent the majority of the population), Romania (in mixed towns in
Transylvania), and Slovakia (on the border with Hungary).
Second, debates about the first post-Communist constitutions were
dominated by ethnic issues in these three countries. Restrictive measures were
included in the laws mostly consisting of the non-recognition of collective
rights. Third, these ethnic disputes were politicized by the formation of parties
along ethnic lines: Hungarians in Romania mobilized in 1989 and formed the
UDMR, the Turks in Bulgaria founded the DPS in January 1990, while in Slovakia
(then part of Czechoslovakia) several Hungarian parties were also formed in
1990 (Gherghina and Jiglau 2011). Fourth, as a response, a few nationalist
parties emerged: the PRM and the PUNR in Romania or the SNS in Slovakia. For
example, the PUNR was formed in 1990 as the successor of the Transylvanian
nationalist movement (Gallagher 1997, 29-31) perceiving its major role as a reply
given to the political structures representing Hungarians in Transylvania (Soare
2010).
Accordingly, it seemed that an ethnic cleavage would develop in CEE
and was expected to play an important role in post-communist politics (Lewis
2000, 143). Kitschelt (1992, 20) expected the ethnic dimension of collective
political identification (including religious and linguistic differences) to be one
with particular features. The first elections provided partial empirical support
for these expectations. As a response to the ethnic mobilization described
above, many parties played the nationalist card. For example, the successor
communist parties in Bulgaria (BSP) and Romania (PSD) adopted an anti-ethnic
minority discourse as an electoral strategy. However, the ethnic issue remained
minimally salient throughout the post-communist period. It did not create a
sharp societal division on which voters could align. It was mainly visible in the
electoral support provided to ethnic parties. There is a process of stable ethnic
voting amongst the minorities that is mainly fueled by ethnic socialization
through information shortcuts. The most important source of political learning
for ethnic voters is the members and leaders of their own ethnic group (Birnir
2007). Ethnic parties rely on these cues and this is the main reason for which
the volatility of these parties is usually reduced.
This process did not lead to the creation of ethnic cleavages within
societies, but only encapsulated voting preferences of ethnic minorities. The
other side of this division is also no longer present in CEE: voters are no longer
mobilized by anti-ethnic discourse. Although radical right or nationalist parties
have not ceased to exist, their discourse changed as a result of the adaptation
function. The initial anti-minority focus – characterized by xenophobic
messages and appeals to violence – and defense of the country against
external interference gradually lost the ethnic component and now targets
contemporary issues such as social protection, migration, and the EU.
Contemporary CEE radical right parties are preoccupied by different issues than
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they were in the beginning of the transition period. Their discourse diversified
to appeal to a broader electorate. Those parties that did not adapt also failed
to enter parliament, for example the PUNR in Romania or the Justice and Life
Party (MIEP) in Hungary. This adaptation function and change of discourse lead
to the occurrence of nationalist parties long-time after the ethnic parties were
constituted (e.g. Ataka was formed in Bulgaria in 2005) or to the emergence of
these type of parties in countries with a very small percentage of ethnic
minorities (e.g. Jobbik in Hungary). These late appearances on the political
scene are accompanied by populist messages oriented not only against ethnic
groups, but also against other political parties. All this empirical evidence
suggests that ethnicity did not represent a major issue within the CEE societies.
Next to these institutional features, there is one behavioral aspect:
electoral participation (Franklin 2004). Although changes in the size of the
electorate were associated with party system electoral volatility, the basic
mechanism exists at the party level. When turnout decreases and citizens who
vote maintain their preferences between elections, the support for one party
increases. Although the absolute number of its voters remains the same, its
vote share increases. If one party has the same number of voters in consecutive
elections, the oscillations of turnout lead to different calculations of the
percentage of total vote share. As a result of this mechanism, it is theoretically
possible to experience volatility without losing or gaining supporters.
Empirically, earlier studies point out that changes in the size of the electorate
are positively associated with volatility in Western European (Bartolini and Mair
1990) and Latin American countries (Madrid 2005). In a departure from these
theoretical and empirical reasons, the turnout variable can explain volatility. As
no previous study has tested its impact in CEE, I use it as a control variable in
the empirical model I develop at the end of this chapter.
Summing up, the two variables that can explain party system and
individual party level volatility are generally problematic in the CEE context.
Most of the problems with these variables are empirical in nature. The number
of parties provides mixed evidence in the post-communist region and has
problems explaining longitudinal development of volatility. With the exception
of an ethnic division that has the potential to mobilize voters of the few ethnic
parties from CEE (see Chapter 2), cleavage structures are almost non-existent
in CEE societies. Let us move on to the most particular level of explanation: the
factors that can explain party level volatility.
Determinants of Party Level Volatility
The three variables that can influence party level volatility are government
incumbency, party identification, and party organization. One of them, the
party identification, is an individual level variable, whereas the other two are
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party related. Accordingly, they explain the variations in electoral support from
various perspectives.
Government Incumbency
First, elections often serve as visible milestones that reflect voters’ tendency to
hold incumbents responsible for their performance. Overall, there is demand
for political change whenever significant downturns occur between elections.
In CEE, citizens often evaluate government performance strictly in economic
terms. When asked in an international survey about the most salient issue in
the country, more than 80% of respondents indicated economy (ESS 2003).
Using the same data, the correlation between evaluation of government
activity and the economic situation in the country is above 0.6 – with modal
values of 0.8 – in the CEE countries, all statistically significant (Gherghina 2011).
Political contexts are sometimes relevant in the assignment of credit
and blame to incumbents (Anderson 2000) especially in local elections (Boyne
et al. 2009). However, in CEE economic evaluations appear to be empirical
proxies for government performance especially in the first post-communist
decade (Fidrmuc 2000). A recent cross-national empirical study focusing on the
six countries analyzed in this book shows that government performance is one
key determinant of voter preference for incumbent political parties (Gherghina
2011). Moreover, Roper (2003) has shown that voters in Romania were
repeatedly disappointed with incumbent governments and based their votes
on these attitudes.
The economic variable appears to play such an important role that even
partisans can turn away from their party in times of poor economic
performance (Kinder and Kiewit 1981). Incumbent parties are directly affected
by retrospective evaluations that are transformed into punishment or reward-
based behavior on the part of voters (Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981; Bellucci 1984;
Ferejohn 1986; Lewis-Beck 1988; Powell and Whitten 1993; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000; Freire and Lobo 2005; Anderson 2007). In spite of their lower
level of experience in elections, these mechanisms are also at work in the new
democratic post-communist countries. Earlier studies (Fidrmuc 2000; Jackson
et al. 2005; Tucker 2006) have indicated an economic effect of the vote for
particular types of parties (e.g. reformists or successor parties). In short, with
these attitudes at work, fluctuations in economic conditions increase electoral
volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005). These theoretical and
empirical factors indicate that government incumbency is a potential source of
volatility at the party level. Accordingly, this book’s empirical analysis includes it
among the control variables.
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Party Identification
If people were to vote based purely on their perception of the economy,
approximately half of the voters would regularly change their electoral
preferences (Wlezien et al. 1997). As that is not the case even in the unstable
CEE (see the levels of volatility in Chapter 2), other underlying factors must
affect volatility. A second variable that may explain volatility is an attitudinal
feature identifiable at the individual level: party identification. Party
identification has received considerable attention as determinant of vote
choice (Belknap and Campbell 1952; Miller 1952; Campbell et al. 1954; 1960;
Burdick and Brodbeck 1959; Converse 1962).
Two possible interpretations of the concept are available. First, party
identification is seen as an enduring psychological affinity between the
individual and the party (Campbell et al. 1960). Second, party identification is
considered to be specific to short-term policy preferences and evaluations
influencing vote choice (Miller and Shanks 1996). From this perspective, it is not
rigid and is often modified depending on societal conditions (Lawson 1980) or
political contexts (Fiorina 1981, 102). Irrespective of the manner in which it is
conceptualized, the logical mechanism through which party identification
represents an important predictor of voting behavior is the same: individuals
who identify with a party tend to support it in elections.
In CEE, electorates are open and volatile and are rarely characterized by
party identification (Rose and Mishler 1998). Frequent vote shifts suggest that
the electorate identifies only loosely with established parties and indicate the
availability of many voters for new electoral alternatives. CEE represents a case
that is illustrative of these situations. Having emerged in an environment
characterized by strong anti-party feelings, post-communist parties faced an
initial legitimacy problem that made the establishment of stable psychological
attachments among voters difficult. The non-crystallization of identities
prevented the emergence of a clear pattern of alignment (Mair 1997, 182).
Weak societal roots strengthened the reticence of voters to attach long-time
loyalty to one political competitor. The picture of low party loyalty is complete
if we add the absence of stable constituencies that may enact strong political
identities among voters (van Biezen 2003, 37) and the presence of several small
parties with no stable norms and conventions in the pattern of competition
(Mair 1997). The latter renders the electoral environment uncertain. These are
all reasons for which we should not expect high levels of party identification.
Party Organization
In addition to incumbency and party identification, party organization is
another variable that can explain electoral volatility at the party level. The
primary linkage between organization and volatility resides in the
communication established between parties and voters. Why do parties
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connect to citizens? The mechanism is straightforward: the exchange of voter
mobilization for policy responsiveness (Poguntke 2002, 44-46). For the most
part, parties connect with voters using two types of linkages, those at the elite
level and those at the organizational level. Elite communication implies a
linkage with voters through direct communication initiated by party leaders or
visible party elites (i.e. MPs, ministers, mayors). The second type of
communication uses the party organization as an intermediary (including party
members) to establish the connection. In this respect, the party organization
can complement leaders’ communication with the electorate in providing
incentives to the voters to stabilize their preferences. The party organization
plays two roles: 1) it acts as an effective communication channel through which
the party messages reach voters; and 2) it mobilizes voters and enhances their
loyalty.
There are three major differences between parties’ direct and
organizational styles of communicating with the electorate. First, the
complexity, coverage, and length of the process differ. Direct communication is
relatively simple and reaches a large audience in a short period of time.
Organizational communication requires more resources and time. Its coverage,
however, can be wider than that of direct communication. More importantly,
through its personal approach it enhances long-term bonds between voters
and parties. Second, while organizational communication can employ direct
communication; the reciprocal is not possible. For example, not only party
leaders use TV outlets, leaders of local branches or prominent members can do
the same. Third, direct communication is almost a constant within the party
system, whereas organizational communication differs greatly given the
different development of party organizations.
Consequently, direct communication cannot explain volatility in CEE.
Given the institutional roots of these parties (see Introduction), the necessity
to compete before developing appropriate organizations, and their emergence
in the era of media politics, post-communist political parties were likely to rely
more on direct communication of the elites in public office with the voters (van
Biezen 2000, 397). However, most parties have access to media and, thus, can
establish direct contact with the electorate, but their volatility varies. At the
same time, direct communication cannot explain the electoral success of new
parties. 15 Similarly, it is quite difficult to explain why parliamentary parties once
highly successful fail to reach the legislature in subsequent elections in these
terms.
15 These arguments refer to the general process of communication. One particular variable that
may explain electoral volatility is the communication strategy of political parties in elections. This
variable was not considered for practical reasons: the communication strategies are not available
for most elections (especially in the 90s) and such information is usually controlled by campaign
specialists or high profile party elites in office at election times.
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On the other hand, organizational communication can explain volatility.
At a general level, the organization of parties, similar to electoral volatility (see
Chapter 2), varies greatly. The existence of strong organizations in CEE is quite
unlikely. Given the elite-driven, top-down formation of most parties, their weak
grounding in society, low party membership, financial dependence on the
state, and dominance of the party in central and public office over the party on
the ground (Kopecky 1995; Lewis 2000; Szczerbiak 2001a; van Biezen 2003;
Millard 2004; Enyedi 2006), the organizational structures of the parties are
underdeveloped. In spite of these general labels – most of them applied after
comparison with Western European reference points – there is visible variation
in the organization of post-communist political parties (see Chapters 3 and 4).
In particular, party organizations may be fundamental for electoral stability in
the long run. In spite of the fact that a strong electoral performance could be
achieved without building organizations (van Biezen 2000, 396), the survival of
political parties depends on their societal connections.
This can best be achieved through party organization, as this is the
most stable component of a political party. In the context of the volatile and
uncertain CEE electorate, with floating elites, and a context of competition in
which the number of actors often changes (Mair 1997), parties with strong
organizations have an advantage over newcomers; established parties display
solid bases on which they can attract voters. Changes at the organizational
level (e.g. leaders’ migration, decision-making layers, mergers and splits) are
often visible and reflected in elections and voters may support or oppose these
changes. Summing up, party organizations deliver coherent messages to the
voters, ensure a continuous and stable presence in the political arena,
undertake homogenous actions, and enhance long-term perspectives for
representation. How do they do this? A few mechanisms by which this takes
place are explored in the following section.
The Party Organization and Electoral Volatility: Relevance, Components, and
Linkages
Organizational aspects represent the core of political parties (Panebianco 1988,
3). Their features are comparable and thus allow for cross-country and
longitudinal comparative research (Janda 1980; Katz and Mair 1994). Most
functions performed by parties take place at the organization level (Dalton
1996). The importance of party organization is emphasized by Huntington
(1968, 461): “organization is the road to political power, but is also the
foundation of political stability (…). The vacuum of power and authority which
exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by
charismatic leadership or military force. But it can be filled permanently only by
political organization”. Along the same lines, Duverger (1954, 4) claims that
party organization “constitutes the general setting for the activity of members,
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the selection of leaders, and decides their powers. It often explains the
strength and efficiency of certain parties, the weakness and inefficiency of
others”.
The organization provides identity and substance to the party. Moreover,
it ensures the predictability and continuity of political and social processes
(Harmel and Janda 1982, 42). Party organizations eliminate uncertain and
episodic policies and politics by coordinating individual actions within a fixed
framework that enhances group responsibility. The organizational dimension
involves effort mobilization and coordination of party members to promote
party strategies and policies (Harmel and Janda 1982, 43). Moreover, party
organizations separate members (partisans) from voters, providing the former
with an internally derived identity that allows them to perceive themselves
within the party framework (Waller 1996, 24).
The Party Organization and Its Components
The party organization is a broad concept used to denominate a conglomerate
of internal structures and procedures such as party units, membership,
allocation of resources (e.g. power, finances), decision-making, elite behavior
(e.g. unity, leadership continuity), and organizational autonomy (Michels 1911;
Schattschneider 1942; Duverger 1954; Neumann 1956; Kircheimer 1966; Epstein
1967; Harmel and Janda 1982; 1994; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1992; 1994;
1995; Kitschelt 1995; Kopecky 1995; van Biezen 2000; Gunther and Diamond
2001; 2003; Ishiyama 2001; Randall and Svasand 2002; Wolinetz 2002; Krouwel
2006).
A century ago, the party organizations in Western European democracies
developed from the necessity to mobilize and encapsulate voters after the
suffrage extension. Initially, they were created to provide a coherent image of
the party and disciplined pursuit of its goals (Weber 1948). Over the following
decades, the differences between party organizations rested mainly on two
dichotomies between: 1) the quality and quantity of party decision-makers and
supporters (Michels 1911; Duverger 1954; Neumann 1956; Katz and Mair 1995)
and 2) loosely and well-articulated structures on the ground (e.g. territorial
coverage and strength of the party through local branches). The first ideal
types of parties were sketched along these features, with various combinations
leading to different labels. For example, the cadre party involved a small
amount of decision-makers and members, and had poorly articulated structure.
The mass party was characterized by broader decision-making process,
intensive membership, and territorially developed branches.
Although each party type appeared as a reaction to previously existing
types (Katz and Mair 1995) and was focused on change (van Biezen 2003), the
scholarly debate around these types brings to the fore essential components of
the party organization. New party types lay out specific dimensions of the
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organization. Panebianco’s (1988) mass-bureaucratic and electoral-professional
types explicitly add two components of organization: the financing and the
importance of the central elite in the internal life of a party. The mass-
bureaucratic model – built on Duverger’s (1954) mass party and Neumann’s
(1956) party of mass integration – considers the interest groups as main
sources of party funding and emphasizes the central role of a representative
bureaucracy. The electoral-professional party relies on organized interests or
government subsidies for funding, whereas the prominent role in the party
belongs to elected representatives and professionals.
The emphasis on the role of representatives within the party indicates
the existence of specific structures. The debates around various types of
parties – cadre, mass or cartel – reveal two ways of structuring the
organization: hierarchy vs. stratarchy. On the one hand, Michels (1911)
portrayed political parties as monolithic organizations in which the power is
located in a single place – in the hands of a strong oligarchy. In light of these
features, the party is a hierarchical organization in which a few people decide
what happens in the party. On the other hand, the idea that power in a political
party cannot be located in a single place (Carty 2004) generated the model of
stratarchical organization. According to this, the party organization includes a
few units enjoying various degrees of autonomy in their particular activities.
However, these are interdependent: local units mobilize the voters and recruit
members (and candidates), whereas the central units ensure the general
integration of the organization and formulate the party policy (Eldersveld 1964;
Katz and Mair 1995).16
As Bolleyer (2011) points out, even the stratarchical structures
presuppose some hierarchy in the distribution of power and resources
between party units. In their activities, central elites are likely to channel the
internal organization. For example, they set the rules according to which the
local branches undertake their activities and are expected to invest resources in
local infrastructures (Carty 2004). Panebianco (1988) argues that a suitable
indicator for party organization is the degree of development of its central
organization. This distribution of power within the party organization is labeled
centralization and refers to the extent to which the national level of party
organization controls the regional and local levels in conducting politics and
enforces its decisions on subnational organs (Harmel and Janda 1982, 59-60). A
few dimensions were used to reflect party centralization: control over
communication, administration of discipline, selection of legislative candidates,
16 Bolleyer (2011) mentions the federation as a type of structure characterizing the new parties in
Western Europe. Such a structure emphasizes the role of territorial units with respect to the
locus of power, basic organizational principle, logic of representation, and logic of competence
distribution across levels.
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allocation of funds, selection of national party leader, formulation of party
policy, and nationalization of structure (Janda 1980; Harmel and Janda 1982,
60).
However, a clear division of power between party units and their
subsequent autonomy does not reflect the complexity of the organization. It is
also important how these subunits interact and their degree of
interdependence – the feature of systemness in Panebianco’s words (1988). To
this end, the three “faces” of parties proposed by Katz and Mair (1990; 1993)
fulfill a double task: better capture the power divisions and connections
between party subunits and clearly outline features of every subunit. The party
in public office includes the representatives of the party in legislative or
government, the party in central office is the national leadership of the party,
and the party on the ground refers to the territorial units. The relations
between these three layers took different forms focusing especially on the
relative size of membership, officeholders, and activists from the central office
(Koole 1994; Ignazi 1996).
One illustrative example for the interactions of the three faces is the
issue of party homogeneity and the means to achieve it. For the party in public
office homogeneity means party unity and loyalty of the legislators and
government officials (i.e. the extent to which they behave similarly and follow
the party line). The national leadership of the party is usually responsible to
achieve such ends and employs a variety of means: (candidate) selection
procedures disciplining mechanisms, pressures, and socialization (Katz 2001;
Davidson-Schmich 2008; Kam 2009; Andeweg and Thomassen 2010). However,
the party on the ground can become part of the decision making process. For
example, the candidates for legislative elections can be selected – partially or
totally – through primaries involving the party members and/or sympathizers.
In this case, the effect on the party unity is often mediated. A low cohesion of
the party on the ground does not necessarily lead to a heterogeneous behavior
of the party in public office (Bolleyer 2009). The control mechanisms of the
party in central office can alter the direct effect.
The structure of organizations and the control mechanisms illustrate
the role played by elites in the internal life of the party. Connected to their
decision-making freedom, general activities, and relationships with the
members, the leadership continuity is a relevant component of party
organization. Such a claim is even more relevant in the context of accumulated
influence gained by contemporary party leaders in the legislature, electorate,
and own organizations (Bean and Mughan 1989; Wattenberg 1991; Mughan
1993; 2000; Farrell 1996; Davis 1998; Scarrow et al. 2000). Moreover, the elites
in central and public office are the visible representatives of the party. Their
political professionalization and behavior can ensure continuity, coherence,
and homogeneity to the organization.
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The notion of party organization is not limited solely to internal
mechanisms. The connections established by the party with other
organizations are also relevant. These connections usually target the financial
and electoral benefits. The issue of party funding was briefly mentioned in a
previous subsection and will be approached in detail in another subsection. The
social networks refer to the relationships established by the party organization
with non-political institutions in an attempt to mobilize and channel the votes
of the population. Putnam (1993) illustrates the increased role played by local
associations in political participation in Italy. Political parties that are able to
attract the loyalty of such local organizations have more opportunities to reach
out to voters and can consolidate their electoral position more easily.
Summing up, the party organizations include a multitude of components
important for the internal life of the party: the organizational units and the
internal decision-making procedures, the party elite, the membership
organization, and the connections established with other organizations (e.g.
trade unions, the church). Most of these elements are essential to illustrate the
various ways in which party organization is linked with the electoral volatility.
Figure 1.2 depicts the major components of party organization and their
hypothesized or empirically tested impact on electoral volatility. Two
provisions are necessary. First, the figure includes only those elements that can
be linked theoretically with electoral volatility. There are more components of
party organization (e.g. nationalization of party structure, party unity etc.)
without theoretical arguments connecting them with volatility. Along the same
lines, some components are very specific. For example, the candidate selection
is part of the decision-making process; only this particular aspect is included in
the figure due to its potential impact on electoral volatility. Second, the figure
is schematic and focuses on the relationships between the components of
party organizations and electoral volatility. Thus, it ignores the connections and
interactions between the components of party organizations. For example,
there is expected to be a general linkage between the type of organization and
the social networks established by parties. Moreover, in the CEE context, as it
will become clear from Chapter 4, there is an empirical linkage between the
type of organization and membership.
In spite of their theoretical relevance, earlier studies or specific examples
indicate the absence of empirical evidence to support the relationship between
some components and the electoral volatility. The variables at the bottom of
Figure 1.2 (bold font) are the ones for which hypotheses are formulated. Age is
the only feature of party organization that was not yet discussed and party
funding is the only variable for which the relationship with volatility is bi-
directional. The logic behind all these linkages and their empirical relevance for
CEE are thoroughly discussed in the following subsections.
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Figure 1.2: The Components of Party Organization and their Influence on Electoral Volatility
   Type of Organization Party Age Social Network
Leadership Changes Electoral Volatility Party Funding
Candidate Selection Party Membership MP Renomination
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The Type of Organization
In CEE, the type of party organization can explain electoral volatility in terms of
differentiated social roots. Three different types of parties were observable at
the beginning of transition (Kopecky 2001, 74–75): continuous, revived (with
existence before communism and reemerged after this regime fell), and newly
emerged parties. Kostelecky (2002) nuanced this typology by adding a new
type of party to the newly emerged category and by distinguishing between
two types in the continuous category. Regarding his additional type, the parties
originating out of dissident movements represent a special category. This new
type is relevant in terms of the connections these parties are able to establish
with voters. Although new, the social roots of these parties are likely to be
stronger compared to those of newly emerged parties, as they opposed the
previous regime and thus aggregated particular interests.
A further nuance is the division between the satellite and successor
parties to better identify the parties associated with the previous regime. The
main difference between the two is that successor parties inherited the
structure and organization of the communist parties, whereas the satellite
parties were somewhat weaker developed during communism and their
legacies were less rich in organizational terms. Moreover, given these features,
the visibility of successor parties is likely to be higher than that of satellites. The
evolution and electoral performance of these parties in the post-communist
period were consistent with this expectation: unlike successors, very few
satellite parties managed to survive and play relevant roles in politics.
There are theoretical reasons to expect the social rootedness to be
higher for successors, satellites, and parties with origins in dissident
movements than for the revived and newly emerged parties. The revived
parties enjoyed strong electoral and governing performance in the inter-war
period; an alternative label for these parties was “historical parties”. As they
opposed communism – not at official or formal levels, as their elites were often
sent to exile – they were likely to have some social support. However,
memories of their existence were quite weak and most of their supporters
were very old at the moment of their revival. The newly emerged parties have
no electoral experience, often born on the eve of elections, with no
appropriate organization and no social roots.
Moreover, political parties with an organizational heritage are better
represented at the local level than newly emerged parties that have not had
time to develop an extensive web of branches. This was reflected mostly by
successor parties (Ishiyama 1999). For example, in the Czech Republic the
KSCM and KDU-CSL cover the territory of their country extensively compared
to the newer and more electorally successful ODS and CSSD (van Biezen 2003,
140; Kopecky 2007, 135). Similarly, the Romanian PSD and PDL have twice as
many local organizations as the PNL (a revived party) and the PRM (a newly
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emerged political actor). With these premises as starting point, successor
parties are expected to have low electoral volatility, whereas newly emerged
parties are expected to exhibit high electoral volatility. An empirical analysis
reveals that these differences are relevant only for the first two elections, but
with the logic reversed. The evidence shows that newly emerged parties were
less volatile than successor or satellite parties as voters remembered the past
and punished existing parties for past performance (Gherghina 2008). These
differences vanish as time passes and cannot explain variation in electoral
support.
Party Age
Party age has been widely considered to be an important indicator for the
effectiveness of organizations (Huntington 1968; Janda 1980; Roberts and
Wibbels 1999) with effective institutions seen as slow growing. In the life cycle
of an organization, there are three phases: genesis, institutionalization, and
maturity (Panebianco 1988, 19). The older the party is, the more opportunities it
has to reach institutionalization and maturity. Each round of participation in
elections makes the party more familiar to voters and creates the opportunities
for a regular exchange of votes for policies. Brand new political organizations,
emerging from scratch or after a party split, are likely to be more volatile in
elections.
It is difficult for parties in the genesis phase to generate stable electoral
loyalties as they first must identify and address niches in the political spectrum,
acquire experience and visibility, and initiate contact with voters. Following this
logic, older parties are likely to be less volatile. In CEE, the type of organization
influenced the age: continuous parties enjoy uninterrupted existence for many
decades, revived parties have ceased to exist for almost half a century, and
newly emerged parties. As the type of organization does not systematically
explain electoral volatility, there are low expectations regarding the
explanatory potential of age. Indeed, Gherghina (2008) presents empirical
evidence showing that party age does not explain electoral volatility at the
party level.
The Social Networks
The CEE parties do not have stable connections with local associations. The
linkages between Christian-Democratic parties and the Church, for example,
are quite loose. In fact, the role of such parties in CEE politics is minimal: in
some countries they have a limited presence in parliament, whereas in others
they failed to gain parliamentary seats at all for a period of time. In some cases,
there are isolated agreements with trade unions prior elections, but they are
not durable, nor are they consistent over time.
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The trade unions facilitate access to the voters they mobilize on a
pragmatic basis. The unions negotiate agreements with political parties willing
to do so and simply pick the best offer. For example, in the two most recent
legislative elections in Romania, the biggest trade union cooperated with the
social-democrats during one election and with their opponents, the liberal-
democrats, in the next. Summing up, there are isolated connections between
some CEE political parties and other organizations; most examples are limited
to the successor parties (e.g. MSZP in Hungary or PSD in Romania) or to
political formation with short life (e.g. Solidarity in Poland or CDR in Romania).
Thus, the social network factor has weak explanatory potential regarding the
shifts in electoral support.
Party Funding
There are two ways in which party funding can influence the electoral volatility.
The mechanism at work in both is similar and relates to voter perception of
parties. First, the financial dependence of political parties on private donors
may cast doubts on the legitimacy of their proposed policies. Instead of
pursuing legislation for the public, parties can reward major private
contributors by proposing and adopting legislation to their benefit.
Accordingly, corrupt or clientelistic allegiances may exist which can negatively
affect parties’ image in the eyes of citizens. Second, public funding requires
detailed justification. Voters are aware that their money is used to achieve
democratic goals (Szczerbiak 2001d; Enyedi 2006c; van Biezen and Kopecky
2007). However, there are instances in which extensive campaign spending
surpasses the amounts received from the state and parties are unable to (or
poorly) justify their revenue. As a result, corruption scandals often influence
the result of elections and represent a salient issue in most CEE countries as
they also positioned low on Corruption Perception Index (Transparency
International).
The relationship between funding and volatility is not unidirectional.
This is especially the case with state funding. State revenues are allocated on
the basis of electoral success and parties have a critical incentive to maximize
or at least stabilize their vote share. State funding can either promote electoral
approaches based on short-term linkages with the electorate (van Biezen 2003,
40) or the development of permanent links with voters. Once a party achieves
a strong electoral performance, its incentive to maintain this level of popular
support is high. In other words, parties that are able to achieve a level of
electoral support that permits them to receive state subsidies have a financial
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incentive to aim for low volatility. Moreover, state funding legislation lacks
great variation in CEE.17
All analyzed countries provide extensive state subsidies18 (Ikstens et al.
2002; van Biezen 2003; Roper 2007; Smilov 2007; Walecki 2007; Lewis 2008;
Gherghina et al. 2011) to political parties, creating almost full financial
dependence. This is confirmed by figures from the mid-1990s with the
exception of communist successors. Political parties in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland could not rely on receiving more than 10% of their income
from members (Lewis 2008, 184). With membership fees and small donations
as only a very small proportion of parties’ income, the remaining majority of the
funding comes from the state. Given the theoretical circularity of the linkage
between funding and volatility and the empirical lack of variation, party funding
cannot represent a potential explanation for electoral volatility in these six
countries.
As these four variables fail to account for variation in electoral volatility,
the following three sections discuss the way in which the remaining three
components of party organization can influence volatility. Accordingly, three
hypotheses are formulated. Unlike some of the aforementioned variables,
candidate selection, membership organization, and MP re-nomination exhibit a
high level of variation across time, countries, and parties. At the same time,
none of these variables has been explored thus far; therefore there are no
empirical tests to indicate their explanatory power.
The Centralization of Candidate Selection
Candidate selection is one of the central functions of political parties. The
importance of this process had already been acknowledged as early as the first
decades of the previous century when Schattschneider (1942, 101) explained,
"he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party". Ranney (1981)
follows this argument and argues that candidate selection ensures control over
party activities. At the same time, candidate selection distinguishes parties
from other organizations (Sartori 1976), sheds light on the type of policies to be
pursued (Crotty 1968; Cross 2008), and reflects the internal democracy of the
parties (Gallagher and March 1988). There is a rich body of literature broaching
17 Instead, what differs is the extent to which parties operating under similar finance regimes
differ in terms of their financial resources. This variation is visible across parties and also over
time for the same political party. Consequently, the impact of financial resources on electoral
volatility is an empirical question that deserves investigation. However, a recent study on the
Romanian political parties illustrates the diversity of financing sources and the difficulty to assess
the financial resources of a party (Gherghina et al. 2011). Such difficulties originate in the indirect
use of public money and clientelistic networks that are often not visible.
18 Until 2001 in Bulgaria, state funding was rather symbolic. The main source of funding was
private corporate donations.
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the issue of candidate selection, ranging from various forms encountered in
party models (Duverger 1954; Kircheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair
1995) to the degree of democratization of candidate selection processes
(Epstein 1967; Ranney 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Bille 2001; Rahat and
Hazan 2001; Lundell 2004; Lisi 2009).
This study focuses on the level of decision making within the party
organization regarding candidate selection. I investigate whether or not the
national level exerts more control over candidate selection for the national
legislative elections compared to the regional and local levels.19 This is the
reason for which the variable is labeled “centralization of candidate selection”.
In the words of previous studies on party organizations, I am interested in
observing whether or not the national office leads the selection politics of the
party and enforces its decisions upon sub-national organs (Harmel and Janda
1982, 59-60) or it is the other way around. The endeavor is relevant in the
context of the list PR systems used extensively in CEE.
How can candidate selection explain volatility? The causal mechanism
relates to the perceived responsiveness of the party to citizens’ needs and can
be summarized as follows. Autonomy of local branches in intra-party decision-
making brings parties closer to the voter. The local branches are often the
primary unit of interaction between voters and parties (Frendreis et al. 1990).
Thus, the local branches are familiar with voters’ needs and policy priorities. By
conducting activities intensively at the local level, parties demonstrate their
willingness to respond to problems raised by citizens. Indirectly, they send a
message of better representation. Based extensively on personal contacts,
local organizations often manage to mobilize voters from marginal categories
(e.g. youth) that are not likely to participate in elections unless there is a
different type of motivation than the conventional one (Geser 1999, 13). Thus,
they enhance the societal penetration of the party, reaching electorates
through other means than conventional communication.
If local organizations have autonomy, they will be able to channel
societal demands and give them priority. In this respect, local organizations’
views and proposals may fulfill two tasks: they may provide necessary feedback
for the central office and the may indicate to the electorate that their voice is
being heard. Local organizations need political power to reflect responsiveness
and to create an institutional linkage with the voters. Their strength ensures
tighter relations with voters. In particular, the selection of candidates for
legislative elections at the local level sends a message to voters that problems
19 I focus on the selection of candidates for the national elections for two reasons: 1) the
legislative elections are very important across all examined countries and 2) the candidate
selection for the local or regional elections has almost no variation (i.e. there are rare instances in
which the central office is involved in).
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are addressed by candidates recruited among them. By successfully adapting to
specific features of local politics, parties increase their attractiveness to the
public and reflect sensitivity to priority issues. The immediate benefit of this to
the party is that voters are able to recognize the candidates on the ballot.
Through all these procedures parties create more intense and stable
communication with the electorate. As a reward, voters may attach long-term
loyalty to those parties that show more consideration of their daily problems.
These strong and consistent ties with voters allow local party organizations to
rely on stable shares of votes irrespective of changes at the national level.
Consequently, I suggest that parties selecting candidates for the national
elections at the local level are less volatile than the rest.
Along these lines, the autonomy of parties’ local organizations makes a
difference at the social level and secures minimal electoral stability. Conway
and Feigert (1968) identify two types of motivations that prevail at the local
level. At urban and suburban levels, ideological motives prevail in making the
choice for a particular party, whereas in rural areas, social motivations are
salient (e.g. enlarging the field of acquaintances, entertainment in social
gatherings, and a feeling of solidarity with members of the community).
Territorial party organizations tackle community priorities and transform them
into political issues, socializing citizens into the functioning of the party. Local
units not only mobilize these orientations, but also act as marketing agencies
for the parties, promoting the priorities and leaders publicly (Geser 1999, 11).
CEE is the fertile soil in which such mechanisms can develop. Political
parties need stronger connections with the voters. Whereas in most Western
European democracies mass mobilization preceded the creation of national
party organizations, parties in newly emerged democracies pursued the
expansion of their organization after winning the first elections that were
based predominantly on elite support (van Biezen 2003, 30). This beginning
was followed by the establishment of close ties with the state in terms of
financing. As a result, the majority of parties were interested in mobilizing
voters around elections (Szczerbiak 2001a; Millard 2004) rather than in
between them (Rohrschneider 2002; van Biezen 2003; Enyedi 2006a). In this
context, party structures on the ground, with decision-making power, may be
able to create tighter connections with voters.
The autonomy of local branches can hardly be total as it may negatively
influence the coherence of the party. A tightly organized and highly disciplined
political party is very likely to behave as a unitary actor in elections and
coalition negotiations (Katz 2002, 87). At the same time, parties must send
homogenous messages to voters to persuade them to acknowledge the party’s
the capacity to represent their interests. A party with highly autonomous local
organizations can be perceived as a less unitary actor, unable to draft and
promote national level policies given the existence of multilevel competition
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within the party. In this respect, there is a thin line between rigidity and unity in
the eyes of the electorate. The perception of rigidity occurs most often when
national organizations dominate the activities of local branches and impose
policies that do not mirror citizens’ needs. The unity of the party is not
influenced if the autonomy of the local branches indicates patterns of
competition and cooperation between the decision-making levels in the party.
If that is the case, the effect is positive and enhances the idea of intra-party
democratic procedures. It also provides the sense of responsiveness to various
challenges (e.g. government at the national level, people’s needs at the local
level). The candidate selection process does not have an impact on the unity of
the party. Instead, a centralized selection process indicates rigidity, whereas
decentralization of selection creates the foundation for voter loyalty in the long
run.
Two supplementary arguments illustrate how decentralized selection
of candidates for the national elections can enhance the relationship between
parties and voters. First, the electorate is more likely to be familiar with those
candidates nominated at constituency level. The enlargement of the number of
voices to count in the process of candidate selection – mainly through
primaries – allowed political parties in old democracies to strengthen their ties
with the electorate (Hazan 1997; Carty and Blake 1999; Pennings and Hazan
2001). In the quasi-total absence of primaries and limited involvement of
citizens into politics (Lewis 2000; Weldon 2006) throughout CEE, any attempt
made by political parties to bring the selection closer to the voters can be
rewarded in elections. By providing autonomy to the local organizations in the
process of candidate selection, political parties deliver the message that they
care about voters’ opinions. Second, politicians usually show the greatest
loyalty to the locus that influences their re-election (Pennings 2000). The local
selection of candidates is likely to enhance further connections between
citizens and elected candidates. Corollary, from the voters’ perspective, a
nominee at local level increases the chances of occurrence for a “psychological
constituency”, i.e. the group of people who believe they are represented by
the candidate (Katz 2001, 279). Consequently, their chances to rely on a core of
voters increase as local organizations have extensive powers in the decision-
making process.
Following all these arguments, I hypothesize that:
H1: Political parties with decentralized candidate selection have lower levels of
electoral volatility than the centralized political parties.
There are theoretical reasons for which the relationship can be formulated in
the opposite direction. Thus, the electoral volatility can generates post-election
adaptation strategies that can modify the candidate selection process.
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However, the post-communist realities justify the hypothesized direction of the
relationship. As it will be shown in the analysis from Chapter 3, the CEE political
parties rarely changed their process of candidate selection. Even after major
electoral loses, the political parties do not modify the distribution of internal
power.
Party Membership
Party members are ambivalently perceived. On the one hand, they are seen as
advantage seekers and tiresome demanders who negatively influence the
democratic process (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 1). Their party affiliation is
considered as driving towards benefits not available for the rest of the citizens.
The nominations in public office based on political criteria are illustrative
examples in this respect. On the other hand, party members ensure long
standing contributions to the political life, provide campaign (including
funding) and electoral support to parties, and constitute appreciative audience
for party elites. Party members provide financial support and volunteer work
on a continuous basis, not solely around elections. The difference between
them and regular citizens resides in their political participation pushed beyond
the occasional voting turnout. Apart from fees, party members develop local
networks and organizations necessary in elections (Kopecky 2006, 133). They
are a valuable pool of resources for recruiting and socializing political leaders
(Kopecky 1995). The party organizations act as training grounds where actively
involved individuals acquire and develop skills for future political careers.
Kopecky (2006, 133) shows how in the 1998 local elections parties with minimal
membership in the Czech Republic faced difficulties in active involvement as
they were unable to field candidates outside the main cities.
Moreover, party members are the primary source of electoral support
for any political party. Although the importance of party membership reached
its apogee during the era of the historical mass party (Duverger 1954),
contemporary political parties continue to rely on the support of their
members in elections. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, even after the
decline in party membership in Western Europe (Tan 2000; Dalton et al. 2000;
Mair and van Biezen 2001; Dalton 2004), its levels in CEE are still much lower
than that of their Western counterparts (Lewis 1996; Bielasiak 1997; Kopecky
2001; van Biezen 2003; Millard 2004; Enyedi 2006a; Spirova 2007; Enyedi and
LInek 2008). This low party membership was explained through a combination
of contextual elements, communist legacies, and institutional and behavioral
components of both the supply (political parties) and demand (voters) sides
(Wyman et al. 1995; Mair 1997; Szczerbiak 2001a; 2006; Bozoki and Ishiyama
2002; Innes 2002; van Biezen 2003; Millard, 2004; Deegan-Krause 2006; Enyedi
2006b; Webb and White 2007; Gherghina 2008; Pop-Eleches 2010). In the case
of Western European parties, Katz and Mair (1995) identify a fundamental
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transformation in the public’s sense that parties became associated less with
society and more with the state. Thus, the shift from mass to cartel party leads
to a lower willingness to attract more members on the part of elites who argue
that the costs of extensive membership exceed its benefits. Parties are no
longer willing, as Widfeldt (1999) argues, to seek the greatest possible
membership.
Post-communist countries never witnessed such a shift given the nature
of their formation and the strong ties with the state that existed from the time
of their inception. The institutional origins of CEE parties (van Biezen 2003)
determined a different dynamic than in Western Europe. Political parties in new
democracies have experienced several more phases of development than
Western European parties. New democracies feature elite and catch-all party
models with no reference to the existence of the mass party in the past (with
the exception of the single-party in the previous regime that cannot be a unit of
comparison). At the beginning of the post-communist period, parties ignored
membership organizations due to the scarcity of time and resources (van
Biezen 2003; Millard 2004). Most parties used electoral mobilization, which was
faster and easier, but produced contextual and unstable attachments (Mair
1997). The short interval between the negotiations for power transfer and the
first free elections did not allow parties to seek membership mobilization (van
Biezen 2003, 44).
Additionally, in most of these countries, forced party membership that
characterized the previous regime was still fresh in the minds of citizens and
new political organizations often avoided calling themselves parties, not to
mention asking citizens to become party members. The few exceptions to this
were the direct successor parties and the historical revived parties. The latter
claimed high membership in Romania and Hungary, with no clear arrangements
for party membership (i.e. subscription form, regular fee, etc.) and with most
of the members being above 50 years of age at the moment of the first
democratic elections. From the beginning of their existence CEE parties used
means of communication and technology for direct communication with voters
extensively. Moreover, as previously explained, the parties relied on large state
subsidies without prior self-funding. All these are reasons for which CEE
political parties do not strive for high membership rates. The traditional roles of
party members (e.g. to provide financial support) are fulfilled by the state or
private donors.
However, there are other reasons for which party membership is
relevant in CEE. One of these reasons relates to the creation of a positive image
of the party through the active involvement of citizens. In all the analyzed
countries, the level of confidence in parties is low (see Introduction). This is
partially the result of the anti-party sentiment generated by the previous
regime (Kopecky 1995; Mair 1997). Another factor that contributes to this low
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confidence is the evaluation of parties on the basis of their poor performance
in government and opposition (often perceived as a routine activity with no
effective results), corruption scandals, false declarations of politicians pursuing
their own interest rather than that of the public (Szczerbiak 2006, 116), and lies.
These negative perceptions are fueled by parties’ controversial acts, leading to
deadlocks. It is a vicious circle in which the initial absence of interaction
between the organization and potential members generates adversity and
makes further interaction less likely. This is where party members can make a
difference. Active involvement in the internal workings of parties may enable
some voters to better understand the functioning of the party and to change
their negative attitudes.20 Furthermore, as members interact with other voters,
this more positive image of the party can be widely spread.
Furthermore, there is an important linkage to be observed, depicted in
Figure 1.2. Party membership can influence the level of electoral volatility.
There are theoretical reasons to expect such a relationship. As membership is a
long-term commitment, networks of support are likely to have an effect that
extends beyond only short-term voting behavior. In this respect, party
members fulfill a relevant communication function with regard to voters
(mostly from their own network) between elections. Members are the carriers
of party message and means of persuasion for those connected to them (e.g. a
snowball effect). Member positioning and activity at the workplace and in
community allows the party to gradually expand and stabilize a core electorate.
They create the premises for political enrolling and education in which citizens
expand their regular political participation. Their active involvement in politics
leads both to a short-term effect – the mobilization of voters at constituency
level during elections and to a medium to long-term effect – the dissemination
and maintenance of party loyalty feelings among people from their social
networks. The permanent anchoring of the party in society through an
intensive activity on the ground has the advantage of mobilizing voters’
sympathies in the long run.
This process leads to a stronger bond between the party and voters.
Duverger (1954) explains how in Western European countries, parties
constructed nation-wide networked membership associations that cultivated
political identities and mobilized newly enfranchised populations. With an
emphasis on enrolment, political education, and encouraging citizens to extend
their political involvement beyond merely voting, these mass parties
established concrete links with those they claimed to represent (Widfeldt 1995,
135; Scarrow 2000, 79). The same logic can apply to the CEE context. At a
general level, the quasi-absence of mass parties in CEE and high values of
electoral volatility indicate a potential linkage. In the dry climate of weak
20 This logic rests on the assumption that members are happy with their activity in the party.
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societal penetration that characterizes CEE, party members can create strong
networks of electoral support in society. In this sense, van Biezen (2003, 43)
argues that large membership enhances durable relationships with society and
supports the party’s stability.
The increased use of technology in voter mobilization does not reduce
the importance of party members. Even for the electoral professional parties
(Panebianco 1988) the active involvement of members is desirable as they can
develop stronger ties with the electorate through specific means. Such means
include local level activities, voluntary information collection, and campaigns
during elections (i.e. enlarging the circle of voters through personal approach,
enrolling new members in the youth clubs or door to door canvassing). The
party members are the promoters of a social logic of bounded partisanship in
which their personal approach is much more influential than other types of
communication (Zuckerman et al. 2007). Such an influence is reflected in the
intensity of relations as well as in the durability of achieved preferences. The
importance of party members increases in the absence of linkages –
characteristic to the CEE space – between political parties and other
organizations (e.g. church, trade unions). The creation of a large membership
organization may narrow the gap separating the CEE political parties from the
voters.
At the same time, a high roster of party members sends the electorate
a message of popular legitimacy and sets the bases for a party speech of strong
ties to ordinary citizens (Dickson and Rublee 2000; Scarrow 2000. 84).
Summing up, membership organizations build an image of legitimacy and
create societal linkages between parties and members. The direct consequence
of this is stronger attachment of the voters to parties and low electoral
volatility.  In light of all of these arguments, two aspects of party membership
are expected to diminish electoral volatility: the size and the constant number
of members. The logic behind the size of membership was explained in the
previous paragraphs. I expect parties that broaden their membership base to
have lower volatility in comparison with the other political actors:
H2a: Political parties with large membership organizations have lower levels of
electoral volatility than the political parties with small membership organizations.
In addition to the size of the membership organization, its longitudinal
variations can also explain electoral volatility. The above mentioned
mechanisms work best if membership organizations are relatively stable over
time. Variations in the share of members can create discontinuities in their
approach and require extensive effort from the party to accommodate them.
Dramatic modifications in the number of members may destabilize the
electoral support of the party. A large increase in membership rates can
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represent a major boost in electoral support. A severe decrease in the number
of party members usually coincides with a loss of votes, as this is a sign of the
decreasing popularity of the party. Such changes affect also the social
networks created around the party and the recipients of the party message. As
a result, constant rates of membership are likely to correspond to stable levels
of electoral support:
H2b: Political parties with low variations of membership between elections have
lower levels of electoral volatility than the political parties with high variations of
membership.
MPs’ Renomination
The MPs are divided in two major categories when speaking about their future
in the legislature: those who terminate their term in office once new elections
are organized and those who get reelected. Incumbent MPs21 are not reelected
for one of the following reasons: they do not want to be, they are not
successful in their attempts to get nominated by the party or they are rejected
by the voters. The first situation is the effect of a voluntary exit of the MPs
from the election process. The second instance can have multiple causes: the
incapacity of MPs to persuade the party regarding their potential to gain votes,
the desire of the party to leave out compromised candidates, or a party
strategy – generated by both endogenous and exogenous factors (e.g.
electoral system reform) – to renew the candidates. The third situation implies
that unsuccessful candidatures can be the result of a party strategy or direct
failure of the MPs to gain support. At the same time, in the case of blocked list
PR, the MPs are placed by political parties low on the lists, on non-eligible
positions. In such a situation, everything depends on the amount of votes cast
for the list; there is not much room for maneuver for bottom candidates to
increase their chances. For open list PR and single member district (SMD)
voting, the failure to get elected can be justified by the incapacity of the MPs to
persuade voters.
Conversely, those who get reelected fulfill all the conditions absent in
the previous setting: they strive for reelection, persuade a party to renominate
them (and eventually to place them high on the party list), and gather enough
votes to allow them to return to Parliament. The analysis from Chapter 3 will
reveal a variety of nomination procedures across political parties in CEE ranging
from totally decentralized to highly centralized manners. As the overwhelming
majority of members of the CEE Parliaments have a political affiliation (Enyedi
21 At a conceptual level, I follow Norris and Lovenduski’ s definition of incumbent (1995, 24) and I
include in this category those MPs who run for a seat, under the label of the same party or
coalition in which their party is part of, in the subsequent general election.
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and Toka 2007), legislative careers are dependent on the support of party
leaders either at local or central level. In this context, why would political
parties renominate incumbent MPs? There are at least four straightforward
advantages - all with positive spillover effects for the supporting parties – that
incumbents have over challengers. They derive from the (voluntary)
exploitation of the office.
1) The representatives who hold the elective office have access to free publicity
through media channels. They are often in the spotlight through organized
press conferences and interviews aimed to reveal to the public their policy
initiatives. Even conflict situations in which representatives engage with other
public officials increase their visibility. The unequal press coverage of
incumbents and challengers transformed media in the US in a factor triggering
the invincibility of incumbents (Herrnson 2004). Moreover, the television
broadcasts of the plenary sessions increase the visibility of MPs, especially of
those delivering speeches and working hard.
2) Given the resources they have access to, incumbents bring benefits to their
constituencies or at least they can always claim to do so. By adding to this
situation the extensive access to media channels we get a picture in which
incumbent MPs can promote their image (Fiorina 1977; Stonecash 2008).
Moreover, MPs have allowances to travel to their constituency and thus
interact with local groups and discuss various perspectives. At the end of the
day state funding is used to portray a positive image of the MP (Mayhew 1974;
Jacobson 2001) in the eyes of the voters and thus creating a direct advantage
against any challenger.
3) On the basis of the MPs experience in office, voters may perceive incumbent
MPs as having political authority, status (i.e. influence), and expertise. On the
average, incumbents are likely to have higher credibility than the challengers
with respect to political issues. Such a situation favors incumbents as elite
professionalization appears to be favored by citizens across Western (Cotta
and Best 2007) and Eastern Europe (Shlapentokh et al. 1999; Ilonszki and
Edinger 2007; Linek and Mansfeldova 2007; Nalewajko and Wesolowski 2007).
4) Incumbent representatives develop fundraising networks (Davidson and
Oleszek 2004, 74) and get easier access to campaign donors as they can use
their potential influence on legislation and promotion of specific agendas as
bargaining leverage  (Huckabee 2003, vii). Whereas such a practice is common
in the US, there are numerous corruption scandals that involved the CEE MPs in
the past two decades having as basis money for campaigns.
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As a result of these benefits, incumbents have always had a high success rate
versus challengers (Gelman and King 1990; Norris and Lovenduski 1995;
Stonecash 2008, 3).22 These advantages of are not limited to the individuals
holding the office but are spilt over the party supporting them. Voters appear
to consider candidates mostly as representatives of their parties; they hardly
separate between the two even in the electoral systems where a personal vote
is expected. Previous research illustrates that the personal vote for incumbents
in the UK is modest with most citizens casting their vote for the party (Butler
and Cavanagh 1992). Levels of constituency work of individual MPs produce
only minimal swings of votes (Cain et al. 1987; Norton and Wood 1990).
The continuity of MPs in the legislative office helps their parties to
establish a strong connection with voters and can influence their preferences
(see Figure 1.3). There are two interconnected mechanisms of communication.
Figure 1.3: The Schematic Relationship between Incumbent MPs and Voters
Features of Mechanisms Voter
Incumbent MPs of connection            response
Expertise Instrumental
Experience
Political        Cast vote for





First, there is an instrumental role of incumbent MPs who have a great visibility,
publicity, and name recognition for the voters. They act as recognizable labels
who add a personal dimension to the prior organizational attachment of the
voters. The previous section revealed how the individual and party do not
represent alternatives for voters but complements. Accordingly, citizens willing
22 There are also downsides of these advantages. One of them is that safe incumbents pay less
attention to the needs of citizens and directly diminish the representation and responsiveness
(Fiorina 1973; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 2003; Griffin 2006). Moreover, the scandals have
remarkably little effect on incumbents (Palmer and Simon 2008, 43-44).
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to cast their votes for certain political parties – based on their policy/message
preferences, voting histories, previous performance – have the additional
argument of being familiar with the faces and names of those to represent
them in the national legislature. It is more likely for citizens to rely on a familiar
face when reaching the final voting decision. Elements such as candidates’
charisma have additional benefits to the voting decision in this situation.
Second, there is a process of voter socialization. Through their
constituency service, MPs accustom voters with the issue of representation
and responsiveness to their needs. Although elite circulation is considered to
be positive as it is a source of new ideas and brings legitimacy to the political
class (Matland and Studlar 2004, 88), the low turnover can provide stability.
This is the case especially in CEE countries that are characterized by low elite
loyalty towards their parties. Voters get socialized with the mechanism of
direct control over the composition of Parliaments. Apart from the negative
effects of high levels of turnover on representation23 (Andersen and Thorson
1984), numerous changes in the composition of Parliament can reflect political
instability. For parties, it reflects the inability to maintain a core of voters where
they once had them. Consequently, at organizational level, they are expected
to promote candidates in the constituencies in which they were successful in
order to maintain if not increase their previous performance. As all analyzed
countries use list PR (with the partial exception of Hungary), the key point
resides in the list making for elections.
Following these arguments, it is expected to have a situation in which
more renominated MPs bring more electoral stability to their parties:
H3: Political parties who renominate more MPs for the legislative elections have
lower levels of electoral volatility than those parties who renominate less MPs.
The Analytical Model
The analytical model used to test these hypothesized effects is graphically
depicted in Figure 1.4. The main variables – decentralized candidate selection,
high and stable party membership, and high rates of re-nominated MPs – are
expected to have both an individual and an aggregate effect on the electoral
volatility at party level.
To identify these effects, a two-step research design is used. First, the
individual relationships between the independent variables24 (from the left side
23 It is not often the case in the analyzed context as the composition of the constituency does not
dramatically change in consecutive elections.
24 The terms ”independent” and ”dependent” variables do not apply generally to correlations.
However, given the direction and the logic of the earlier presented hypotheses, the components
of the party organization can be treated as independent variables; electoral volatility at party
level is the dependent variable of this study.
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of the figure) and electoral volatility at party level are observed with the use of
bivariate analyses (correlations). Each of Chapters 3-5 deals with one
independent variable25 focusing on the empirical strength of the relationships,
and the cross-country and –party comparisons. In doing so, I aim to provide
both general and contextual explanations for observed patterns.







Party Party System Voter
Incumbency Volatility Turnout
Second, a multivariate regression model – Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with
robust standard errors – is used for two purposes. Such a model allows
capturing the predictive power of each variable for electoral volatility when
holding the other variables constant. At the same time, it reveals the aggregate
explanatory potential of these variables. The model has the following form:
Electoral volatility = constant + β1 Centralization of Candidate Selection + β2
Size of Membership + β3 Variations in Membership Size + β4 MP Renomination
Rate + μ (1)
On theoretical grounds, I test for the effects of three control variables: party
incumbency, party system volatility (referring to the environment in which
parties act), and voter turnout. While the effect of all these variables is
discussed extensively and tested in Chapter 6, the previous sections have
already delved into the possible influence of the government incumbency and
voter turnout. The only as yet unexplained variable is party system volatility
25 There are three components of party organization and four hpotheses due to the fact that
party membership can influence volatility through size or variations in size. Accordingly, Chapter
4, dedicated to party membership, tests both hypotheses.
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and its interaction with the party level. Two possible effects of the party
system on its components (i.e. political parties) may be at work. First, there is
isomorphic mimetism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) or experiential learning.
Political parties learn from each other’s experience. Once a party manages to
stabilize its electorate, its techniques are known by its competition partners
and may be imitated. Second, there is  competition for a limited number of
votes. Irrespective of the number of parties, the number of voters remains
approximately constant within a country. As a result, losses for one party quite
often imply gains for another.26 The OLS model including these three control
variables has the following form:
Electoral volatility = constant + β1 Centralization of Candidate Selection + β2
Size of Membership + β3 Variations in Membership Size + β4 MP Renomination
Rate + β5 Party System Volatility + β6 Voter Turnout + β7 Government
Incumbency + μ (2)
Why do the main effects matter over controls? There are both theoretical and
empirical reasons that justify such an expectation. A growing body of evidence
suggests that voter perception is biased as a result of party or candidate
preference (MacDonald and Heath 1997; Wlezien et al. 1997; Nannestad and
Paldam 2000; Anderson et al. 2004). The independent variables from Figure 1.4
– corresponding to β1- β4 and in model (2) – emphasize such factors
characterizing the relationship between parties and voters. Moreover, the logic
behind the hypotheses focused on psychological effects that may determine
voting stability. By contrast, the control variables refer much more on formal or
mechanical effects that are sometimes unknown to individual voters (i.e. party
system volatility or voter turnout). At the same time, the level of measurement
is different: all independent variables are measured at party level, whereas this
applies to only one out of the three control variables (government
incumbency). The other two control variables are systemic and their cross-
party explanatory potential is significantly diminished. Accordingly, these
variables are likely to shape voters behavior more than the controls that focus
more on general aspects of the
Conclusions
There is a great deal of work that has been carried out on addressing the
causes of high electoral volatility in CEE. Most of this work focuses on party
systems, discussing both their volatile features and determinants of volatility.
26 Even if I do not consider all the parties in a party system (the sum of the votes of the analyzed
parties rarely equal more than 80% of the votes cast), the degree of interdependence between
the political parties in a national party system remains considerable.
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In this context, there is little systematic analysis conducted at the party level.
The first two sections of this chapter presented theoretical and empirical
arguments in favor of this approach in CEE. Consequently, the differentiation
between party system and party level volatility appears to be an analytical
necessity. The third section of this chapter illustrated the limited explanatory
potential of macro level factors (i.e. party system level factors) in the post-
communist political context. Comparisons across time and countries do not
reveal any clearly identifiable pattern; the distribution of volatility appears to
be random when those determinants are considered. A similar situation is
observed with respect to the factors influencing both the party system and
party volatility. There is one exception – voter turnout – which has not yet been
explored for CEE and is included as a control variable in the empirical test in
Chapter 6.
Thus far, party level determinants have been both theoretically ignored
and empirically unexplored in the literature. Most existing studies accounted
for exogenous determinants of electoral volatility (e.g. electoral system,
degree of democratization, voter turnout, etc.). The arguments presented
throughout this chapter converge towards the idea that the causes of volatility
may be identified within the party itself. The way in which political parties
organize can shape the electoral stability of voters. The three factors advanced
as major explanations propose different mechanisms by which variation in
electoral volatility can be explained.
Candidate selection refers to the enhancement of strong
communication with the electorate and adaptation to its necessities. By
providing autonomy to the local organizations in selecting candidates, political
parties send voters a message that they are receptive to their concerns. Local
candidates are more likely than those selected at the central level to be familiar
with constituency problems. Membership organizations can ensure the stability
of support by means of the social networks developed by members. In addition
to direct communication during electoral campaigns, political parties with
established membership organizations can also benefit from the interactions
between their members and regular voters in the time period between
elections. Moreover, members provide an alternative, more personal approach
to reaching out to voters than what is generally used by most parties in
contemporary times. The re-nomination of MPs can lead to the idea of
continuity and professionalization in the eyes of the voters. As it does so,
parties also rely on recognizable candidates; a challenger is less visible than an
incumbent.
This new perspective has two major implications. From a theoretical
point of view, for the first time party organization is considered to be a
predictor of electoral stability. So far, studies have focused on the emergence
and types of political organizations (Kopecky 1995; 2001; Roper 1995; Lewis
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1996; Szczerbiak 2001a; 2001b; Spirova 2007; Webb and White 2007; Enyedi and
Linek 2008) or the effect of party organizations on political performance (Agh
1995; Lewis 1996; Ishiyama 2001). This chapter provides sufficient grounds to
justify consideration of party organization – either as a whole or as specific
constituent components – as a potential determinant of volatility. In
methodological and empirical terms, this perspective proposes the
investigation of causes at the level of volatility occurrence. The volatility is the
change of electoral support for a party or an electoral alliance/coalition.
Accordingly, the process can best be understood through an analysis at this
level. The empirical evidence in the following chapters provides insight into the
party support dynamics in CEE and reveals great variation in terms of party
organization.
63
Chapter 2 Electoral Volatility in New Democracies:
Conceptualization, Measurement, and General
Empirical Results
Introduction
The concept of volatility has traditionally been used to describe the electoral
instability of democratic systems in Europe and North America (Blumler 1975).
The previous chapter highlighted the existence of a general consensus
regarding this process in contemporary democracies, not only in CEE. In this
respect, electoral volatility is often conceived of as a feature of the political
system. However, in analytical and empirical terms, it refers to the preferences
of voters towards political formations – parties and alliances – competing in
elections.
Variation in electoral support for parties should exist with no clear
threshold for what an acceptable level of electoral volatility is. Nonetheless,
extreme variation in electoral support is unhealthy for parties in particular and
political systems in general. High levels of volatility are symptomatic of party
system instability (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Blais 2004; Lawson and McCann
2005) and reveal multiple problems: weak political parties that fail to fulfill their
functions, absent partisan cues, and limited party roots in society (see Chapter
1). Similarly, the absence of vote shifts reduces incentives for electoral
competition, thereby reducing the level of contestation. The quality of
representation is endangered in two ways: a) it is difficult for the newly
emerged actors to gain access to the redistribution of power; and b) in the
context of stable electoral success, the accountability of politicians and parties
and their responsiveness to citizens’ needs are reduced (Bartolini 2000).
The main research question of this book is addressed from the
perspective of political parties. For parties, low levels of volatility are, generally
speaking, preferable to high rates of electoral change. Although electoral gains
are always welcome, the arguments presented in the Introduction and Chapter
1 indicate that political parties may strive for less electoral volatility as soon as
they reach a comfortable position within the system. Parties are deemed to be
relatively ‘comfortable’ when they gain access to the legislature, take part in
coalition governments, or play otherwise pivotal roles within the party system.
This chapter is structured along theoretical, methodological, and
empirical lines. The first section presents a theoretical discussion of volatility
and a purposive argument in favor of measuring electoral volatility at the party
level. Next, several methodological issues are discussed pertaining to the
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appropriate tool to be used to measure electoral volatility and other
methodological choices that are made throughout the book. Finally, the
chapter includes multi-layered empirical observations that shed light on the
propensity for and differences in volatility across time, countries, and parties.
Differentiating Electoral Change: Voters and Parties
Volatility occurs due to dynamic and inter-related processes registered at the
levels of both the party and the electorate. On one hand, one party cannot
perform in precisely the same way over time. Sensitive to the context in which
they find themselves, parties either adapt to favorable conditions and improve
their performance, or fail to exploit their opportunities and lose votes. Due to
their inter-temporal nature, elections are fuzzy and long-term contracts
between those governing and the governed (Lane 2007, 174). Citizens have
only one means of punishing parties for making false promises, namely voting
for a different party in the next elections. As they are aware of this pattern, it is
rational for political parties to shape their discourse and adopt strategies to
convince the electorate of their capacity to represent their interests.
On the other hand, the electorate cannot freeze its preferences. The
structure of the electorate changes and, as a direct consequence of the above
mentioned mechanism, its priorities change. Apart from natural sources of
change in the composition of the electorate (e.g. mortality rates, migration),
electoral behavior is also a reaction to the structure of the political space and
to the policy proposals made by political parties (Tavits 2008). In sum, change
in electoral volatility is triggered by complex embeddedness in the competition
space (e.g. composition, strategies, and prior commitments) and electorates’
response to it. Within such a framework, we should investigate whether or not
electoral change involves different principles at the two specified levels: the
voter and the party.
What we refer to as electoral volatility is solely a technical
measurement developed in order to assess the intensity and nature of change
in political support. As this support is the direct effect of two interrelated
forces – one exerted by the voters as principals and the other exerted by
political parties acting as agents – electoral change is measured and calculated
separately on the demand and supply sides. First, at the individual level, gross
electoral volatility refers to the total amount of vote switching in a party
system (Crewe 1985a, 9). This measure basically gauges the electorate’s loyalty
on a continuum with extremes at a situation in which no voters change their
preferences in any way, and at an instance at which every single voter behaves
differently than they did in the previous election. By focusing on vote shifts at
the individual level, gross electoral volatility attempts to explain processes and
phenomena within the political system with characteristics of the electorate
65
and observed patterns like partisan dealignment and a decrease in party
identification in mind.
As individual data regarding voter behavior (i.e. election surveys) are
rarely available, net electoral volatility is the appropriate proxy by which to
measure political change and reflects the aggregate vote transfers between
political parties within a party system in subsequent elections. Net electoral
volatility is considered to be the measure that can best capture electoral
change between two consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 19). The
measurement equivalence rests on the assumption that aggregate changes at
various levels over time accurately reflect the corresponding levels in individual
volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 27).
Furthermore, there is a strong empirical relationship between gross and
net electoral volatility, with up to three quarters of the amount of gross
electoral volatility being reflected in the measure of net electoral volatility
(Lane and Ersson 1997). I have elected to use net electoral volatility as it
provides two important advantages. First, by using a systematic measurement,
it allows to map and compare variation in support for political parties both
longitudinally and across countries. Second, it extends beyond the electorate’s
values in providing explanations for vote shifts, allowing institutional and
contextual factors to be incorporated (e.g. party organization, cleavages,
electoral system etc). Following this methodological line, the next section
illustrates the difficulties encountered in measuring the concept of electoral
volatility and selects out of the three existing methodological alternatives to
calculate electoral volatility.
Measuring Electoral Volatility
The longitudinal and cross-sectional design of this research requires an inter-
election net volatility approach (Rose and Urwin 1970; Crewe 1985a, 9). This
approach reflects the net changes in the vote share obtained by a political
party in consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 19). Several formulas
are proposed in the literature to calculate electoral volatility, the most widely
used by far being the one proposed by Pedersen (1979). Its properties
recommend it against alternative calculations (Taagepera and Grofman 2003).
Developed at party system level, the Pedersen Index bears one major
theoretical and empirical shortcoming when it is applied at the party level. It
weights political parties equally, includes only the absolute change in vote
share, and ignores the size of the party. Designed to measure net electoral
volatility, the index accounts for the difference in received votes,
underestimating change for small-sized competitors (the index subtracts the
vote share for election t0 from the vote share received in election t1). Crewe
(1985a, 9) illustrates the way in which a small party that doubles its vote share
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from 5 to 10% exhibits sharper volatility when compared to a large party that
increases its vote share from 45 to 50%.
The example presented in Table 2.1 is similar. The scores included in the
table belong to two randomly selected parties from different countries – the
PRM from Romania and the MSZP from Hungary – in all elections in which they
participated and simulations for all mentioned formulas are listed. Looking at
the difference between the PRM’s performance in 1996 and 2000, we observe
that in 2000 the party has four times as many supporters (as a percentage of
the total voters) as it did in the previous election. However, Pedersen’s formula
indicates that the electoral volatility of the party is 15. Similarly, comparing the
electoral results registered by the MSZP in 1990 and 1994, we observe that its
vote share increases three fold. The formula reveals a paradox: although the
MSZP’s evolution is less spectacular than that of the PRM, the MSZP’s volatility
is higher than that of the PRM (calculated at 22.1 and 15 respectively).
Table 2.1: Comparing Measurements of Party Electoral Volatility
Measure
Party Election Results (%) Rose and Urwin Pedersen Birch
1992 3.9
1996 4.5 5 0.6 7
PRM 2000 19.5 5 15 62
2004 13 5 6.5 20
2008 3.1 5 9.9 61
1990 10.9
1994 33 7.5 22.1 50.3
MSZP 1998 32.9 7.5 0.1 0.1
2002 42 7.5 9.1 12.2
2006 43.2 7.5 1.2 1.3
A similarly striking situation is registered when comparing the PRM’s election
results in 2004 and 2008 with those of the MSZP in 1998 and 2002. In the case
of PRM, there is a decrease in vote share from 13 to 3%, whereas in the case of
MSZP, the vote share increases from 33 to 42%. Calculations based on
Pedersen’s formula reveal that the two parties exhibit similar volatility (9.9 for
PRM and. 9.1 for MSZP). In fact, the net difference is indeed similar, but without
reporting it relative to the size of the parties, erroneous conclusions may be
drawn. For the PRM this difference meant losing approximately three quarters
of its previous support and, thus, failing to enter parliament in 2008. In 2002,
the MSZP, a large party in Hungary, experienced an increase in support equal to
approximately one quarter of vote shares compared to the 1998 elections.
This pattern is suggestive of the situation described in the previous
section in which two parties of different dimensions gain/lose a similar number
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of votes, but the volatility differs with a higher impact on the small competitor.
The index proposed by Pedersen is not sensitive to these discrepancies. This
shortcoming is not diminished in the modified version proposed by Neff Powell
and Tucker (2010). Their volatility index accounts for the character of shifts in
electoral support: type A reflects the shifts caused by the emergence or
disappearance of political parties, and type B corresponds to electoral shifts
among existing parties. The separate counting of the two types increases
accuracy only at the party system level – at which entries and exits are isolated
– but does not change the structural problem highlighted above that is
inherent to Pedersen’s index of party volatility.
The formula provided by Rose and Urwin (1970) almost one decade
before Pedersen captures the trend of party support. They regress the vote
share received by parties against time in order to calculate the annual change in
party support. Although they focus on the party level, their measure has two
major shortcomings that render it inappropriate for use as a calculus of
electoral volatility at the party level. On one hand, the formula is not sensitive
to modifications in consecutive elections, but detects long-term trends. The
examples in Table 2.1 reflect this situation: both parties have the same score in
every electoral year. On the other hand, the measure yields errors even when
calculating the long-term trend. Following the figures provided in Table 2.1, the
average volatility of the MSZP is larger than that of the PRM. The index appears
to be sensitive to electoral performance rather to its differences and indicates
that the larger party bears higher volatility. In reality, the opposite is true.
Birch (2001) calculates volatility in a relative manner, reporting the
difference in vote shares relative to the total votes received by the party in
both elections. This measurement eliminates the problems inherent to the
other two measures, and accurately describes fluctuations in party support
relative to its vote share. For example, the measurement correctly shows that
an increase in vote share from 4.5 to 19.5% (PRM in 1996 and 2000) is similar to
a decrease from 13 to 3.1% (PRM in 2004 and 2008). Moreover, it reveals that
the MSZP has a more stable electorate than the PRM and shows that the
highest volatility of the former is significantly below the highest electoral
instability of the latter. Intuitively, and consistent with electoral results, we
assert that the PRM is more unstable that the MSZP, a claim that is revealed by
this formula. One more advantage of this measure is that allows for
comparability. Unlike Rose and Urwin’s index that is biased towards stability of
low-performing competitors, Birch standardizes differences that occur at the
party level by using party support as a reference, thereby making the scores
comparative.
All these arguments favor the adoption of the formula proposed by
Birch:
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Vj = party j electoral volatility,
Vt0 = the share of votes obtained by party j in election t0,
Vt1 = the share of votes obtained by party j in election t1.
Electoral volatility is calculated for the second chamber or for the entire
legislature whenever this is unicameral. Data are compiled from various
sources, most of these sources being electoral databases and handbooks. The
next section complements the methodological information and provides
details on case selection, units of analysis, and time period.
Methodological Choices
The most important methodological choice for the analysis employed
throughout this book pertains to the selection of parties. In my study, I include
those parties that simultaneously satisfy the following two criteria: 1) gained
seats in at least half of the legislative elections under study; and b) ran in
elections and gained seats in parliament at least once on an individual basis (i.e.
without relying on electoral alliances or coalitions). The first criterion is
intended to isolate the political actors without electoral appeal – those
consistently failing to obtain seats – or those political parties with sporadic or
contextual presence in the legislature. In all such instances, volatility is either
difficult to calculate or overestimates the electoral stability of the political
parties. For example, a political party that obtains 1% of the votes in elections
across two decades exhibits low volatility. At the same time, the party in
question has low public appeal and little if any relevance to the political system.
The second criterion aims to capture electoral support for individual parties. As
the book focuses on party-level volatility, and due to the fact that elections in
CEE are characterized by numerous electoral alliances and coalitions (see
Chapter 3), electoral support for specific parties is a key analytical component.
Does this selection process influence the results? As is the case with
every methodological choice, the application of these two criteria has a certain
impact on the empirical analysis. However, this impact is minimal and does not
systematically bias results for at least two reasons. First, the analysis includes
almost all parties with a relevant voice in domestic politics during the post-
communist era. Quite often, support for the political parties under scrutiny
adds up to more than 80% of the vote share in national elections. There are only
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three political parties/organizations – NDSV in Bulgaria, LPR in Poland, and
PNTCD in Romania – that actively participated in the government of their
countries and are not included in this analysis. NDSV and LPR do not display
continuity of representation in half of the elections, whereas PNTCD does not
fulfill the criterion of running alone in elections.27
Second, as Table 1 (in the Introduction) illustrates, for most countries
the number of parties included in the analysis is a good approximation of the
average number of parliamentary parties present during the entire post-
communist period. On these grounds, concerns regarding biased results are
not justified. The criteria do not distort the universe of observed cases. Instead,
the criteria were designed to limit the analysis to the most relevant political
parties and to shed light on their development. Moreover, from a
methodological perspective, limiting the analysis to the parties that fulfill these
criteria allows for more reliable measurement of volatility. The electoral
evolution and stability of political parties with a prolonged presence in
parliament and the ability to mobilize voters on their own can be traced
without further problems.
Calculating volatility in CEE is not limited to the mathematical
operations outlined in Formula (1). Numerous party name changes, splits and
mergers, entries to and exits from the legislature, and the formation and
disentanglement of electoral alliances are major challenges that precipitate
several coding decisions. First, party name changes raise problems only when
they are the result of splits and mergers. If political parties change their name
in order to become more appealing to the voters or do so following a merger
with a minor party (see below), there is no direct influence on the calculus of
volatility as the succession can be clearly established. For example, not much
changed with the FIDESZ in Hungary in 1995 when it decided, following poor
electoral results one year before, to add the Hungarian Civic Party MPP to its
name. Similarly, the HZDS in Slovakia made a strategic decision in 2000 to add
“People’s Party” (LS) to its name. This was done in an attempt to achieve
increased membership in the European People’s Party (Henderson 2008).
However, when a name change is accompanied by more dramatic alterations
such as a change in leadership or organization, there is no continuity and
parties with new names are considered to be new parties altogether.
Second, frequent splits and mergers complicate the calculation of
volatility. In general, for party mergers, splits and name changes, the guidelines
of Bartolini and Mair (1990, 311) are followed. For party splits, they mention
that “when a party splits into two or more parties, the relevant electoral
volatility is computed by subtracting the combined vote of the new parties
27 PNTCD competed on individual grounds in 1990 when no electoral threshold was in place and
thus obtained parliamentary representation.
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from that of the original party in the election immediately preceding the split”.
When parties merge, the vote for the new combination is compared to the
combined vote of the merged parties in the previous elections. Given the
complicated picture in CEE, I have developed a few specific coding rules that
address these issues in a consistent manner. If a party splits after elections t0
and one party is the clear successor (e.g. maintains party leadership, label, or
organization), this party is not considered to be a new party at t1 and volatility
can be calculated in this case. Difficulties occur, however, when a party splits
and there is no clear successor party. In this case, I consider the electoral
support at t1 to be a reference indicator.
This can be explained in practical terms as follows, Party A splits after
the elections t0 and the resulting parties are B and C. If B scores very low in the
t1 elections – much lower than expected after the split – and C has electoral
success comparable to that of A, then C is the direct successor of Party A as it
has maintained existing voter support. In this situation, Party B is considered to
be a newly emerged party. One further example helps to illustrate this point.
Following the Civic Forum’s clear victory (more than 50% of the vote share) in
the 1990 Czechoslovak elections, the movement split into four parties to
contest the subsequent 1992 election in the Czech Republic. Out of these, ODS
was most prominent, gaining 33.9% of the votes. The three remaining parties
obtained more modest results: the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) achieved
5%, the Civil Movement 4.4%, and the Club of Engaged Non Party Members 2%
(Neff Powell and Tucker 2010, 11). According to my coding scheme, the ODS is
the successor of the Civic Forum, whereas the other parties are new.
If the resulting Parties B and C have similar electoral strength after the
split, I consider both B and C to be successors. In this case, volatility is
calculated by dividing the electoral result of A at t0 into equal shares. One
example illustrates the appropriateness of my choice. In Romania, the National
Salvation Front (FSN) split in 1992 and the resulting parties were the National
Salvation Front (FSN, later PD) - that inherited the label, office, and the central
organization of the original party – and the Democratic National Salvation Front
(FDSN, later PDSR, and from 2001 PSD) that retained most of party elites and
local branches of the initial party. Thus, both splinters had advantages with
FDSN winning the next election, and the new FSN finishing third.
With respect to mergers, there are two possible outcomes: the
continuation of old parties with new partners under a common label, or the
emergence of a new party. My coding is best illustrated in terms of the
example of the t1 election with the t0 election as a reference point. A merger at
t1 is considered to be a continuation when it takes place between one party that
won parliamentary seats in the t0 elections and a minor party that was either
recently created or performed poorly in those elections. The party that resulted
after the merger is considered to be the continuation of the larger party
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irrespective of the label adopted. Accordingly, the calculus of volatility includes
the electoral result of the larger party at t0. Quite often, the change of party’s
name as a result of a merger is a good indicator of the impact of the merger
(i.e. large parties do not generally change their name when merging with small
parties). One exception to this observation is represented by the PSD that
emerged in 2001. Prior to that date, there existed two different parties: the
PDSR – the successor communist party – and the PSDR, a revived socialist
party. PSDR only contested elections on its own in 1990. After this point, it
joined various alliances: the CDR (with other three parties) in 1992, the USD in
1996, and an alliance with the PDSR in 2000. The PSDR’s electoral support is,
thus, not high and therefore the result of the merger – PSD – is the continuator
of PDSR. A party is coded as newly emerged at t1 if it results from the merger of
two or more parties gaining parliamentary seats after the t0 elections.
Third, the reported national election results in CEE always include the
category “other” (Neff Powell and Tucker 2010, 9) which makes tracing the
records of political parties more difficult. The most common problem is related
to those parties that win parliamentary seats in election t1 – and thus pass the
electoral threshold – without being registered on the results sheet in election
t0. Are these parties newly emerged? Or did they have such a low score at t0
that they belonged to the “other” category? The analysis of party histories
plays a crucial role in answering these questions. The documented birth and
evolution of CEE political parties (Lewis 1996; Szczerbiak 2001a; Kopecky 2001;
Bugajski 2002; Millard 2004; Szajkowski 2005; Spirova 2007; Webb and White
2007; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008) reduce this uncertainty and help
distinguish between newly emerged parties that did not participate in the t0
elections, and those existing parties that obtained poor results in those
elections. With this in mind, volatility can be calculated accurately when the
emergence and trajectory of political parties is known.
Fourth, electoral alliances and coalitions are also problematic for the
calculus of volatility. The simplest situation exists when the parties forming an
alliance specify the number of seats allocated to each party after elections. For
example, the FIDESZ and the KDNP contested the 2006 elections in Hungary as
an alliance with a clear division of their mandates. The difficult cases are those
in which there is no reference made to the share of votes divided among the
constituent components of the electoral alliance or coalition. I use two
techniques to reduce the distortion produced by this type of situation and to
limit the shortcomings generated by lack of data. Both techniques involve a
comparison between the votes received by the alliance or coalition and those
received by its constituent parties in the previous election. I weight the parties
forming an alliance differently based on the share of votes they received prior
to the electoral alliance or coalition formation. For example, if Party A receives
10% of the votes in the t0 election and forms an alliance in the t1 election with
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three other parties – extra-parliamentary at t0 – and this alliance obtains 15% of
the votes, the credit for this result goes to Party A. In a theoretical instance
such as this, the electoral support for this party did not change dramatically
between t0 and t1. If, on the other hand, there is an alliance of parties that were
not in parliament at t0, I weight all the members equally. All these decisions are
based on the assumption that an alliance is the sum of the votes of its
constituent parts, although this is not true all of the time. In this case the
electoral potential of the alliance is ignored to better approximate the results
obtained by individual parties.
This logic also covers those cases in which political parties join an
electoral alliance or coalition between two elections contested on an individual
basis. In other words, in those cases in which the parties compete alone at t0,
join the alliance or coalition at t1, and contest alone again at t2. The procedures
explained in the previous paragraph apply irrespective of our knowledge about
the ratio of votes belonging to each party within the alliance or coalition at t1.
The t2-t1 volatility presupposes the application of a symmetric principle to the
one described for parties entering a coalition. In this case, I compare the votes
of the parties exiting the alliance or coalition at t2 with those at t1.
Mapping Volatility in CEE
How volatile are the CEE political parties? Figure 2.1 plots the simple frequency
distributions of electoral volatility across the national legislative elections held
in the six investigated countries for a period of almost two decades (N=116).
The vertical axis refers to the number of observations and the horizontal axis
refers to the percentage of party-level volatility. In line with existing studies
carried out at the party system level, the histogram indicates that CEE parties
are quite volatile: the average electoral volatility is 22.30% and the standard
deviation is 20.98. The figure illustrates that this is the result of a moderate
clustering of parties around the mean – the modal outcome is in the 0-5% array
– rather than the outcome of outlying elections. The positive skew (1.07) and
platykurtic (0.32) distribution reinforce this observation, indicating that the
mass of the distribution is concentrated on the left side of the volatility
spectrum, with a wider peak around the mean and relatively few high values.
The universe of observations is not very homogenous. The value of the
standard deviation indicates a moderate dispersion of the values. At the same
time, the range of volatility is quite broad: the minimum value is 0.11% and the
maximum is 89.21%. There are indeed isolated instances in which volatility
exceeds 70%, but one fifth of the observations falls within the 40-60% category
in terms of volatility.
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Figure 2.1: The Distribution of Party Level Electoral Volatility in CEE (1990-
2008)
Previous research at the party system level provides mixed evidence with
regard to the development of electoral volatility over time. There are a few
studies that explain how electoral volatility diminishes after initial elections and
how the system stabilizes with time (Agh 1998; Lewis 2000; Tavits 2005; Toka
and Henjak 2007). However, other works show oscillations in the evolution of
volatility as opposed to indicating the existence of a decreasing trend (Sikk
2005; Enyedi and Casal Bertoa 2011) suggesting that time has no effect on the
stability of electoral preferences. Constructed on axes similar to those in the
graph above, Figure 2.2 presents the distribution of electoral volatility in the
two different post-communist decades to examine whether volatility is
modified after a few elections. The distribution on the left side belongs to the
1990-2000 period, with three elections for most of the countries (four in
Romania). The distribution on the right corresponds to the 2001-2008 period.
Although in temporal terms the first appears to be more extensive, the number
of cases is slightly higher in the second (i.e. 59 vs. 57). This is due in large part to
the presence of three Polish political parties as of the 2001 election.
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Figure 2.2: The Distribution of Electoral Volatility per Decade in CEE
1990-2000
2001-2008
At the party level, there are no relevant differences between the distributions
across the two decades. Their averages are similar, being slightly smaller in the
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first decade (mean = 21.50, standard deviation = 20.49) compared to the second
(mean = 23.07, standard deviation = 21.60). The absolute minimum of volatility
among the CEE parties is registered in the first decade (0.11%). However,
volatility in the second decade has a comparable minimum at 0.24%. The
maximum volatility for the first decade is 70.86%, whereas in the second the
absolute maximum in terms of volatility values is registered at 89.21%. Overall,
the average, standard deviation, and range of volatility indicate that in the first
elections political parties in the six examined countries were slightly less
volatile than in the second. Both distributions are right-skewed and platykurtic
– with similar values – indicating a concentration of the values around the mean
with few values approaching the upper extreme of the volatility range. The
visible difference between the two distributions is the existence of more
parties above the 60% volatility level in the second decade as opposed to the
first. This produces the longer tail of that specific distribution. To conclude,
time has no substantive impact on the electoral volatility of the CEE political
parties.
For those parties in government before the elections, their activity
represents a relevant component of the voting decision (see Chapter 1).
Incumbency is expected to influence the volatility of political parties and, as
such, is included as a control variable in this analysis. This effect is bidirectional:
incumbents are rewarded for their accomplishment and punished for the
failures.
With regard to whether or not this is the case in CEE, Figure 2.3
compares the distribution of opposition and incumbent parties across all
countries for the entire post-communist period. At a glance, there are three
visible differences between the two distributions. First, there are fewer
incumbent parties (49) than those in opposition (67). This observation is not
surprising given that in most multi-party systems only a few parties form a
coalition government, whereas the rest are in the opposition. Second, the
distribution of opposition parties takes more values, whereas the incumbent
parties mainly cluster within two areas: 0-20% and 35-60%. This situation
corresponds to the reward and punishment principles outlined above. On one
hand, incumbent parties with satisfactory results gain voters’ confidence and,
as a result, their volatility remains low. Theoretically, volatility can also increase
if a party in government does very well and is able to attract voters who did not
support it before. Empirically, this is not the case in CEE.
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of the Distribution of Electoral Volatility for




The high levels of electoral volatility for all incumbent political parties resulted
from a loss and not from a win of support. On the other hand, the incumbent
parties that fail to deliver what they promised produce a change in voter
preference and, as such, their volatility increases. Third, on the basis of the
previous observation, there are more incumbent parties that benefit from loyal
electorates (i.e. that experience very low levels of electoral volatility)
compared to the opposition parties. Approximately half of the incumbent
parties are situated in the 0-10% array of electoral volatility, whereas only one
quarter of the opposition parties share those values.
The statistical indicators support these observations. The mean
volatility for opposition parties is approximately 10% higher that that of the
incumbent parties (26.51% vs. 16.54% respectively). The averages tell different
stories: opposition parties have modal values around the mean (standard
deviation = 21.23) and incumbents cluster in two broad categories to the left
and to the right of the mean (standard deviation = 19.41). The lower average of
the latter is the result of strong clustering towards the left side of the volatility
continuum. In line with this, the minimum value among the incumbent parties is
the smallest among the universe of cases (0.11). The more homogenous
distribution of the opposition parties is also visible in terms of the range of
values: it is 82.42% in their case and 89.10% for the incumbent parties; the
incumbent parties have both the absolute minimum and the maximum values.
One final difference is observable with respect to the peak of the
distribution. The opposition parties have a platykurtyc distribution (0.42) that is
flatter than a normal distribution, with a wider peak and a probability for
extreme values that is less than it would be for a normal distribution. For the
incumbent parties, the distribution is mesokurtic (2.98), which is a normal
distribution in that respect. Both distributions are right-skewed with most
values concentrated to the left of the mean with extreme values towards the
right. Consistent with the above observations, the value of the skewness is
higher for the incumbent parties (1.72) than for those parties in the opposition
(0.78). This indicates a greater tendency of the cases to be positioned to the
left of the mean. In a nutshell, incumbent parties are, on average, less volatile
than opposition parties. At the same time, incumbent parties lack moderate
volatility clustering, particularly in the lower or high arrays. One possible
explanation for this is that these volatility values may correspond to the reward
and punishment attitudes of the voters.
This brief description of the electoral volatility distribution in CEE – and
ways in which time and government incumbency shape it – revealed general
tendencies visible across countries and parties. The following sections narrow
the scope of the discussion and focus on the other two aspects of my analysis:
a) country differences examined in terms of volatility distribution and extreme
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values; and b) cross-party comparisons conducted in light of their average
volatility and elasticity (i.e. a concept used only in this chapter).
Country-Level Similarities and Differences
The cross-national focus of this section complements the longitudinal
distributions examined so far. Figure 2.4 reflects the clustering of volatility:
each square represents the electoral volatility (on the horizontal axis)
characterizing a political party in one election. The similarity of all those clusters
is consistent with the graphical representation in Figure 2.1. The majority of CEE
political parties, irrespective of the timing and country in which they compete,
have large volatility arrays. There are at least two major observable differences
between the countries, all relevant in the process of understanding the
electoral diversity of the CEE region. First, even among the least volatile parties
(i.e. those included in the 0-20% category), the starting point and dispersion of
volatilities are country specific. In four out of the six countries, there are
political parties with volatility close to absolute zero. The Bulgarian and Polish
parties are a bit further away from this extreme value with minimums of 1.3%
and 8.6% respectively. These same two countries have the lowest density of
political parties with low volatility, whereas the highest density is observed in
Hungary and Romania. At the same time, the Czech Republic has the highest
percentage of its total number of political parties clustered in this low range of
volatility (only two values are above 20%).
Second, the homogeneity of dispersion and the maximum values
reached by electoral volatility differ across countries. Hungary and Slovakia
have the broadest dispersion, and are also the only countries in which political
parties register the highest values of electoral volatility above 80%. Apart from
the Czech Republic, the countries with the most homogenous distributions are
Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. The shape of these distributions, however,
differs. The Bulgarian political parties are divided into three categories that
cluster around certain increasing values of volatility: a small group situated
around 3%, a larger group around 20%, and the largest group around 40%. The
Polish political parties have a similar distribution, but the categories of party
clusters are reversed: most parties are positioned around the 15% value, slightly
fewer around the 50% value, and the smallest cluster resides close to 65%. One
further difference when compared to the situation in Bulgaria is that the
categories get closer in terms of value towards the upper extreme of the
volatility spectrum. Romania has two main groups of parties – those with low
volatility (up to 20%), and those with high volatility (more than 40%) with no
values in between.
The visualization of these distributions is complemented by descriptive
statistical indicators that confirm these country differences. With the exception
of the Czech Republic, which has an average volatility of 11.73% (consistent with
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its clustering described above), the mean electoral volatility over all countries is
very similar (around 25%). However, the mean does not tell us much without
considering the standard deviation. The values of the latter support the earlier
observation that Hungary and Slovakia have the highest dispersion of volatility
as their standard deviations (around 25) greatly exceed those of other
countries. Furthermore, the range of volatility values reaches its peaks in these
two countries, at 89.10% in Hungary, and 82.21% in Slovakia. The next country,
Romania, follows far behind at 62.50%. Bulgaria has the smallest volatility range
(45.97) followed by the Czech Republic (54.88). This confirms the existence of
a homogenous sample of parties in both countries. It is relevant to note that
without an outlier situated at close to 60% volatility, the Czech Republic would
have by far the smallest range with a difference of about 25% between the
maximum and minimum volatility. The similarities between the distributions in
Bulgaria and Poland are also visible when reporting the indicators of central
tendency: there is a striking similarity in terms of averages (24.48 and 24.17)
and standard deviations (16.88 and 16.78). However, the observations based
directly on the graph were better suited to highlight differences in the
clustering (i.e. the categories around certain values).
Figure 2.4: Clusters of Electoral Volatility at Country Level
Electoral Volatility
Summing up, the distribution of electoral volatility across countries indicates a
few notable similarities and differences. First, there is a general tendency of
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most parties to cluster in the area between 5-40% electoral volatility. Extreme
values of volatility – both minima and maxima – are quite rare. Second, the
countries pair up in terms of the range of volatility or shape of dispersion. At
the same time, differences are identified along the same lines. Even in those
instances at which general resemblances are noticeable, a closer look reveals
various patterns. Following this line of reasoning, it is useful to analyze the
political parties with extreme volatility (both low and high) from these
countries. In doing so, I use their average volatility calculated as the mean
electoral volatility in all elections in which these parties competed between
1990 and 2008.
Table 2.2 includes these values and provides an indication of the
average range of electoral volatility at the party level in CEE countries. These
extremes (i.e. the least and the most volatile party in every country) reflect
general differences between the observed cases. For example, Poland is
characterized by small discrepancies between the parties situated at the ends
of the volatility continuum, but their electoral volatility values are high. By
contrast, Slovakia widens the gap between the volatility extremes.
Furthermore, the least volatile Polish party has higher values than the most
volatile Czech party, but Hungary and Slovakia have parties that are more
volatile than the most volatile Polish party.
Table 2.2: Extreme Averages of Electoral Volatility in CEE Countries
Country Political Party / Formation Average volatility (%)
Bulgaria DPS 17
SDS 31










In fact, the parties that exhibit extremely high volatility in Hungary and Bulgaria
are not (or are no longer) major political actors. For example, the MDF did not
gain access to the 1998 legislature, and the SDS in Bulgaria continuously lost
ground in national politics. Two observations can be made on the basis of this
general data. On one hand, the level of volatility at the party level is rather high
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and partially consistent with previous research that identifies such trends at the
party system level in the region. Moreover, the most volatile party in the entire
region, the Slovak SDL is no longer in parliament. In the most recent election
(2006), SDL did not compete individually as it merged in 2004 with Direction –
Social Democracy (SMER which was initially a faction of SDL). On the other
hand, consistent with the observations made previously in this section,
electoral volatility has a high degree of cross-country variation.
According to the data presented in Table 2.2, there are three types of
parties that exhibit the least electoral volatility. First, ethnic parties, with their
clearly targeted appeal and focus of representation, stabilize their electorate
quite well in two out of the three countries in which they can be found in CEE.
The Turkish minority party28 in Bulgaria (DPS) and that of the Hungarians in
Romania (iUDMR) count on a quite consistent body of voters, with the UDMR
being the most stable in the region. Its average volatility of 3% is, in large part,
the result of a relatively constant share of votes – very closely reflecting the
proportion of Hungarians in Romania – in all the elections irrespective of the
turnout. This evidence suggests that ethnic Hungarians mobilize to a similar
extent as ethnic Romanians. Second, there are two Christian-Democratic
parties that appeal to rather stable electorates in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. Third, successor parties display divergent paths: they are the most
stable in Hungary and Poland, and the most volatile in Slovakia in which the
successor party is the most volatile from the party system.
This apparent discrepancy (i.e. the variation in success of successor
parties) can be explained by a taking a closer look at cross-country political
developments. Comparative analyses indicate that the ex-communist parties in
the region generally followed the path of “pragmatic reform” (Ziblatt 1998)
and/or made a “nationalistic-patriotic” maneuver (Bozoki and Ishiyama 2002).
The first strategy refers to the invocation of the Western social democratic
tradition and called for “a sort of pro-capitalist policy ‘with a human face’”
(Bozoki 1997, 56; see also Sitter 2002). Given their inability to pursue classical
redistributive social-democratic policies alongside market-economic
transformation, the regenerated communist heirs dressed up their tactics into
“the catchy but empty slogans of competence and modernization” (Bozoki
2002, 6). As such, the key issue of their election campaigns became the
exclusive claims to political experience and technocratic expertise in
administering market restructuring more sensitively and effectively than any
(supposedly novice and inept) competitors. Ultimately, this strategy amounted
28 Due to constitutional provisions, in Bulgaria DPS is not referred to as a ”political party”; in
Romania, UDMR also avoids the term of party, using instead the term ”alliance”. However, both
political entities fulfill the functions of parties as defined by Sartori (1976) and, as such, the term
party is used to refer to both in this work.
82
to the neo-liberalization of the communist successor parties which tended to
pay off for those that managed to radically and credibly reorganize into
European social democratic parties into “competent arbiters of change”
(Hough 2005, 5). The most notable cases in this regard are the MSZP in
Hungary and the SLD in Poland. The achievement of these parties had a
positive impact upon the stability and clarity of at least their side of the political
spectrum.
However, the successor parties in Bulgaria and Romania (BSP and PSD)
are seen as the least compelling examples of communist regeneration. Rather
than turning wholeheartedly towards social democracy, these parties
“transmuted”, or moved away from their leftist traditions and drew nearer to
the cultural right, nationalist angle of politics (Bozoki and Ishiyama 2002). Their
“patriotic” line of adaptation was not so much the reflection of deep
ideological commitments, but rather an opportunistic (and largely successful)
attempt to retain power by means of dispersing populist propaganda and
making concessions to ultra nationalistic formations. (Pop-Eleches 1999, 132)
This tactic amounted to a lethargic and largely simulated transition that
essentially sabotaged economic reform and party system consolidation,
thereby relegating Bulgaria and Romania to the trenches of progress in the CEE
region.
As for the right-wing actors in Central and Eastern Europe, they seem to
have opted for a programmatic fusion of (neo-)liberal and various conservative
elements in order to gather electoral support and assert themselves in the
political arena (see Hanley 2000). The most remarkable case is that of the
FIDESZ in Hungary, which capitalized on the fragmentation of the right in the
country by forming strategic party alliances and absorbing smaller
organizations into a broad and durable block. In stark contrast, the tragic
narrative of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in Poland resulted in the
disarray of the right, characterized by a great deal of party fragmentation and
almost continuous new arrivals on the political stage (e.g. LPR, PIS, or SRP).
Cross-Party Comparisons
The extreme values displayed in Table 2.2 provide the basis for useful
comparisons at the country level. In narrowing down the scope of this analysis,
supplementary information is necessary. In this respect, a map of all analyzed
political parties in the region helps to sketch an accurate picture. In this
respect, the longitudinal distribution of volatility presented above is
complemented in this section by a bi-dimensional graph that both illustrates
the positioning of political parties relative to one another – revealing
commonalities and differences – and particularizes the analysis by associating
labels with specific values. The bi-dimensional space consists of the average
volatility calculated for some parties in Table 2.2 and a second dimension used
83
only in this chapter for a general electoral mapping of the CEE parties, namely
vote elasticity. Calculated on the basis of the formula proposed by Rose and
Urwin (1970), vote elasticity is the difference between the highest and the
lowest vote share received by a political party in all the legislative elections in
the period under scrutiny. The vote elasticity can also be seen as a function of
the size of the party. The measure emphasizes the homogeneity of voters for a
specific political party. A measurement such as this accounts only for the
difference between extreme performances in all elections in which a party
competes (unlike volatility that refers to consecutive elections).
In light of this, a party with stable electoral support scores low both on
elasticity (i.e. the vertical axis) and average volatility. Figure 2.5 draws a
complex picture in support of previous observations according to which UDMR
and KDH benefit from stable electoral support and are thus positioned in the
bottom left corner of the graph. At the other extreme, SDL in Slovakia is
situated towards the upper right corner, indicating high volatility and elasticity.
Before delving into the details, a methodological and an empirical observation
deserve attention. Methodologically, there are two parties with similar levels of
volatility and elasticity: KSCM in the Czech Republic and DPS in Bulgaria.















































On empirical grounds, there is higher variance on the volatility dimension
compared to vote elasticity. The figure depicts a variance in elasticity of up to
34% (SDS in Bulgaria), with more than 60% of parties being clustered below 20%.
However, on the volatility scale, the maximum score is 75 and the cut-off point
for half of the parties is somewhere around 30. The more homogenous
distribution in terms of elasticity is also indicated by the maximum point on the
graph (40) compared to that of volatility (80). This variance increases for
volatility when analyzing the volatility of electoral cycles. The figures and
graphic representations in this section are aggregated and refer to averages
and extremes only. More of this diversity is revealed in the following chapters
in which the formulated hypotheses are tested.
According to Figure 2.5, CEE parties can be clustered into four different
categories. The first category consists of parties with very low volatility and
very low elasticity. These are the competitors that are best able to mobilize a
stable core of voters across time. Two of these parties were referred to
extensively in the previous paragraphs (UDMR and KDH). The other two are
the MKP and KDU-CSL. All of the parties in this category are relatively small
and, in terms of their electoral performance, obtain an average of 8-9% of the
total vote share. It comes as no surprise that this category includes all the
ethnic parties as they have a clear target group and convey messages that
appeal to a stable core of electorate. Chapter 1 concluded that in CEE cleavages
have in general a weak explanatory power regarding the electoral volatility.
Whereas such a claim is valid for the broad universe of cases, this first cluster of
parties represents an isolated situation in which the ethnic cleavage is a
particular explanation for the level of electoral volatility.
However, the cleavage explanation does not cover the Christian-
democratic parties. All of them with the exception of the KDU-CSL were
unsuccessful in a series of elections, some of them failing to access the
legislature over several elections (e.g. KDNP in Hungary). The KDNP secured a
rather stable share of votes in the first elections (6.5% in 1990 and 7% in 1994),
but it dropped to half of this share in the subsequent 1998 and 2002 elections
as its message was taken over by major parties in Hungary. If the KDNP had
continued along the same line it did in the first electoral competitions, its score
would have placed it in the category of low volatility (elasticity is low).
The second category, which includes more parties, is characterized by
low to average volatility and elasticity. The two parties situated in the proximity
of the cluster are the KDNP and the ODS. Similar in terms of ideology to two of
the parties placed in the first category, the ODS has low volatility and high
elasticity brought about by a decrease in support in 2002. One of the two large
parties in the Czech Republic, the ODS is one of the least volatile in the region,
situated at the same level as the KDU-CSL on this dimension. In fact, the rest of
the ethnic and Christian-democratic parties are located within this category,
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thus strengthening the argument that their appeal is precisely targeted and
usually mobilizes specific voters. The rest of the parties in the category cluster
homogenously, with the SZDSZ in Hungary being the most elastic of all.
The third category is comprised of those parties with average volatility
and high elasticity. It is a less homogenous category than the previous two and
includes most major parties in the region: the BSP in Bulgaria, the CSSD in the
Czech Republic, the MSZP and the FIDESZ in Hungary; the PO and the SLD in
Poland, the PDL in Romania, and the HZDS in Slovakia. Overall, the major
parties can be expected to have higher elasticity for at least two reasons. On
one hand, most of these parties were small at the outset and gradually became
larger. Thus, the difference between the initial and most recent scores is great.
On the other hand, those parties that started out large (e.g. BSP) experienced
sudden drops in electoral support.
The fourth cluster of countries is heterogeneous and is characterized by
average elasticity and high volatility. It includes parties that, with the exception
of PNL in Romania, have failed at least once to gain access to parliament. The
average value of elasticity indicates that these parties perform similarly in
electoral terms, but the high volatility reveals the more important characteristic
these parties share: they are rather small parties that occasionally register very
good electoral results. Both parties that fail to enter parliament after 2000 –
FKGP – reside in this category. In fact, counter-performance such as this
triggers high levels of volatility, irrespective of the homogeneity of a party’s
range of electoral results.
One final relevant point revealed by Figure 2.5 is related to the
dispersion of parties within the same party system. There are rare occasions on
which parties from the same country follow similar patterns. In Poland, the PO,
the PIS, and the SLD reside in the third category. In Romania, the PNL and the
PRM reside in the fourth cluster. In the vast majority of cases, political parties
from the same country perform differently on the two dimensions, revealing
once more the need to study them closely in order to fully understand the
dynamics at work. In this respect, the most illustrative case is that of the PSD
and the PDL in Romania. These parties emerged after the 1991 split within the
FSN (i.e. the umbrella organization that played a major role in the 1989 regime
change). Their development over the course of two decades differs
significantly. The PSD registers stable levels of support and keeps the
discrepancy between its best and worst performance to a minimum.
Unlike the PSD, the PDL ran in elections in multiple coalitions (only in
2000 and 2008 it run on its own) and its performance varied greatly. With
average results in the first three elections, the party became larger as of 2004
and managed to maintain relatively stable core of voters (although it
performed more poorly than PSD). The real difference between the two parties
can be expressed in terms of elasticity: the PDL oscillates between the 7% it
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received in 2000 and the 32% it received in the most recent elections.
Conversely, the PSD has a narrower interval of electoral support (21.5% in 1996
and 24% in 2004).
The Role of Extremes within Party Systems
As a final point, the emphasis has been placed on specific cross-party
differences derived from Figure 2.5. In doing this, the five parties positioned at
the extremes of the volatility and/or elasticity axes are selected and their
development between elections is briefly analyzed. Beginning with volatility
trends, the parties with extreme values are examined from the perspective of
the role they play within party systems. The observation of trends in volatility
implies a return to the initial calculations based on formula (1). Throughout this
book, the unit of observation is the political party/election and – unless
specified as in the previous sections – the analysis employs calculations at that
level. Figure 2.6 traces the evolution of levels of electoral volatility (Y axis) for
each party in consecutive elections (X axis)29.























Note: The elections included on the horizontal axis refer to 1994, 1997, 2001,
and 2005 in Bulgaria; 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Hungary; 1992, 1996, 2000,
2004, and 2008 in Romania; 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Slovakia.
29 The numbers on the horizontal axis mark the election in which volatility is calculated. Thus, the
number 1 corresponds to the second election in which the party competes.
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The selected parties are the UDMR and the KDH30 (low elasticity and electoral
volatility), the SDL (medium elasticity and high volatility), the MSZP (low
volatility and high elasticity), and the SDS (medium volatility and high
elasticity). Given the profiles of these parties, their volatility trends are
expected to differ considerably. Figure 2.6 confirms this expectation with the
two least volatile and elastic parties having low volatility values with little
variation across time. At the other extreme, SDL has consistently high levels of
volatility. With the exception of the first period (between election one and two
on the graph), the intermediary cases of the MSZP and the SDS display similar
volatility trends at various levels. The following paragraphs attach meaning to
these values and tendencies and explain the role played by these political
parties within their systems.
UDMR is the high performer of the CEE region in terms of volatility and
elasticity. Formed on the same day on which the Ceausescu couple was
sentenced to death and executed –Christmas Day, 1989 – the UDMR refers to
itself as an alliance rather than a party. In practice, this is connected not so
much with anti-party feelings amongst citizens, but with the institutional
origins of this political actor. It initially included sixteen different parties and
associations that were able to preserve their status inside UDMR. This was
made possible by the internal organization of the party which grouped local
caucuses into autonomous county31 branches (Bugajski 2002, 865).
The party statute granted decision-making power to the local branches.
The common denominator between all component entities was that they ran
under the same label, proposing a unitary list of candidates in the national
legislative elections. With a message focused on the representation of
Hungarians in Romania, this party consistently gravitates around 7% of the vote
share. The quest for a legal framework in which collective rights for national
minorities would be secured determined the UDMR to seek inclusion in
government coalitions. Its stable electorate allowed the party to play a pivotal
role in Romanian politics. After two terms in opposition (1990-1992 and 1992-
1996), as of 1996, the UDMR either took part in government coalitions with
various partners or maintained a “silent agreement” with the minority cabinet
(2000-2004). Its party discipline, capacity for adaptation, and loyalty to the
government coalition32 transform it into a reliable partner. Thus, with the
30 The two parties are selected because they have similar average volatility and electoral elasticity
scores.
31 The county is the main territorial-administrative unit of Romania, it corresponds to the
constituencies in the legislative elections.
32 UDMR joined the government coalition led by CDR between 1996 and 2000. When its term of
office was close to an end, one of the coalition partners (USD) defected and CDR created a
minority government relying on the suport of UDMR. A similar situation, with more or less the
same actors, was recorded in 2007 when PD (half of USD) left the coalition government created
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exception of the extremist PRM, most parties are willing to take UDMR on
board when forming governments.
This pivotal role of the UDMR is made possible by permanent discourse
adaptations. The goal of UDMR to represent the interests of the Hungarians
both from the perspective of their particular ethnic background and ideological
perspective (Bugajski 1994, 18) provides room for maneuver. The party was
always a mixture of radicals and moderates and experienced ongoing internal
disputes. Although the leaders of the party were generally moderates, the
beginning of the UDMR’s existence was marked by radical action that was
largely a response to the nationalist acts on the part of Romanian leaders. For
example, in 1992 an autonomy manifesto of the Hungarian minority was
launched as a response to the anti-Hungarian measures adopted by the mayor
of Cluj-Napoca (Bugajski 2002, 868). This is the main city in Transylvania in
which Hungarians make up almost one fifth of the population. These internal
divisions characterized the party throughout the entire post-communist period,
but no defections were recorded (Millard 2004, 136). Although the moderate
approach granted the party access to coalition governments, workable
compromises between internal factions became more difficult to achieve as
the party became a solid pillar of the Romanian party system. The party has
made slight modifications to its discourse in recent years in response to
numerous signals that it would lose votes to a more radical faction to be
formed within the Hungarian minority (i.e. the Hungarian Civic Forum)
(Gherghina and Jiglau 2008). The achievement of internal balance cleared the
path towards low levels of volatility in elections.
Similar to the UDMR in terms of elasticity and average volatility, the
KDH shows a stability pattern only as of the third election in which it
participates. The curve in Figure 2.6 indicates that these two parties follow
paths similar to that of the UDMR at a lower level of volatility. The party
garners more electoral support than the UDMR, with results around 8.5% of
votes in elections with a peak in 1994 at which point it obtained 10% of votes.
Founded in 1990 by a Catholic dissident from the communist era, the party
combines the tradition of Slovak pre-WWII political Catholicism and the
ideology of Western European Christian democracy (Szajkowski 2005, 527).
Based on this close connection with Christian Democratic parties around
Europe, the party was a strong supporter of the European and Atlantic
integration project throughout the 1990s (Bugajski 2002, 308; Henderson 2008,
286). In the second post-communist decade, the Catholic ideological roots of
the party gave rise to conditional support for the EU, and the contention that
accession should be accompanied by active involvement. For example, in 2003
with PNL (part of CDR back in 1996) and UDMR. The latter two parties supported a minority
government that finalized its term in office without early elections.
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KDH supported a motion in parliament on the sovereign right of EU member
states to decide on cultural and ethical issues (Haughton 2004b).
In organizational terms, the KDH faced two relevant splits that
weakened its appeal to voters. This is particularly true in that the most recent
split took place in a period of electoral apogee. Two years after its formation, in
the aftermath of the ‘velvet divorce’ from the Czech Republic, a nationalist
faction split from the party (Bugajski 2002, 306-307). The second split took
place in the wake of the 1998 elections at which point disagreement between
two leaders of the KDH about the future of the party within the Slovak
Democratic Coalition (SDK) led to the separation of the Mikulas Dzurinda
faction which led to the creation of a new party – the SDKU. The most recent
split partially explains the KDH’s shift in ideology during the second decade. Its
orientation towards conservatism and soft Euro-scepticism was meant to
provide a contrast with the attitudes of SDKU (Henderson 2002, 2). In spite of
splits, ideological changes, and relatively low electoral support, the party
remained a consistent actor on the Slovak political scene. Its electoral stability
coincided with the KDH’s reliability as a partner in all coalition governments in
which the HZDS did not take part, as the two political actors were in fierce
opposition. Thus, the KDH was in the coalition government after the 1998 and
2002 elections.33 In 1998, they led the broad five-party coalition and provided
the prime minister in the person of Dzurinda, whereas in the latter they left the
government at the beginning of 2006 due to an international dispute between
Slovakia and the Vatican over a religious issue.
As a successor of the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), the SDL inherited
extensive membership34, nationwide organizations, and a recognizable label.
Its popularity has suffered from dramatic oscillations, transforming the party
into the most volatile in CEE. Without outstanding electoral results (see the low
level of elasticity in Figure 2.5), this party did not manage to maintain a stable
core of voters between elections. Its evolution is characterized by high
oscillations: achievements in terms of voter support were immediately
followed by major drops in support and electoral success emerged after a
disappointing performance. What were initially good results in 1992 (14.5%),
were followed by a drop in the subsequent 1994 early elections to half of that
share. However, in the 1998 elections, the party gained a similar amount of
votes to those it gained in 1994. After the second major drop in 2002 (1.4% on
common lists with two other parties), SDL merged with another political party
33 KDH also took part in one government before the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and its
leader, Jan Carnogursky was prime minister between 1991 and 1992. For details, see Henderson
(2007, 287).
34 In 1991, SDL decided to initiate the re-registration of members and, as such, dropped from an
initial amount of more than 100,000 inherited members to 20,000 volunteer members. For
details, see Bugajski (2002, 298).
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(SMER), losing its label and identity. This drop was produced by the major split
of a moderate faction led by Peter Weiss and Milan Ftacnik who formed the
Social Democratic Alternative (Szajkowski 2005, 532).
Although it is one of the few Slovak political parties with consistent
presence on the political arena next to the HZDS and the KDH, high electoral
instability is only characteristic of the SDL. At the same time, it is the only
Slovak party among the three that did not safeguard a key role in the political
evolution of the country. It was included only once in a government coalition
following the 1998 election at which point it achieved its highest electoral
performance, and an invitation to engage in a cooperation agreement with the
Meciar government towards the end of its second term in office. This situation
was mainly the result of consistently lower antipathy shown towards HZDS by
the elites of SDL compared with the other opposition parties (Deegan-Krause
2006, 104). Although this agreement to support a minority government was
not enforced (Pridham 2002), it highlights the SDL’s susceptibility to blackmail
at that particular moment, very close to their 1998 electoral peak. Although the
average electoral performance of SDL is higher than that of KDH, the trends
they exhibit in the context of Slovak politics differ considerably. Ideology can
play an important role in explaining these trends, but it is quite unlikely to be
the key explanatory factor in this case as both the SDL and the KDH have broad
views that should allow for coalitions with multiple competitors. At the same
time, the SDL was not marginalized and the KDH did not display a coherent
ideology throughout the investigated period. There is definitely an association
between the roles in Slovak politics and electoral volatility: the more involved
KDH benefited from a stable core of voters and could thus continue its
activities at comparable levels across elections.
From the same category of successor parties as the SDL, the MSZP tells
a different story. It is the successor of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
and it is one of the two large parties in Hungary. With low electoral volatility,
the party has high electoral elasticity due in large part to the results of the first
post-communist election in which it attracted only 10% of votes. As the average
vote share received in the second election (1994) was around 35%, the volatility
is large only at the beginning and drops again by the third election. This
situation is reflected in Figure 2.6. From that moment onwards, the MSZP’s
volatility level can be compared to those of the UDMR and the KDH. The party
formed a coalition government in 1994-1998 as well as in the most recent two
terms in offices (2002-2006 and 2006-2010). Recent scandals involving the
president of MSZP, and then prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsany, revealed lies
and manipulation during the electoral campaign. As a result, their coalition
partner (SZDSZ) withdrew and the MSZP formed the first minority government
in Hungary that lasted until April 2009 at which point Gyurcsany resigned and
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the new prime minister, an independent, Gordon Bajnai, was supported by the
MSZP and the SZDSZ.
The MSZP is the political party that transformed the Hungarian political
life into a play with two main characters. It shaped three out of five
governments until 2010, won every election but the initial ones (in 1998 it did
not govern though it obtained the highest share of votes and number of seats),
and represented a significant governing alternative in the form of a major
opposition party during the FIDESZ government in 1998-2002. MSZP
encapsulates, on a relatively constant basis, the preferences of more than one
third of the electorate. Its presence in the party system coincides with the
consolidation of a broad electorate.
The SDS was founded in December 1989, as a union of 11 political
organizations in opposition to the Communist government (Bugajski 2002). Its
composition changed immediately afterward and, in 1990, six more parties
were incorporated (Waller and Karasimeonov 1996). In February 1997, SDS
transformed into a single unified party. The 1990s were the years of glory for
the party that reached its peak in the 1997 legislative elections at which point a
coalition called United Democratic Forces (ODS) was formed around the SDS.
The coalition government remained in power until 2001 and represents the only
time at which SDS took part in government. During these two decades, the SDS
ran only once in elections without coalition partners (1994) and their volatility is
quite high. Moreover, as its scores oscillated heavily, the difference between its
worst and best performance is very high and that is why the SDS is positioned
at the extreme in terms of elasticity in Figure 2.6. Its support in the first three
elections (1991-1997) is situated around 33%, whereas in the most recent two
elections its vote share decreases to 10%. This discrepancy is reflected in the
shape of the volatility curve that increases between the elections in which SDS
lost a large proportion of its voters (1997 vs. 2001) and stabilizes at both ends
(1991 vs. 1994 and 2001 vs. 2005). Once a major actor in Bulgarian politics, SDS
consistently lost ground and succeeded in entering parliament only by joining
new electoral alliances or coalitions.
This sub-section primarily illustrates the important roles played by the
five parties that register extreme values in terms of volatility and elasticity
within their respective party systems. Most of these parties are relevant
political actors participating in coalitions and represent more than marginal
forces on the political scene. However, there are a few visible differences
between them with substantial implications in terms of volatility. There is a
positive association between the importance of a party to the party system and
electoral volatility over time. Given the dual nature of such a relationship in
which volatility can be either the cause or the effect of importance within the
party system, no cause-effect conclusions can be derived. Nevertheless, this
systematic observation indicates that neither volatility nor importance is
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influenced by the level of electoral support. Both the highly popular MSZP and
the specifically-oriented UDMR shape the political environment decisively
through their involvement in a number of government coalitions. In general,
the more volatile parties participate in coalition governments less often. Most
of the time, these parties are in opposition, although their ideology allows
them to collaborate with other political actors.
Conclusions
Can volatility be measured only through individual-level voter changes? The
answer to this question is negative. Relying on theoretical arguments from the
literature, the first section of this chapter explored the reliability of an indicator
that accounts for the aggregate change in votes in consecutive elections. At
the same time, unlike previous research conducted the party-system level, this
chapter argues in favor of the necessity of calculating volatility with the
primary unit of political representation (the political party) as the reference
point. In doing so, there are a few methodological choices that must be made
in terms of the relative measurement of vote shifts and the identification of
political support for individual actors following splits, mergers, or an electoral
alliance formation and disintegration. In addition, the focus on individual
parties requires the estimation of changes in electoral support relative to the
size of the party.
The descriptive analysis presented in this chapter justifies the analytical
endeavor in the four chapters to follow. There exists great variation in electoral
volatility across countries and parties. Aggregate and party-level data (Figures
2.4 and 2.5) reveal important differences between political actors in terms of
electoral support. In this setting, time does not influence the stability of voter
preferences. This empirical evidence supports the refutation of the
democratization argument presented in Chapter 1.  The time passed from the
moment of regime change means the achievement of democratic
performances for these countries. Moreover, it coincides with an important
component of institutional democratization – the experience of free elections.
As post-communist citizens were deprived of the right to choose their
representatives for more than five decades, their behavior was expected to be
chaotic at the outset and stabilize over time. This is not the case with the
parties included in this analysis. The distribution of volatility in the two post-
communist decades is very similar with a slight increase in the number of stable
voters in the first rather than the second decade.
Government incumbency appears to make a difference with respect to
voter preferences. This observation allows for the formulation of two
propositions. On theoretical grounds, voters appear to behave in a manner that
is consistent with the reward or punish strategy with regard to incumbent
parties. In empirical terms, incumbency may explain certain variation in party
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volatility and its inclusion among the control variables is justified by these
general findings. The cross-party differences, although calculated here on the
basis volatility means and electoral elasticity, encourage the quest for an
explanation of their dispersion. Furthermore, the analysis of the outliers
revealed an association between high levels of volatility and importance of the
party in the context of the political system of the country. These are the
general premises on which I design and conduct the empirical tests to identify
the impact of specific features of party organization on electoral volatility.
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Chapter 3 The Centralization of Candidate Selection Process
and Electoral Volatility
Introduction
Political parties are composite organizations with multiple purposes that range
from self-preservation to the implementation of policy preferences (Rose and
Mackie 1988). Most of the times, such purposes are not exclusive but rather
complementary. Their prioritization in the life of a party depends on the
opportunities and constraints coming from the external environment (e.g.
competition, electoral system) and internal developments (e.g. splits,
mergers). To ensure its survival, the party organization seeks to stabilize and
control both dimensions (Panebianco 1988, 12). In doing so, the biggest
challenge for political parties is to identify the means to stabilize their most
salient external feature: the electoral support. Irrespective of parties´ priorities,
votes are the necessary precondition for achieving other goals (Sartori 1976, 25;
Budge and Keman 1990, 10; Laver and Schofield 1990, 36-38); they are also
essential for parties´ political survival. In this respect, parties seek to avoid loss
of electoral support that will remove them from scene.
Hence, they behave as agents of electoral mobilization occupying a
relevant position in the social flow of political communication (Hucksfeldt and
Sprague 1992, 70). The instrumental dilemma is how parties communicate with
their voters. Poguntke (2002, 45-48) identifies two possible ways in which the
party-voter relationship can be established. First, there is a direct
communication of the party leaders with the electorate through the mass-
media and, more recently, Internet. The main mechanism can be summarized
as follows: party leaders are aware of individual citizens’ preferences and
promise responsiveness in exchange for their votes. This direct linkage
between leaders and electorate faces numerous challenges (e.g. issue saliency
decided by elites) and bears multiple uncertainties (e.g. low levels of
confidence towards party leaders). Second, the communication is mediated by
own (e.g. youth organization, local branches) and ancillary organizations (e.g.
trade unions, Churches). These intermediaries are meant to aggregate the
multitude of individual wishes into coherent demands to be sent to the party
elites. Party organizations play a much more important role in the mediated
linkage compared to external organizations. Although the internal life of
parties becomes increasingly complex (Kitschelt 1989; Heidar and Koole 2000;
Rahat and Hazan 2001; Deschouwer 2006; van Houten 2009) and the political
parties’ organizations are quite heterogeneous (Katz and Mair 1994), the usage
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of internal mediators is more likely to be controlled than external organizations
that may attach no party loyalty.
Parties can benefit greatly from an organizational communication with
the voters. As explained in Chapter 1, tighter connections with the electorate
are possible through the party structures on the ground. Voters can be
encapsulated through active local party branches, formally organized, and with
decision-making autonomy within the party. If local organizations receive
substantial powers within the intra-party procedures they will be able to
channel the societal demands and give them priority. One of the most
important decisions within the life of a party, visible to voters, is the candidate
selection for national elections. This can have an effect on the electoral
volatility; the formulated hypothesis (H1) specifies that political parties with a
decentralized selection of candidates for the national elections coincides will
have lower levels of electoral volatility than the parties with centralized
selection of candidates.
The first section conceptualizes and operationalizes the centralization
of candidate selection and explains the methodological choices. The second
section compares the formal provisions regarding candidate selection
identified in the statutes with the reality observable in CEE. The third section
presents and discusses the general situation in CEE, emphasizing the
distribution of political parties across the categories of candidate selection.
Next, I discuss the results of the statistical analysis and present the party
specific candidate selection. The chapter ends with a section dedicated to a
detailed discussion of two political parties. These illustrate how the relationship
between candidate selection and electoral volatility functions.
The Conceptualization and Operationalization of Candidate Selection in CEE
The intra-party decision-making generally refers to the overarching distribution
of power within party organizations. Its importance is revealed from early
assertions. Eldersveld (1964, 4) argued that political parties were poorly
organized and did not posses any of the conventional systems of a
bureaucracy, lacking division of roles, discipline, and sanctions. Two decades
later, Gibson et al. (1983, 198) identified the necessity of political parties to
have strong organizations. The two criteria used to assess the strength were
the organizational complexity (i.e. the existence of enduring headquarters
operation) and the programmatic complexity (i.e. the engagement in various
activities related to their electoral targets). Panebianco (1988) developed the
criteria and explained how the development of the central party organization
may represent a key element for survival. Parties with bureaucratic
organizations are able to better channel their messages and ensure consistent
means of elite recruitment. The development of national offices does not
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reflect only the concentration of power, but also the capacity to divide the
labor so that the tasks are efficiently performed.
The key issue is who takes the decision and to what extent the central
office (i.e. national level) controls the regional and local levels in conducting
politics, thus enforcing its decisions on sub-national organs (Harmel and Janda
1982, 59-60). The selection of candidates is a crucial indicator for the internal
party democracy (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, 1). Given its importance and the
numerous problems that may occur (i.e. internal conflicts), it is likely to have all
these regulated in the official documents (Bille 2001, 365). The rules about
candidate selection vary among the ideal types of party organization ranging
from loose rules and self-selection in cadre parties to the formalized criteria
identifiable in the mass parties (Hopkin 2001, 344). This is the main reason for
which I assess the candidate selection based on the formal specifications from
the statutes.
Bille (2001, 365) points at the difference between the specific party
regulations and the procedures adopted by the Western European political
parties. The rules are too narrow to create comparable categories. A
comparison can be made if concepts are reduced to their lowest common
denominator and thus different phenomena are given the same name (Katz
and Mair 1990, 1). The statutes of the CEE political parties raise a similar
challenge. As it will become obvious from the sections dedicated to country
and party descriptions, the rules are specific and employ different means of
treating the relationships between the decision making layers. The empirical
analysis conducted in this chapter reduces the complexity of regulatory texts
by focusing mainly on the intra-party layers that decide upon the candidate
nominations and the weight of their decisions. In doing so, it assigns secondary
roles to particular procedures of nomination and various mediating committees
between the decision layers. The resulting categories account for similar layers
of decision – i.e. local, regional, and central – through a standardized
procedure.
Previous studies operationalized the candidate selection rules (Bille
2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Lundell 2004; Kittilson and Scarrow 2006; Shomer
2009). The existing measurements focus on two dimensions of candidate
selection – the centralization and the inclusiveness – sometimes treated
together. As centralization is crucial for this study, the measurement of
candidate selection aims to differentiate between the layers of decision.
The scale elaborated by Lundell (2004, 31) is appropriate in this respect.
Given the empirical diversity of CEE, I use a modified version of this scale. I add
a supplementary category (i.e. number 4 in Figure 3.1) that helps for a better
differentiation between the candidate selection for the national elections
across political parties. Following the analysis of party statutes, Lundell created
a five point scale that had as extremes the selection of candidates at local
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meetings or through primaries and the exclusive selection by the party leader
or by a national selection committee. In between there are three categories in
which the selection process at national and regional level is influenced by local
or national bodies, with possibilities of negotiation between the two layers.
The additional category created in the light of the empirical realities from CEE
refers to the composition of the list of candidates through a joined effort of the
local/regional and national levels. The resulted index (Figure 3.1) consists of six
categories and ranges from the selection of candidates at local level to a highly
centralized selection procedures.
Figure 3.1: The Index of Candidate Selection in CEE Political Parties
1 2 3 4 5 6
Selection at           Selection at
local level           central level
1 – Decentralized
2 – Local authority
3 – Local nominations
4 – Mixed nominations
5 – Central nominations
6 - Centralized
This selection index is used as the independent variable in the analysis from this
chapter. The six categories reflect the layer of decision regarding the candidate
selection within a party. The meanings of the labels and values are the
following:
1) Decentralized: Selection of candidates is either done at the local level by
selection committees or by primaries open to all party members.
2) Local authority: The selection takes place at the local level (e.g. committee,
organization, or local assembly), but the formal approval by regional or
national organs is necessary. There is no actual involvement of these organs in
the outcome of decision.
3) Local nominations: The selection takes place at the local or regional level,
but the national level exercises influence over the final composition of the lists
through veto rights or the possibility to add names.
4) Mixed nominations: The selection takes place both at local and central level.
Local and central organizations propose candidates to a relatively equal extent
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or on the basis of an internal algorithm (e.g. one third local vs. two thirds
central); the final decision is taken at central level.
5) Central nominations: The selection takes place at central level with the
possibility for the local organizations to exercise influence over the list
composition (e.g. adding names).
6) Centralized: Selection done by the party leader, national executive organs,
or central office (committee).
A few practical nuances are necessary to diminish the risks of conceptual
stretching or over-simplification. First, the category of decentralized decision
making does not imply a total autonomy of the local branch in deciding upon
candidates’ selection. As each party has a national organization, the central
office will always keep an eye on its local branches. Moreover, there are certain
guidelines that local organizations follow in deciding who makes the party list
in the future elections. There is always a minimum control that ensures the
cohesiveness of the party, the coherence in transmitting the electoral
messages, and avoids the confusion of the voters (Rose 1980; Harmel and
Janda 1994; Pennings and Hazan 2001).
Similarly, there are isolated cases in which the decision power rests
absolutely into the hands of the party leadership with no influences from
territorial branches. However, when such influences are marginal and not
established on institutional bases and the outcome depends to a heavy extent
on the central – quite often national committee or council – office the political
party is considered to be highly centralized. Second, in spite of specific
regulations and particular labels assigned to decision making bodies within the
party organization (e.g. National Council, Regional Committee, Territorial
Organization etc.), the structure of decision follows a similar pattern. Thus,
three main layers are easily identifiable: local, regional, and central.
Methodological Choices
The analysis of the statutes focuses on the provisions regarding the candidates
selected for the legislative elections. In the vast majority of cases, the statutes
do not distinguish between the nominations for the Chambers of Parliament.
Whenever the party statute includes specific references to the nomination
procedures for the Lower Chamber candidates, only those are considered.
There is one party (DPS in Bulgaria) that does not mention the
candidate selection in its statute. In this case I have looked at the internal
hierarchy of the party and noticed that the central office and the leader of the
party (Ahmed Dogan) play a crucial role in any decision. Whenever complex
divisions of power occur within the party – regarding specific issues – they are
formally regulated by the statute. As nothing is written down with respect to
the candidate selection, the decision-making process is hierarchically
100
organized, in the simplest top-down possible manner. The only provision about
the candidates refers to the prerogative of the party leader to approve them. In
these conditions, it is safe to consider that the selection is centralized.
Moreover, when examining the party statutes, a striking issue popped-
up in the Hungarian case. Given the structure of the electoral system – which
includes single member districts, regional PR lists, and local PR lists – the
political parties have general rules regarding the nomination of candidates. The
local organization decides the single member districts candidates, the regional
organization decides and proposes the candidates for the PR system at their
level, whereas national lists are compiled by the central office. Such a situation
in which two thirds of the candidates are appointed by the local level and one
third by the national level would generally receive a score of 4 according to the
above index. This would mean the absence of variation across the Hungarian
parties.
However, the provisions of the statutes mention the prerogatives of
the central office in implementing this rule and thus increased variation occurs
between the Hungarian parties. For example, the MSZP has absolute freedom
in nominating candidates. Starting 1999, the National Council has a limited right
to influence the candidate nomination. Thus, it can cancel the nominations of
local branches only in exceptional cases, with very strong arguments (Machos
2000). The MDF displays a balance between the local and central layers at all
decision-making levels regarding the candidates. Whenever one side proposes,
the other can oppose. The FIDESZ is the party where the central office has the
final word to say regarding all candidates. It always expresses an opinion based
on the nominations of the local branches.
Parties make small paces towards organizational change. Once
established at a certain level of centralization, political parties rarely modify this
setting.35 Adaptation processes are slow as quite often political parties, after
perceiving the necessity for change, initiate internal debates that require time
until a decided policy is implemented. It is more likely to have faster changes
within the more centralized parties compared to the rest; they have a more
direct chain of command and decision-making, with little contestation in the
territory. For example, one of the two political parties that modified their
degree of centralization in candidate selection is the PSD in Romania. In 2004 it
implemented the primaries for all party members to select the candidates. This
setting was abandoned at the 2008 elections, the party going back to the old
practices. The 2005 statute mentions that primaries are optional.
35 Some parties modified their statutes in the first years after formation as their initial power
relations were quite blurry; this is the case with SZDSZ (in 1991) and FIDESZ (in 1993) in Hungary
or SDS in Bulgaria. For details on these examples, see Balazs and Enyedi (1996) and Waller and
Karasimeonov (1996).
101
With this exception and that of the KDU-CSL in the Czech Republic, the
provisions regarding the decision making within the party organization are not
significantly modified over time to determine shifts of the political parties
between categories. Thus, the candidate selection is a longitudinal constant for
a party. Methodologically, an accurate correlation should be made between the
index of candidate selection and the average electoral volatility. However,
empirical considerations determined a different choice. When calculating the
average volatility, the differences between the electoral volatility of the parties
are distorted. There are instances in which a political party has a stable core of
voters for the vast majority of time, but a very high volatility at a certain
moment in time (e.g. MSZP in Figure 2.6). The aggregated volatility mean puts
on an equal foot such a case with that of a political party with constant medium
levels of electoral volatility. To avoid such a shortcoming, the correlation is
conducted between the level of centralization and the volatility at each
election. Without running into the over-estimation of the relationship, such an
approach isolates outlier behaviors and detects general trends closer to the
real situation.
Structural and Procedural Commonalities of Candidate Selection in CEE
On the basis of statute analysis, a few common features of candidate selection
cand be identified across the CEE political parties. First, given the existence of
nationalized organizations, national party congresses are held regularly. Their
frequency ranges both in terms of regulations and in practice. In most cases,
the party statutes impose a minimum time frame between congresses. Such an
interval ranges from one to four years. In practice, most CEE political parties
organize their regular congresses every two or four years. The national
congresses are organized strategically half way between the legislative
elections and before election time. Extraordinary national meetings are usually
generated by unexpected events such as major electoral failures in the recent
elections, early elections, loss of leaders, possibilities of mergers, or imminent
splits due to internal conflicts.
Second, the national congress generally includes representatives
elected either by local organizations or through various committees at
intermediate echelons. At the same time, the size of the congress reflects the
extension of territorial organizations and the membership dimension. Although
the ratio between delegates and party members is rarely specified (van Biezen
2003, 121), there is a general tendency among the CEE parties to have a
proportional representation of their membership organizations. This is why the
size of the national congress is altered between gatherings. These often
modifications are a possible explanation for the lack of any explicit provisions
regarding the members-delegates relationship.
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Finally, most of the CEE political parties have four institutions of
authority. The first in order of importance is the national congress that can
wear the alternative labels of conference or assembly. The major functions of
the congress target the adoption of changes in existing party documents (e.g.
statutes), the elaboration of new party documents, the adoption of general
decisions, and the election of an executive body for the party. The national
organizational structure is the second institution of authority and it has various
names ranging from central bureau to supreme council. It generally consists of
an executive body that includes the key figures of the party leadership
(president, vice-president, secretaries) and a national board.
Apart from its executive and general tasks between the national
congresses, this structure has decision making powers that correspond to my
conceptualization of centralized. Whenever decisions are taken by the national
organization, there are a few influences of the local or intermediary
institutions. The third institution is represented by the territorial or regional
council – with alternative names such as office or board – that gathers the
leaders of local organizations. There are numerous regional councils, varying
according to the territorial administrative divisions of the countries. With a
permanent existence, this institution is relevant within those parties where the
decision represents a negotiation between the local and central organizations.
Apart from its mediating role, it acts as a filter for the demands of the local
organizations and in the candidate selection process. This organization also
chooses the representatives for the national congress. Finally, the fourth
institution is represented by the local organization that usually comes last in
the chain of decision within a party. The initiatives takes at this level require
approvals and often face vetoes of the superior decision layers. This is mainly
the reason for which the analysis of party statutes revealed so few cases of
candidate selection and program drafting at local level.
With these methodological and empirical issues in mind, the following
section discusses the similarity between the formal division of power (i.e.
expressed in the statutes) and the practice (on the basis of expert surveys).
Such an analysis is meant to show that formal regulations are the basis of
action.
Formal and Practical Decision Making
It is common knowledge that the formal regulations and informal practices of
parties often differ. This section includes an empirical test between these two
variables across the CEE political parties. The formal regulations are
represented by the index of candidate selection (Figure 3.1). The practices of
parties are approximated through an expert survey (Borz 2009). The survey
was conducted online, for three months at the end of 2007. There were three
reminders for questionnaire completion. For each country there were between
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five and 10 experts. No data are available for the Bulgarian parties as there
were not enough experts to answer. The question referring to party
centralization was the following: “Centralization of power refers to the
location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party
with regard to the top national party organs. Assign a score from 1 to 5 to each
party for the level of centralization in decision-making, selection of candidates,
and the distribution of party finances as of 2006/2007”. The possible answers
were: 1) very low, 2) low, 3) medium, 4) high, and 5) very high.
There are two methodological reasons that may influence the
correlation strength between these variables. First, the question in the survey
is broader than the scope of the statute analysis. Apart from candidate
selection, it refers also to the general level of centralization and distribution of
party finances. Second, the survey question refers to a specific period of time
(i.e. 2006/2007). Thus, expert evaluations may be contextual or influenced by
recent events. As mentioned in the previous section, in the case of statutes
there is almost no development over time. Despite numerous modifications in
the party statutes over two decades, the initial setting for decision-making
within the parties is almost unchanged. Figure 3.2 depicts the distribution of
the political parties on the formal dimension of centralization and the
evaluations of the experts (i.e. average of evaluations for each party). The
survey contains only 22 out of the 29 parties analyzed in this book.
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Note: The formal scores are takes from Borz (2009).
As visible also from Figure 3.2, there is a high positive correlation between the
variables: 0.66, statistical significant at the 0.01 level. This means that a party
that has a formal centralized decision making in its statute behaves accordingly
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in real life. This indicates that the CEE parties do what they preach. However,
experts’ opinions on these parties tend to indicate more centralized features
for all of them. Although the available range of answers was 1 to 5, most
evaluations are situated in the range 3 to 5; there are only two evaluations
below 3. Such a tendency may be given by the other two factors that the
experts had to bear in mind when making the evaluations – the overall
centralization and distribution of funds. The latter is rarely the task of the local
organizations within the CEE parties.
This brief statistical analysis indicates that there are deviations of the
CEE political parties from their formal regulations. Based on the experts’
evaluations, these deviations appear to be small. The assessment of the
practical centralization of power cluster on the corresponding categories
identified at formal level. For example, the experts’ evaluations for the parties
within the same category of formal decentralization (1 on the horizontal axis in
Fiure 3.2) are homogenous. The graph illustrates that deviations are random
across political parties. Consequently, there is no systematic bias in considering
the formal regulations as the basis of action for the CEE political parties.
The Negotiation of Candidate Selection
This section compares the candidate selection procedures for national
elections among the CEE parties (Figure 3.3). The analysis includes 31 cases due
to the fact that the KDU-CSL in the Czech Republic and the PSD in Romania
changed the candidate selection procedures in their statutes during the post-
communist period. The category corresponding to value 2 in the index has no
corresponding case. There is no party in CEE in which the statute to mention a
formal role of the central organizations in the candidate selection without any
effective influence.
Almost 60% of the surveyed parties opt for a balance between the local
and central layers in selecting the candidates. This balance is reflected in three
categories: local nominations of candidates that can be modified or veto-ed by
the centre (36%), mixed nominations that involve both local and central level
(19%), or central nominations that can be later influenced by the local
organizations (6%). There is a tendency of many CEE political parties to allow
the local organizations to organize the selection and to influence it afterwards.
The predominance of this arrangement is not surprising if we consider the
willingness of both central and local elites to control the nomination process.
Moreover, it can be a cost-benefit assessment coming from the centre. As the
selection process takes place at local level, most resources are spent by the
territorial branches (e.g. time to recruit candidates, socialization processes
etc.). The central level spends less time or effort and ensures an effective
control if it expresses opinion on an existing list of candidates.
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There are equal percentages of parties with centralized and decentralized
selection of candidates (19%). Accordingly, there are six parties in each
category. The centralized parties are the DPS in Bulgaria, the FKGP in Hungary,
the PSL and the SLD in Poland, the PRM in Romania, and the SDL in Slovakia.
The decentralized parties are the KDU-CSL after 1997 in the Czech Republic, the
MSZP in Hungary, the PNL, the UDMR, and the PSD in 2004 in Romania, and the
SDKU in Slovakia. Within each category there are observable nuances between
the political parties. For example, the FKGP in Hungary and the PSL in Poland
are both considered centralized, but with slightly different statute provisions.
The FKGP is a pure monocracy in which the party leader nominates candidates
and the National Council approves them. The central leadership plays a primary
role also in the local elections where all candidatures need its approval. The PSL
has a more horizontally division of power at central level, it is not concentrated
in the hands of a single individual. It has an Electoral National Convention that
confirms, on the proposal of the party’s Supreme Administrative Committee
(NKW PSL), the candidates to the Polish Parliament.
The decentralized parties display a similar variation. In general, once
the nomination decision is taken at local level, there is only a minimal approval
required from the National Council on the party lists (i.e. it checks the
fulfillment of standard requirements regarding the candidates). Even if this
organ decides the rejection of candidates, the task to replace them belongs to
the local organizations that initially proposed the unacceptable candidates.
However, there is an exception to this general rule – the PNL in Romania – to
be extensively discussed in the section dedicated to the single case studies. The
local branches of the party obtaining electoral results better than the average
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share of votes received by the party (i.e. usually, half of the local branches) can
propose without any restrictions candidates for the legislative elections. The
other branches do not have a direct word to say, but candidates are proposed
by the Territorial Permanent Delegation that is composed of members of the
local branches.
The relatively low percentage of both centralized and decentralized
parties can be explained through the learning process that political
organizations are subjected to. The large parties’ failures to survive at the
beginning of the transition period (e.g. Solidarity in Poland) or the repeated
splits and mergers of relevant competitors during the first post-communist
decade were primarily caused by strong internal factions that quit the party or
joined forces with other actors. One crucial factor contributing to this dynamic
was the internal division of power. A centralized leadership produces
discontent in local organizations. When these local organizations unify their
claims and get a voice through Parliament representatives, an imminent split
occurs if nothing changes in the decision making process.
Conversely, decentralized candidate nominations allow local
organization to grow strong. Whenever they form divergent opinions from the
central office or when competing interests occur, their actions will no longer be
consistent with those of the central elite. An illustrative example is the recent
case of the PSD in Romania. One strong local branch, situated in the Cluj county
(one constituency of the country), raised voice against the proceedings from
central office. Their major discontent was related to the very centralized
decision-making (including the discourse) and found support among other local
branches. As a result, the party was confronted with a “riot” in which
numerous MPs and party officials were involved. As nothing changed, the split
occurred: the Cluj local leaders withdrew from the party. The PSD lost
considerable support in that constituency at the 2008 local and legislative
elections and in the subsequent 2009 European elections. To avoid such
situations, most parties decide in favor of a joint effort in nominating
candidates, decreasing thus the probability of institutionalized discontent.
The selection of candidates for national elections appears to be
dominated by negotiations between the local and central organizations across
CEE political parties. This interplay between the local and central layers of
decision fulfils two tasks. First, it ensures particular representation of the
territorial branches’ will. Thus, local organizations notice that their preferences
are considered within certain boundaries. Such an approach limits the conflict
potential within the party organization. Second, it allows the central office to
effectively control the final composition and structure of candidate lists. In the
setting characterizing the majority of CEE parties, the central level plays a very
important role in either selecting the candidates or approving them by vetoing
and modifying the choices of the local organizations. For only 22% of the
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investigated political parties the centre does not have a substantial word to say
in the process of candidate selection.
The next section presents and discusses the statistical relationship
between the index of candidate selection and electoral volatility at party level.
Departing from this correlation, it delves into the specific statute provisions
across the CEE political parties.
Downplaying the Centre: Empirical Evidence from the CEE Political Parties
The statistical analysis indicates support for the hypothesized relationship. The
correlation coefficient is positive, with a moderate value (0.36), statistical
significant at the 0.01 level. Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of the political
parties on these two variables. The horizontal axis represents the centralization
of candidate selection for national elections (1=decentralized and
6=centralized). It also shows the strength and the positive direction of the
correlation. In the words of H1 this means that the political parties in which the
candidate selection takes place at local level are less volatile than the rest.
Figure 3.4: The Distribution of Parties according to Candidate Selection Index
and Electoral Volatility
The results are even more telling in the context of a broadly used list PR
system. Also, very few parties organize primaries that ensure a direct
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connection between candidates and voters. In this case, the parties that are
more permissive and allow nominations from the territory or only use their
veto against local proposals have lower electoral volatility than the centralized
parties.
It appears that the recipe to maintain voter loyalties consists of getting
closer to allow decision-making at the level that is closer to the citizen. Voters
stabilize their electoral preferences around those organizations that not only
play a decorative role within the larger political frameworks provided by the
party. Immediate replies to voters’ needs and priorities (i.e. reflected in party
programs proposed at the local level) appear to provide rewards to parties.
Whereas this statistical observation is sufficient to draw a few inferences
regarding the hypothesized relationship, the party specific information
36provides substantial information about the processes that take place within
political systems and parties.
Bulgaria
The Bulgarian parties are characterized by relatively high levels of
centralization. These levels range between local nominations requiring the
approval of the central office (BSP) and the heavily centralized decision making
of the DPS. The BSP had to overcome its legacy (Karasimeonov 2005, 98) and
behave differently than its communist predecessor (see Chapter 4). In doing
so, a decentralization of decision making in the party was a first step. Its
candidates for local elections are selected by local party structures, but all
proposals must be approved by the national organization) Supreme Council.
The latter has the right to make modifications according to a few criteria (e.g.
importance, continuity, renewal etc.). The Supreme Council decides the leaders
of the lists, agrees places of coalition partners, and organizes pre-registration
lists (article 57). A somewhat different process is visible within the SDS. The
local organizations (District Council) propose together with the executive
central body of the party (National Executive Council) the lists of MPs. These
final lists require the approval of the central organization (National Council)
(article 15). In the case of the SDS local branches have less freedom than those
of BSP.
The DPS has a special story of centralization with most decisions
belonging not only to the national organization, but particularly to the
chairman of the party. With the same leader from its beginning in 1990, Ahmed
Dogan, the DPS vests extensive powers in the hands of one person. He is the
chairman of the Central Council (the national organization) that convenes once
every three months (article 9, paragraph 2), elaborates all party documents,
36 For consistency, the references to procedures belong to the most recent statutes from all
parties.
109
and adopts uniform rules of conduct. The selection of candidates takes place at
the central level. The president is the crucial layer of decision: he has to
approve all candidates for parliamentary elections (article 10).
Czech Republic
Although Millard (2004, 161) considers that the ODS, the KSCM, and the KDU–
CSL developed highly centralized selection procedures, the analysis of the
statutes reveals two issues. First, their selection procedures are not very
centralized; the ODS and the KSCM are in the category with most parties from
CEE (local nominations on which it is exercised central influence). Second,
there are relevant differences between these parties in terms of candidate
selection; the CSSD is the least centralized among them. The ODS and the
KSCM are on a relatively equal foot regarding the candidate selection process:
both local and central levels are involved. The ODS statute mentions that the
local and municipal (an intermediary layer between the local and regional)
organizations propose candidates for the legislative elections. The executive
body decides about the final composition of the list – and thus has the right to
reject some proposals – with a final word to say from the congress that
formally approves the lists of candidates.
Despite its unreformed character (Kopecky 2007, 120), KSCM has a
similar setting. The local and regional organizations propose candidates and
the Central Committee approves the lists with a possibility to alter them. The
CSSD differs in the sense that the central level is involved in candidate selection
(a score of 4 on the index). The local and regional organizations compile the list
of candidates. The Central Bureau contributes to this list of candidates (article
31), whereas the Central Executive Committee is also involved in drawing up
the lists and approves the final composition and order (article 30).
Starting 1997, the KDU-CSL is the only Czech party using primaries to
decide on the composition of its lists following proposals arrived from
members and various organs of the party. The results of the primary elections
are considered by the Regional Committee that establishes their final
composition. Any change must be accompanied by explanations to the regional
committees and negotiations between the two party organs. Prior to 1997, the
1995 statute included a more centralized selection of candidates. The latter was
nationwide compiled by the Bureau of the KDU-CSL on the basis of proposals
from members submitted through three filters – local, district, and provincial.
Each of these layers could attach their own nominations and the order of
candidates. Although the National Bureau drew the lists of candidates, they
were done after prior consultation with the provincial bureaus so that at least
two-thirds of the candidates were resident in their constituencies (art. 40).
Further adjustments could be made by the National Bureau on the basis of
coalition agreements. Although this method of candidate selection involved a
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great deal of influence from the national organization, all proposals came from
the territory and the list composition was negotiated with provincial bureaus.
Hungary
The Hungarian political parties are characterized by a complex decision-making
process regarding their candidate selection given the nature of the electoral
system. Parties have to nominate candidates for the single member districts,
territorial lists, and national lists. Accordingly, different layers of the party
nominate de facto candidates: the local organization proposes candidates for
the single member districts, the territorial organization proposes the
candidates for the territorial lists, and the national lists are drawn by the central
organization37 (Makos 2000). However, there are deviations from this general
rule. The MSZP is the most decentralized Hungarian Party with the local and
territorial organizations taking decisions without interventions from the centre.
The National Council (national organization) proposes the national lists and the
decision belongs to the congress where national and local organizations are
also represented. This extensive decision making at local level was not altered
although starting 1999 the central level has the possibility to intervene in the
process of nominating candidates. Following a request of the National Electoral
Commission of the party, it can cancel the decisions of local and territorial
organizations but only in exceptional situations and on solid grounds (e.g. the
candidate affects party’s image).
The FIDESZ and the KDNP share the same common balance between
the local and central levels in deciding upon candidates. The national
organization of the FIDESZ can interfere in the decision of the local and
territorial organizations by expressing opinions on the proposed candidates
and suggesting modifications. Following the general rules specified above, it
also decides about the national lists. The central organization of the KDNP can
veto the proposals from the territory about territorial lists and decide upon the
national lists. The SZDSZ has an arrangement in which the negotiation plays a
supplementary role: the national organization discusses with the local or
territorial organizations the composition of the lists. if one third of the local or
territorial organizations disagree with what suggested from the centre, the
case goes to the national congress. In addition, the central organization sets
criteria for nominations and all candidate proposals from the territory should
fulfill them. In the MDF, the central organization has the right to propose veto
(exercised by the congress) and to nominate new candidates in case of
rejecting those proposed by the local and territorial organizations. The local
organizations also have veto rights regarding Council’s proposals (not for the
37 The entire argument in the book is centered around the composition of the party lists. This is
why only the territorial and national layers are relevant in this case.
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national lists38). Also, the local organization can make proposals and replace
the rejected candidates. The final decision reached after these negotiations are
subjected to the vote of the National Council. The most centralized Hungarian
party is the FKGP where the central organization decided all candidates
following the proposal of the president.
Poland
The Polish political parties emerged after 2000 are less centralized than the PSL
and the SLD that exist from the beginning of the post-communist period. The
PIS and the PO have a medium centralized decision-making with respect to
their statues and content of programs. In terms of candidate selection, the
local organizations of the PIS propose candidates that have to be approved by
the territorial organization and a final vote is given by the central organization
(the Political Committee). Similar provisions are encountered in the PO
regarding the program drafting. Regarding the selection of candidates, the
territorial organizations – the layer immediately above the local ones – propose
the candidates and the central organization approves them with plenty of
room for negotiation. Among the long lasting parties, the PD has a candidate
selection similar to that of the PIS and the PO. The territorial branches select
candidates and the final approval of the central organization is necessary. The
PSL and the SLD have a centralized selection of candidates. In both parties the
candidates are proposed by the central organizations and approved by the
national congress. No influence of the local or regional organizations is
possible.
Romania
The Romanian political landscape is the most diverse among the analyzed
countries, being populated with two decentralized political parties (plus PSD in
2004), one centralized, and two positioned in between, with various degrees of
centralization. The decentralized parties are the PNL, extensively discussed in
the case study section, and the UDMR. The candidate selection in the PNL
provides extensive freedom to the local organizations in placing candidates on
the lists. Similarly, the electoral program is elaborated at local level, with
territorial input. The UDMR organizes primary elections for the candidate
selection and allows complete freedom to its local and regional organizations
in drafting the program. As the party is a mosaic of numerous organizations, it
would be difficult to function otherwise. The centralized character of the PRM
does not represent a surprise given the existing consensus in the literature
38 Until 1998, the national lists composition is decided by the National Council following party
leader’s nominations. Since 1998, the party leader loses the nomination procedure in favor of the
National Leadership Council (Makos 2000).
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about the strong leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor (Gallagher 1999; Mudde 2000;
Light and Phinnemore 2001; Mungiu-Pippidi 2001; Sum 2010). Candidates’
nominations are done exclusively by the central organization at the proposal of
the president of the party. The central figure of president is also involved in the
program drafting with no input from regional or local organizations.
For most of the PSD’s existence, the candidate selection was a mixture
of central and local negotiation in drawing the lists of candidates. In 2004,
primary elections were organized, but immediately abandoned as they created
internal conflict in the party. Some of the leading elite of the party was less
successful in the primaries and the centre overruled their results by appointing
those candidates on the lists. The new statute, adopted in 2005, stipulates that
primaries are optional and whenever they are not organized the decision is
represented by the above mentioned mixture. In the PDL, the candidate
selection is done at territorial level with the possibility of influence from the
central organization. Any divergences are solved during the national congress.
Slovakia
Only one out six Slovak parties is decentralized confirming thus earlier
qualifications regarding the centralization of decision-making in Slovakia
(Millard 2004; Deegan-Krause 2006). The SLD is the most centralized party in
terms of candidate selection for the national elections. This can justify its lack
of adaptation and the disappearance from the political scene on December 31,
2004 when it merged with SMER. The HZDS displays a mixture of candidate
proposals from local organizations, regional branches, and the central
organization. Similarly, in the SNS the local and the central organizations
propose candidates for the elections, a final decision is reached by the
president of the party.
The KDH vests the central organization with the power to approve the
nominations of the local organizations. The latter have a relevant word to say
also in the drafting of the program. The electoral platform is the joint product
of central and local representatives elected in the district assembly of the
party. The MKP has a similar candidate selection procedure with the KDH, the
major difference occurs with respect to the electoral program. The MKP works
on a decentralized basis with each layer of decision having its own program.
This freedom of action appears to be a characteristic of the parties
representing ethnic Hungarians in the CEE region – a similar situation was
encountered in Romania. The SDKU organizes primaries to select candidates
for the national legislative elections. The central organization has the right to
overrule, in exceptional situations the results of the primaries.
These detailed references regarding the procedures of candidate
selection illustrate a diversity of settings across parties. They help
understanding the way in which the centralization of candidate selection is
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related to electoral volatility. For example, referring to the average values of
volatility from Table 2.2 (Chapter 2), there are relevant differences. In half of
the countries, the political parties with the lowest electoral volatility in their
countries have less centralized candidate selection than the parties with high
electoral volatility. Starting 1997, the KDU-CSL organizes primaries to select its
legislative candidates and it is the least volatile Czech party. The CSSD has a
mixed selection process in which the local and central levels compile together
the lists of candidates. In doing so, it is the most centralized Czech party and
also has the highest volatility. The same observation is valid for Romania. The
UDMR organizes primaries open to all its members to select the candidates; it
also has the smallest volatility in Romania and in the entire CEE region. The
PRM selects its candidates at central level, with the leader of the party in a key
position, and also has the highest volatility in the country. The relationship is
visible also in Slovakia, but the discrepancy between the procedures to select
candidates differs less starkly. In Slovakia, the least volatile party is the KDH in
which the central organization exercises influence over the selection made by
the local organizations. The most volatile party is the SDL that has a centralized
selection of candidates.
In Hungary the political parties with a similar candidate selection
occupy the extreme positions on volatility. The SZDSZ is the least volatile party,
whereas The MDF has the highest volatility in the Hungarian party system. They
both have central nominations that can be influenced by the local
organizations. Bulgaria and Poland are the two systems in which the least
volatile parties are more centralized than the most volatile ones. In Bulgaria,
DPS has a centralized candidate selection, whereas the SDS opted for a mixture
of decision between the centre and local organizations. In Poland it is the same
distribution of candidate selection and volatility between the PSL (the least
volatile and the most centralized) and the PO.
These observations are illustrative for the direction and strength of the
hypothesized relationship. In some cases there is an observable linkage
between the centralization of candidate selection and electoral volatility. In
other cases, the relationship either does not exist or it goes against the initial
expectation. The following section narrows the scope of analysis and intends
to reveal how the relationship works in specific contexts. In doing so, it focuses
on two political parties selected from the categories with extreme values. The
cases are illustrative and not intended to be representative for their categories.
The PNL is one of the two parties with complete decentralization, whereas the
FKGP in Hungary is selected among those with total centralized mechanisms in
taking decisions. Both cases claim their origins from successful inter-war
political actors, have similar trajectories of their electoral volatility, and are less
investigated. The goal of the section is twofold. First, it explores the way in
which parties with completely different approaches towards the intra-party
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decision-making evolved in terms of volatility. Second, it explains the formation
of a relationship between these two variables over time.
Where is the Difference?
The trajectories of the PNL and FKGP’s electoral volatility are quite similar,
characterized by numerous oscillations. Figure 3.5 reflects the levels of
volatility in longitudinal perspective, the horizontal axis marking the number of
elections from the beginning of the post-communist period. The first point in
time is 1992 for the PNL and 1994 for the FKGP, corresponding to the second
election for each party (i.e. the first time when volatility can be calculated). The
elections during the first post-communist decade are the ones in which these
parties had a relatively constant electoral volatility, at various levels. The PNL
had higher volatility than the FKGP, with a value around 40% as opposed to 20%.
From the fourth round of legislative elections (2000 for the PNL and 2002 for
the FKGP), the volatilities of these two parties contrast dramatically.
Figure 3.5: Volatility Trends for Parties belonging to Extreme Categories of





















PNL: Decentralization as Mean of Political Survival
The PNL reduces its volatility in that election, it increases in 2004 to a similar
level to those of the 90s, whereas for 2008 its volatility decreases to a level
close to 0, managing to stabilize its electorate. In 2002, the FKGP registers one
of the highest volatility in the region, above 80%, that also keeps the party
outside the Parliament with an electoral support below 1%. This is a critical
juncture in the history of the party as it never recovered. In that respect, the
extremely low volatility in the subsequent 2006 election does not tell a success
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story. On the contrary, the FKGP maintained itself at the extremely low level of
support from 2002. Summing up, although the electoral volatility of these two
parties registers similar oscillations, their faith is different. The following two
subsections delve into this matter by closely investigating the organizational
development of each party.
The PNL: Decentralization of Candidate Selection as Mean of Political Survival
The PNL is the most dynamic Romanian political party in electoral and
organizational terms. The party was officially registered in January 1990,
claiming the ideological heritage of a traditional actor from the Romanian
political scene. Originating in the second half of the 19th century, the Liberal
Party represented for a few decades the main alternative to the Conservative
Party in a two-party system. Its importance was not diminished in the
multiparty systems of the interwar period and it is best illustrated by the
formation of numerous governments in which the leaders of the party were
prime-ministers (Preda 2002; Gherghina and Chiru 2010). Following WWII,
Communists banned the Liberal Party and its leaders were either executed or
sent in exile. Almost half a century later, the PNL revives its tradition and builds
its discourse on historical grounds with an anti-communist message.
Its electoral dynamics is visible in the number of electoral alliances and
government coalitions in which it got included. The party competed alone four
out of six times – passing the electoral threshold all the time but in 1992 – and
whenever contesting elections within an alliance or coalition it was among the
winners and got into government. Its initial anti-communist discourse did not
impede the PNL to govern next to one of the successor parties – the
contemporary PDL – in 1996-2000 and 2004-2008 or to sign support
agreements with the other successor party – PSD – In 2000. It is the only
Romanian party that does not suffer major loses of electoral support after
exiting a coalition that coincides also to government incumbency. Figure 3.4
shows that at the fourth and six elections the electoral volatility of the PNL is
close to 0; those are the 2000 and 2008 elections that followed The PNL’s
terms in government. This low level of volatility indicates almost no variation of
electoral support compared to the previous elections. Paradoxically, all its
coalition partners register high levels of volatility. In 2000, the PNTCD had a
volatility of over 65% that lead to its disappearance from the political scene,
whereas in 2008 the PDL had almost 40% volatility that secured its place into
the subsequent government.
This relative electoral stability is surprising in the light of the PNL’s
evolution across time. Its history is marked by large numbers of splits and
mergers, but no relevant ideological shift or modification and no name
changes. The vast majority of these events, summarized in Table 3.1, have
actors that left and came back to the PNL. The internal fractions of PNL that
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left the party (PNL-AT, PNL Campeanu) made further alliances and returned to
PNL a few years later or in a different format (PNL Campeanu, NPL, PL). The
reverse of the coin is that there was one party, led by Niculae Cerveni that
joined the PNL in 1990 (PSL) and quit the PNL two years later, staying in the
CDR under a different name (PNL-CD). Three mergers with political parties
situated at the centre-right of the political axis indicate Liberal’s willingness to
gather around them all the forces that might counter-balance the social-
democratic domination in the country. In this respect, there were three fusions
with small parties (1998 with PAC, 2001 with APR, and 2004 with UFD) that
provided notabilities to the Liberal Party and allowed them to structure votes.
Table 3.1: The Splits and Mergers of PNL in the Post-Communist Period











2003 PNL Campeanu PNL
2006 PLD PNL
Source: Website of PNL.
The party also had several splits, most of them being small as intensity: the
PNL-AT, the PNL Campeanu, and the PNL Traditional. However, the last split
was major as the new formed party of the dissidents won more than half of the
vote shares gained by the PNL in the European elections. At the end of 2006,
key actors for the PNL in the 2000-2004 period, Valeriu Stoica and Theodor
Stolojan, leave the party together with a few MPs and create the Liberal
Democratic Party (PLD). In ideological terms, the difference between the two
cannot be easily identified. The split can find its sources in the harsh
relationships with the current PNL leadership and the close relationships with
the Romanian president (former president of PD and very close to that party).
PLD had a short life on its own as after the European elections in the autumn of
2007 they merge through absorption with the PD and create the PDL.
The political survival of the PNL after the numerous splits and mergers
and its relatively low electoral volatility can be partly attributed to its
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decentralized decision-making process. The basic organizational unit39 of the
PNL exists at the level of voting booth or neighborhood and can be formed by
five to nine people. The next layer is represented by the local organizations
that are formed at the level of village, city, or town by at least 15, 51, or 91
members, including a minimum of two thirds of from the voting booth
organizations (Art. 26 of PNL statute 2009). The regional organizations can be
formed by at least 10 local organizations and 300 members.
The complexity of the organizations attached to each layer increases as
we get towards the centre. There are two basic structures that exist at all levels
– the general assembly (labeled conference at territorial level and congress at
national level) and the Political Bureau (the executive and leadership branch).
The permanent delegation is an institution occurring for the first time at county
level (territory) and includes the members of the Political Bureau, the leaders
of the territorial organization, and representatives from local organizations. At
central level the components are similar, the representatives belonging to
territorial organizations instead of local. Permanent Delegations meet
regularly. At central level, the supplementary institution is the National
Executive Council that is the main decision maker between the meetings of the
Permanent Delegation. The relationship between these auxiliary institutions is
of subordination from the broadest (General Assembly) towards the narrowest
(the Political Bureau).
The candidate selection for national elections takes place at local level
and the approval of the National Executive Council is necessary mostly as a
formal issue. The local organizations send their proposals to the territorial
organizations. A dual process occurs in this case generated by the results of the
local elections. The candidates proposed by organizations with results above
the average of the party are directly approved by the National Executive
Council that mainly checks for general criteria regarding their eligibility (only
procedural issues, nothing substantial). The candidates proposed by those
organizations with results below the average are filtered by the Central Political
Bureau and final lists are proposed for approval to the National Executive
Council (Art. 68 of PNL statute 2009).
Summing up, candidates are proposed by local and regional
organizations through the voice of the latter. This happens also because the
regional organizations are formed at constituency level. Thus, they decide
almost entirely upon the list of candidates. The less successful organizations
require a supplementary filter at central level. In this respect, the statute of the
party is quite vague and does not explicitly mentions the situations in which the
39 The 2009 statute of PNL serves best the descriptive goal of this section. The provisions of the
previous statutes are slightly different, but the logic of decentralized decision is similar. The 2009
statute explains best the roles of each organization in deciding the candidates.
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Central Political Bureau can reject the proposals of territorial organizations. It
only says that they also can propose candidates in the name of the least
successful organizations (art. 70 of PNL statute 2009).
Thanks to its decentralized process of candidate selection the PNL
could maintain stable and strong ties with its voters despite the numerous
changes in its composition. As the candidate selection process took place
mostly at constituency level, the splits and mergers could rarely influence it.
Quite often, the splitters or joiners were underdeveloped in the territory,
lacking regional or local organizations. Under these circumstances, a large part
of the local organizations could continue using their methods to select
candidates for the national elections irrespective of party’s structural
modifications. Moreover, the voters get accustomed with the decentralized
process of candidate selection and the names of candidates are sometimes less
relevant. For example, when splitters with territorial strongholds left the party,
the PNL had to develop new local organizations able to take over. Although
voters were not familiar with the new candidates, they could recognize the
selection style. The party continued to select candidates at the local level and
thus conveyed the same message of mirroring societal needs and closeness to
voters. Consequently, the candidate selection process kept the communication
with voters away from the shocks suffered by the party through splits and
mergers; the direct result was a relatively constant electoral support received
by the PNL even in harsh times (e.g. after a failed period in government).
The FKGP: The Electoral Failure of Candidate Centralization
The FKGP made its debut on the post-communist Hungarian political scene as a
member of a surplus coalition (Wolinetz 2006) government next to the MDF
and the KDNP. The FKGP continued the rich tradition of the Smallholders´
Party, a party of the land-owning peasantry, with a leading role in inter-war
politics and a substantial vote share (57%) in the 1945 elections (Korosenyi 1998,
44). The FKGP and its predecessor formed the last government before
communism and the first Cabinet in the aftermath of regime change. Following
the ideology of its predecessor, the FKGP appeals to broad segments in society,
but primarily to farmers, agricultural workers, and small businessmen. In
general, the FKGP was characterized by traditionalist, nationalist, and anti-
communist discourse (Enyedi 2006b, 178). An example of its traditionalist
approach is represented by the key feature of the 1990 campaign manifesto
that claimed a return to the 1947 property status and dismantling of the large-
scale production units in agriculture (Racz 1991, 115). On these grounds, the
FKGP’s main political elite was recruited from members of the provincial middle
class with agricultural backgrounds (Korosenyi 1998).
Given the FKGP’s organizational roots, discourse, and candidate profile
most of its voters were clustered in the rural areas. In the attempt to better
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represent its core supporters, the FKGP opposed the sale of public assets to
foreign buyers. From its perspective, the privatization implied a return of assets
to their previous owners. The failure of the government to act in this direction
determined the departure of the FGKP from the coalition in 1992 (Korosenyi
1998, 44). These inter-party conflicts within the governing coalition were
complemented by intra-party splits in the FKGP. Its division into two
parliamentary factions led to the loss of 40 parliamentary seats by the next
elections (Nikolenyi 2011, 24). In 1993, the party was further fractionalized
(Ilonszki and Kurtan 1993; 1994). The most important breakaway group from
the Smallholders Party (EKGP) existed in the legislature as a faction without a
party. Its only purpose was to maintain the government's majority (Agh 1997,
425). Table 3.2 includes all the splitters that gained at least 1% in the elections
following the split.
The splits starting in November 1991 ended up with four different
Smallholders’ parties contested the 1994 election (Millard 2004, 115). The noisy
internal life of FKGP – scandals within its national organization – was also
mirrored at local level. For example, in Szentendre, a small town next to
Budapest, its first local leadership was ousted by a new group, headed by the
generally disliked owner of a big enterprise. In this particular case, corruption
was intrinsically linked to the FKGP: the wealthy entrepreneurs used the FKGP
organization for converting economic to political capital and the other way
around. In return, they heavily sponsored the local FKGP newspaper (Javor and
Rozgonyi 1994).








Notes: The table includes the splitters that obtained at least 1% in elections. It
excludes those splitters presenting candidates only in single member districts
or did not run at all in the election after the split.
The period spent in opposition appeared to be beneficial for the FKGP in terms
of internal conflicts. It presented itself in the 1998 elections as a unitary actor,
gained 48 seats in the legislature, and entered a coalition government with the
FIDESZ. However, this apparent unity proved fragile and short-lived; the party
fractured again as a result of public scandals and pressure from the coalition
partners. In 1999, the first tensions emerged between the FIDESZ and the FKGP
120
over the properties of the Vasas sports club. The FKGP MPs voted against the
FIDESZ Minister of Youth and Sports (Bugajski 2002, 358-359).
In 2000 the poor management of the FKGP ministries negatively
influenced the image of the governing coalition. There was a financial
accounting scandal surrounding the FGKP’s party leadership. Some FKGP MPs
raised calls for the dismissal of the Minister of Environment (Pal Pepo), but
Torgyan refused to do so (Bugajski 2002, 359). The situation ended with an
resignation of this minister (Ilonszki and Kurtan 2001) after pressures put by
the FIDESZ. In 2001, the FKGP was torn apart after the FIDESZ forced a
prominent FKGP party leader and the Minister of Agriculture to resign and
rejected his FKGP-nominated successor. The subsequent departure of one third
of FKGP MPs (Nikolenyi 2011, 24) created a new internal split within the FKGP.
The government avoided early elections as the remaining MPs continued to
vote with the government (Ilonszki and Kurtan 2002). Consequently, in the eve
of the 2002 election the FKGP was considerably weakened by conflicts with the
government coalition partner FIDESZ and by unresolved internal issues (Batory
2002a, 532). The party received less than 1% of the votes in the first round
compared to 13.2% in 1998. Due to its highly publicized internal conflicts and
eventual disintegration, the FKGP lost credibility in front of its voters (Batory
2002b, 5). According to the figures on party membership (see Table 4.5 in
Chapter 4), not even all members of the FKGP voted for the party (their
percentage in the electorate was 1.99 in 2002).
The internal dissent, numerous institutional splits, and desertions of
individual elite members from the FKGP were primarily caused by the
leadership style of Jozsef Torgyan. Throughout the years this party leader
remained a perennial source of controversy. The historical roots of the FKGP
and the appeal to specific segments of society provided the FKGP a strong
political identity. However, the maverick features of Torgyan led to an isolation
of the FKGP by the rest of the parties until the 1998 election (Fitzmaurice 2000,
Karacsony and Toka 2001). The militant nationalistic discourse of Torgyan in the
1990-1994 led to the 1992 split off from the governing coalition. The declared
goal was the pursuit of a more populist policy. All those factions that did not
accept the party leader’s authority and policy were forced to leave the party
(Bugajski 2002, 358). The 1998 change of rhetoric to a more moderate centre-
right position did not alter the authoritarian decision-making of Torgyan. He
stepped down from the position of party leader after the 2002 failure of the
FKGP to enter Parliament when not much could have been saved.
The splits and internal dissent put an end to the FKGP’s presence on the
political scene. Despite visible similarities with the structural evolution of the
PNL in terms of splits, the major difference between the two parties consists of
the degree of centralization in reaching decisions. In the FKGP, the selection of
candidates is made by the national presidium following the proposals coming
121
from the party leader. In the presence of such formal regulations and given the
authoritarian features of Torgyan’s presidency, no adaptation was possible. No
responsiveness was visible to the desires of local organizations or internal
factions. In such a context, the splits and departures of individual MPs severely
affected the electoral performances of the party. The FKGP lost MPs in each
legislature (Nikolenyi 2011), being thus a unique case within the Hungarian party
system.
The poor performance from the 1998-2002 period spent in government
shook the electoral credibility of the FKGP. Nevertheless, the image of the
party was heavily damaged by the apparently endless internal conflicts. The
centralized decision process within the party made things worse for the FKGP.
The PNL had a similar failure in government between 1997 and 2001 and its
splits weakened the party. However, its decentralized candidate selection
brought to the fore new faces, not publicly compromised during the
government period. In the FKGP this was not the case. As the local
organizations did not have the formal power to nominate candidates, the party
relied on Torgyan’s choices.
To conclude, the different processes of candidate selection can
represent valid explanations for the divergent paths of electoral survival and
electoral volatility of two parties with similar structural evolutions. Both the
PNL and the FKGP were internally divided, had numerous splits, and individual
dissent. With a decentralized decision-making in selecting candidates the PNL
avoided the numerous shortcomings derived from having a strong leader in
charge of everything as happened with the FKGP.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that there is empirical evidence supporting the
relationship between the centralization of candidate selection for national
elections and electoral volatility at party level in CEE. The way in which a
political party selects its candidates for the legislative elections is closely
related to the stability of its electoral results. The political parties that allow the
local organizations to play an active role in the candidate selection process are
less volatile than the other political actors. The theoretical underpinning of the
relationship refers to a better capacity of such parties to respond to voters’
needs and priorities; parties with decision reached at local levels are able to
better adapt to constituency requests. This observation received added value
in the CEE context where all political parties have national organizations and
most of them prefer a relatively high involvement of the centre. The limitation
of such involvement appears to make a difference in the electoral volatility. The
practical implication of such a finding is directly observable: political parties
that want to stabilize the preference of their voters can alter the selection
procedures of the candidates.
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The quantitative analysis revealed a moderate – but statistical
significant – correlation between the index of candidate selection and electoral
volatility. Although this statistical tool does not capture a causal mechanism,
the detailed descriptions of the processes in CEE illustrated how and why the
relationship is unidirectional from selection to volatility. Three supplementary
findings deserve closer investigation. First, the CEE political parties appear to
do what they preach. The bivariate correlation between the formal provisions
of candidate selection and the evaluations of experts based on the practices of
political parties is high (o.66, statistically significant at the 0.01 level). This
implies that the measurement based on the analysis of party statutes –
employed in this chapter – is a good approximation of the internal decision-
making of political parties. Second, the detailed investigation of party
provisions regarding candidate selection revealed nuanced information about
these processes. The index of candidate selection indicates further difference
between the CEE parties than those indicated by earlier research. Finally, the
two case studies from the final section of the chapter illustrated specific means
to reduce volatility through candidate selection. The similar internal dynamic
leads to different electoral outcomes when the decision making is
decentralized.
These quantitative results and qualitative assessments indicate how
one aspect of the party organization – the decentralized candidate selection –
has an influence on the electoral volatility. The following chapter takes this
analysis one step further and focuses on the effect of another component of
the party organization on electoral volatility. It investigates the role of
membership organizations in shaping the electoral volatility of the CEE political
parties.
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Chapter 4 A Mobilizing Network?
Membership Organizations and Electoral Volatility
Introduction
The theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 1 point in the direction of a
linkage between party membership organizations and the stability of electoral
support. The two hypothesized relationships refer to the positive effects that
large size (2a) and minimal variation in size (2b) of membership organizations
can have on the level of electoral volatility at party level. This chapter provides
an empirical test of both hypotheses. In doing so, it combines a bivariate
statistical analysis with qualitative assessments. The latter describe the
longitudinal development of party membership in CEE. At the same time, such
qualitative insights investigate the cross-country and cross-party differences
regarding party membership.
This chapter follows a deductive logic, starting with a section that
describes the general development of membership organizations. It also
presents several aggregate data that reveal cross-national and cross-party
comparisons. The following section includes the empirical testing of the
hypothesized relationships (H2a and H2b) between membership organizations
and electoral stability. The general results indicate that size of membership has
a limited role in explaining electoral volatility, whereas the variations in
membership size are not related to the stability of electoral support. The third
section focuses on cross-parties development of membership organizations
and qualitatively assesses the relationship with electoral volatility. The final
section includes two single case studies – the BSP in Bulgaria and the SLD in
Slovakia – as illustrative ways in which the membership organizations are
marginal in electoral volatility.
The Phases of Membership Development in CEE
Chapter 1 briefly explained why the expectations for large membership
organizations in the post-communist countries are unrealistic. That is why
instead of contrasting ideal types and searching for their applicability (e.g.
cadre, elite, mass etc.) this section emphasizes the longitudinal development of
membership organizations departing from the existing differences at the
beginning o the post-communist period. As previously mentioned, the
successor parties had the advantage of an organizational legacy when
compared to the political competitors starting as intellectual clubs, like-minded
circles of friends, passionate units of anti-communist fight, or revived parties.
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The Initial Differences
In the aftermath of regime change, mostly due to the extensive membership
pursued by the communist parties, the newly emerged political actors
considered membership as a legacy of the past. Their discourse responded to
and further fueled the existing anti-party feelings. The avoidance of the party
label, of issues resembling party discipline, structured bureaucracy, and office-
seeking behavior were symptomatic for most newly created umbrella
organizations. For example, the Czech Civic Forum (OF) adopted ”Parties for
party members – Civic Forum for everybody” as one of main slogans for the
first free elections in Czechoslovakia (Toka 1997, 5). Such attitudes combined
with the structural and membership heritage (Kitschelt 1995) of the successors
resulted in visible differences between the membership organizations of the
political parties at the beginning of the post-communist period.
Apart from the public discourse of the newly emerged parties, their
formation did not allow a lot of room for maneuver. Many actors were initially
created as discussion partners for the communists in the Round Table Talks
(Walsh 1994; Ester et al. 1998). This meant the legalization of parties operating
as dissident/intellectual clubs, groups and circles in a clandestine manner during
communism (Szczerbiak 2001a, 13) and the creation of anti-communist
umbrella organizations gathering the opposition forces. The registration of
these formations did not imply their conversion into articulated organizations.
These political parties or electoral coalitions could rely neither on membership
nor on extensive territorial organizations in the first elections. The poor
membership and organizational structures was due to their embryonic form,
loose organization, and ideological diffuseness (Berglund and Dellenbrant
1994).40 At the same time, the revived parties (for details, see Kopecky 2001)
failed to establish the organizational continuity with their previous existence
and they could rely solely on the political memory as basis for mobilization
(Waller and Karasimeonov 1996, 135).
Figure 4.1 depicts the levels of party membership of successor and
newly emerged parties in the first elections. Among the newly emerged
political actors, I selected those parties in the study with the highest
membership rates (the vertical axis represents percentage of party members
from the electorate). Even so, differences are visible: except of Poland, in all
the countries the successor parties have considerably higher percentages of
members compared with the best performer among the newly emerged
category. The biggest discrepancy appears in the Bulgarian case where the BSP
has the highest membership rate among the successor parties in the region. A
40 One exception to this situation was Romania where the FSN also took the shape of an
umbrella organization. Instead of anti-communist forces it brought together the successors
(Ishiyama 1995; Ishiyama and Bozoki 2001; Bozoki and Ishiyama 2002; Pop-Eleches 2008, 466).
125
high level of membership is registered in Romania where the rates of the two
successor parties are added (as they competed together in the 1990 elections).
The successor parties from the Czech Republic are close to 3% membership of
the total population, whereas the SDL in Slovakia appealed to slightly more
than 1% of the population. The MSZP in Hungary and the SLD in Poland are the
least successful successor parties in securing membership, the latter being the
only case in the region with a smaller membership rate than another party in its
country.
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Note: The figures for the Czech and Slovak parties are from 1992.
The relevant observation in Figure 4.1 is the high membership rate of the UDMR
in Romania, with a level slightly higher than that of the KSCM, the third
successor as membership performance in the region. The paradox for the
UDMR was that the anti-party discourse determined many ethnic Hungarians to
enroll and thus become members. By avoiding the party label and adopting a
position in which the Alliance dissociated from political parties, the elites
transformed their formation into an attractive entity for citizens. In reality, the
functions fulfilled by the UDMR are those of a political party, starting with the
electoral competition and ending with the policy proposals and
implementation. As revealed in the next section of the paper, this was the
highest membership rate they had. There are two possible explanations for the
apogee of party membership in its initial period of existence: 1) the enthusiasm
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of ethnic Hungarians and confidence in a new force to represent them after
half decade and 2) the lack of alternative groups to promise the same thing.
The appearance of other political formations targeting the same group and the
disillusionment of ethnic Hungarians with the performance of the UDMR
(Gherghina and Jiglau 2008) appear to be the explanations for the decrease of
membership across years.
The Oscillating Paths of Membership Organizations
Despite a very good start in terms of membership organizations, none of the
successor parties succeeded to maintain such high levels. In fact, most of them
registered declines and oscillations. As Figure 4.2 reveals, 14% of the analyzed
parties have ascendant trends, no successor party falling in this category. On
the contrary, two of them (BSP and SDL) registered descending membership
rates in the past two decades. A similar percentage of 14% constantly lost
members between elections. Almost three quarters of the CEE political parties
(72%) have oscillations regarding their membership rates, the favorable periods
(i.e. gains of members) alternating with significant losses.







The general explanation for decreasing membership rests in the
disappointment of people involved and party’s inefficiency and ineffectiveness
in tackling such attitudes. Most of the parties in this category (i.e. UDMR in
Romania, MKP in Slovakia, and SDS in Bulgaria) initially mobilized large
amounts of members, but as time passed the enthusiasm went down especially
that the rhythm in which policies were implemented differed considerably from
the initial expectations. The ethnic parties went down on membership as soon
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as their activities did not meet to the level of expectations. Their trend is
peculiar when compared to the general tendency of membership for all
investigated parties: the average level of membership increased from the first
(0.8%) to the second election (0.9%) and then decreased below the initial level
(0.7% for the third election and 0.65% for the fourth). The apogee for party
membership in a comparative perspective was between the first and second
elections. As the vast majority of studied parties last from the beginning of
transition, this evidence supports the theoretical underpinnings and
descriptions for the region (see Chapter 2).
The first elections were often held in a tensed environment,
immediately after the negotiations and the development of political parties
could be observed only after setting the first government, with the first
legislature at work, and with a constitution on the working table. Thus, in the
second elections parties benefited of most members compared with the rest of
their development and most of them are not able to maintain this level. Only
14% increase their membership rolls out of which almost three quarters are
parties established after the mid-1990s. Thorough explanations for this
situation are provided in the following section delving into the national
contexts.
The key observation at aggregate level is the absence of stable
longitudinal trends. This general picture bears relevant implications that
contrast previous findings. Mair and van Biezen (2001) illustrate how party
membership generally decreases over time at country level. Their findings are
valid also for the CEE countries, with more people getting involved into party
activities at the beginning of the democratization period. This conclusion does
not hold when looking at the party level for the entire post-communist period
at regional level.41 The relevant parties from the political scene (i.e. those
included in this study) are not characterized by the decrease of membership
organizations. Instead, progresses in attracting members are followed by drops
and vice versa. There are only isolated instances (e.g. ODS or MSZP) in which
the oscillations are smooth, with relatively small discrepancies between
elections. Such situations indicate consistent attitudes of the parties towards
members, keeping a rather constant number of people actively involved in the
internal life.
Low Membership Rates
Figure 4.3 shows country-level membership rates after three post-communist
elections. These are the cumulated percentages of all parties within the
political system. Romania has the highest membership rate, with slightly more
than 10% of its voting population being enrolled into political parties. Without
41 The following section indicates major oscillations at country and party levels.
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diminishing the efforts of the Romanian political parties in developing
membership organizations, this percentage is augmented by the election laws
and counting accuracies. Various laws during the post=communist period
require parties to have a few thousands members (10,000 to 25,000) to register
in the electoral competition. Furthermore, most parties do not update their
database and even if they have as a requirement the payment of a monthly fee,
members who do not comply are not thrown away. To conclude, the high
percentage of party members in Romania may have procedural bases rather
than substantive meaning.




































Source: Mair and van Biezen (2001), Szczerbiak (2001a; 2001b), Official Party
Registry in Romania (2003), Weldon (2006), Spirova (2007).
At the other extreme, Poland has less than 1.5% of its voting population
enrolled in a political party. This percentage comes as no surprise as the
interest and involvement into politics is generally low in post-communist
Poland. It is the only state in the region where the turnout was constantly
below 50%. Szczerbiak (2001a, 63) provides three possible explanations for the
low membership in Poland, all being encountered at regional level as
emphasized in chapter 1. First, the political parties see the enrolled electorate
as a worthless electoral asset and see their recruitment and retention as
inefficient use of resources. Second, there are poor logistic resources that
hardly allow parties to properly recruit members and to support local
initiatives. Third, the hostility and lack of trust in the political parties is still
widespread and thus diminish incentives to enroll into political parties.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the average size of membership organization –
calculated as percentage of party members from the electorate – for each
political party. The distribution of membership in CEE allows drawing three
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main conclusions. First, the vast majority of political parties has a minimal
membership organization. The members of most parties account for less than
1% from the total share of voters. Only two political parties (BSP and KSCM)
have more than 2%. However, their average size of membership organizations is
distorted by the initial high numbers of members (both are successor parties).
Moreover, their membership is in decline starting with the first or second
election. Consequently, this indicates that no claim regarding mass
membership is supported by empirical evidence in CEE.
Second, despite relatively low levels of membership, there is wide
variation between the organizations established by political parties. Such
variation is recorded both across countries – thus complementing the trends
observed in Figure 4.3 - and across the political parties within the same party
system. Third, all parties with large membership organizations were formed at
the beginning of the post-communist period. Some of them are either revived
(FKGP) or successors (BSP, KSCM, PSD, or PDL). In general, the organizational
legacy of the former communist parties helped the successors to reach higher
levels of membership compared with the rest of competitors.
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However, as illustrated by Figure 4.4 and by the case study of the SDL, being a
successor does not always guarantee a large membership organization.
Instead, the moment of formation and the length of existence on the political
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scene appear to be goo explanations for large size membership organizations.
Practically, none of the parties emerging along the way managed to develop
their membership organizations. The PRM is one of the performers in this
category, whereas the PIS or the PO have the lowest membership rates in CEE.
In light of these general trends and figures, the next section
investigates the relationship between the size and variation in size of
membership organizations and the electoral volatility at party level.
Party Membership and Electoral Volatility: A Weak Link
Overall, the relationship between party membership and electoral volatility is
weak. Figure 4.5 graphically depicts the distribution of the CEE political parties
on two dimensions: the electoral volatility and party membership. Membership
is calculated as the percentage of party members from the electorate. This
distribution allows a general observation that may explain the absence of a
strong relationship between party membership and electoral volatility.
Figure 4.5: The Distribution of Parties According to their Size of Membership
and Electoral Volatility
There are minor cross-party differences in terms of membership size. As
already pointed out in the previous section, the levels of party membership
tend to be low for the vast majority of CEE parties. Figure 4.5 illustrates how
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most political parties have less than 1% members. At the same time, there are
major cross-party differences with respect to the electoral volatility. There is
considerable variation of electoral volatility among political parties with similar
percentages of membership.
The broad picture reveals the existence of a weak negative relationship
that goes in the hypothesized direction. The political parties with large
membership organizations have slightly lower levels of electoral volatility than
those with very limited percentages of members. In this sense, it can be
observed that most political parties with membership organizations larger than
1% have relatively low levels of electoral volatility. The parties with the highest
percentage of members have very low levels of electoral volatility. However,
this tendency is quite weak. The statistical analysis confirms this visual
observation.
The statistical analysis reveals a weak negative correlation (-0.10)
between the size of membership and the electoral stability of political parties,
both at general and country level (Table 4.1). A large membership organization
rarely coincides with lower levels of electoral volatility. The relationship also
lacks statistical significance. A closer look at country level may explain why this
is the case. With the exception of Hungary, there is weak empirical support for
the hypothesized relationship (without statistical significance). The weakest
correlation is observed in Poland (the value of the coefficient is -0.10). This is
mostly due to the fact that some of the recently emerged political actors (PIS
and PO) are not successful in creating large membership organizations (see
Figure 4.4), but have relatively lower levels of volatility compared to the rest.
Table 4.1: The Relationship between the Size of Party Membership and
     Electoral Volatility
Notes: Reported coefficients are Pearson’s r.
** statistical significance at 0.01 level.
* statistical significance at 0.05 level.
The correlation coefficients are generally small with slightly higher values in the
case of Romania and Hungary. In Romania the sign of the coefficient indicates a










volatility. Those political formations that develop stronger membership
organizations reduce the volatility. In Romania, the electoral stability of PSD
and its increased claims to become a mass party together with the stable
performance and high membership of the UDMR lead to the above mentioned
result. Furthermore, the development of the PDL and its increasing stability in
the electorate represents an asset for a stronger correlation in future elections.
The relationship has a similar strength in Hungary, but in the opposite
direction. This result is counter-intuitive as Hungary was the usual suspect to
observe a positive relationship between membership rates and level of
electoral volatility. Given the complex electoral setting in Hungary, such small
differences may count both in the networking among other voters and in
electing MPs in the single member district where every vote counts. Although
there are no large discrepancies between parties in terms of party members,
those with less members are less volatile. The correlation coefficient would
have increased if the FKGP, the largest in terms of membership, would have
maintained the trend observed until 1998, its failure to enter the Parliament in
2002 dramatically increased the electoral volatility. At the same time, the
FIDESZ and the MSZP, the two stable political parties in Hungary had for long
time small levels of membership.
This evidence shows weak support for the hypothesized relationship
between the size of membership and electoral volatility (2a). The empirical test
of hypothesis 2b illustrates that even this weak linkage vanishes. Figure 4.6
graphically depicts the distribution of the CEE political parties according to the
variation in membership size (calculated as difference in the percentages of
members) and electoral volatility.
The vast majority of parties register small variations in the size of their
membership across time. There are isolated political parties for which the
percentage of members varies greatly from one election to another (e.g. BSP in
1997 or PDL in 2000); the maximum variation is almost 2.5% (KSCM in 1998). All
these major differences are drops of membership (see the following section).
The points in Figure 4.6 indicate a broad variation of the electoral volatility for
the political parties with similar (little) variation in their size of membership.
This empirical observation may explain the absence of a relationship between
these two variables (see also the line in Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.6: The Distribution of Parties According to their Variation of
       Membership Size and Electoral Volatility
The statistical analysis confirms the above specified empirical observations.
Table 4.2 includes the correlation coefficients between the variations in
membership size and electoral volatility. Overall, there is no empirical
relationship between the variation of membership organization size and the
electoral volatility.42 The value of the correlation coefficient is very small, with
no statistical significance. The absence of an empirical relationship between
these two variables complements the statistical results of hypothesis 2a in
illustrating the limited role played in CEE by the membership organizations in
diminishing the level of electoral volatility. Whereas size of membership brings
marginal benefits with respect to electoral volatility, the variation in size
appears to have no impact on it. Consequently, referring to electoral volatility,
the CEE political parties are better off if they pursue the increase of their
membership organization than its stability. In light of these poor results, the
theoretical benefits of membership mentioned in Chapter 1 appear to find no
correspondent in reality. When members create mobilizing networks, their
effect is rarely visible for more elections.
42 The number of cases differs from the previous table due to some missing values.
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Table 4.2: The Relationship between the Variation in Membership Size and









Notes: Reported coefficients are Pearson’s r.
** statistical significance at 0.01 level.
* statistical significance at 0.05 level.
At country level, the cases can be divided in three categories: no relationship,
weak relationship in the hypothesized direction, and evidence against the
hypothesis. In Romania and Slovakia the variation in membership size is not
related with volatility. The political parties in the Czech Republic and Poland
have a very weak tendency to have large variations in the size of their
membership organizations when they have lower levels of electoral volatility.
The Bulgarian and Hungarian parties display the opposite trend: the relative
constant number of members is correlated with higher levels of electoral
volatility. The relationship for Bulgaria is problematic given the small amount of
data, only seven cases being available. The high value of the coefficient
indicates a medium relationship in the Bulgarian case. The empirical evidence
does not support the hypothesis 2b. A closer look at the developments of party
membership across time and parties provides valuable insights that may
explain the weak or lack of empirical support for the expected relationships
(hypotheses 2a and 2b).
Membership Organizations and Electoral Volatility: A Cross-Party Perspective
This section focuses on the development of membership organizations at party
level. By using a country level approach, it shows the similarities and
differences observable between the political parties from the same political
system. The comparisons include both the absolute number of members and
the share of membership as a proportion of the electorate.
Bulgaria
Table 4.3 includes the available figures for the Bulgarian parties. The party with
the highest membership rate is the BSP, the successor party: it starts as the
party with most members in the 1990s and maintains until 2005 significant
differences between its membership rolls and the rest of the analyzed parties.
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If we compare the percentage of members from the electorate belonging to
the BSP (Table 4.3) in 2001 with the country’s aggregate percentage of
members (Figure 4.3), this party alone enrolls more than half of the Bulgarian
members. Its importance in terms of membership organization is also reflected
on the political scene. The BSP has the most relevant electoral performances
and presences in government among the three Bulgarian parties included in
this analysis.
Table 4.3: Party membership in Bulgaria
Absolute numbers
1991 1994 1997 2001 2005
BSP 365,567 370,333 253,802 210,961 191,000
DPS 140,000 n/a n/a 32,000 95,621
SDS n/a 35,000 n/a 60,000 29,000
Percentage of the electorate
1991 1994 1997 2001 2005
BSP 5.38 5.29 3.48 3.05 2.84
DPS 2.06 n/a n/a 0.46 1,42
SDS n/a 0.50 n/a 0.87 0.43
Sources: Ishiyama and Breuning (1998), Millard (2004), Spirova (2005), van
Biezen and Mair (2009), and the official party records.
The DPS had before the 2005 elections over 95,000 members, being the second
party in the country after the BSP. Its continuity and presence into government
represent possible incentives for ethnic Turks to join the party. Similarly to
UDMR, it started with a very high number of members, probably enthusiastic of
the idea of political representation. The rolls decreased to less than a quarter
until 2001 and increased until 2005. The high number of members in 2005 can
be seen as the result of four years in government. This high number was not
influenced by the fact that three other Turkish political formations oppose
DPS’s politics. Although they have united to form the Balkan Democratic
League, their support is reduced and failed to enter Parliament in the 2005
elections. At the latter, the DPS came third and entered the coalition for a
second consecutive term government next to the BSP and the NDSV.
Unlike the UDMR in Romania, the DPS membership registered a
relevant increase between two electoral moments. As previously mentioned,
this corresponds to the government period of the party. Following the 2005
apogee of their membership rolls, the DPS secured an unprecedented 20.3% in
European elections in 2007. Its strong mobilization of the addressed target
group appears to be linear with the capacity to increase membership rates. The
BSP registers an opposed trend, losing more than one third in its absolute
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membership figures in approximately one decade (between 1994 and 2005).
Such a trend can be explained by the terms spent out of office by the BSP
between 1997 and 2005, the confidence and support of Bulgarians in the party
being altered. Even with these losses, the party continues to have the highest
membership in the country and being surpassed at regional level only be the
Romanian Social Democrats. As a comparison, in 2005 the BSP had more
members than all the Hungarian parliamentary parties (see Table 4.5).
The SDS is the party with the lowest membership rate in Bulgaria in
2005. It started in 1989 as a union of 11 political organizations opposing the
communist regime and in 1990 six more parties joined (Waller and
Karasimeonov 1996). This conglomerate is a possible explanation for their
initial membership of 35,000, quite significant for a newly emerged political
formation. The turbulent life of the party (i.e. splits and mergers, perceived
government failures, corruption allegations etc.) did not transform the SDS
into a popular party (Kolarova 2002) and its electoral success following the
1997-2001 term in office remained limited. In this environment, the party could
not develop a strong membership organization. Table 4.3 illustrates the low
SDS levels of membership, the major problem being again the few data points
to draw substantial conclusions.
Czech Republic
Similarly to the Bulgarian case, the KSCM is the party with the highest
membership organization in the entire party system. Its lowest number (from
2006) is slightly lower than the sum of members coming from the three other
parties. The initial high level presented in Figure 4.2 is maintained throughout
the entire period. In fact, between 1992 and 1996 the party registers a relevant
increase in the number of members, also as a consequence of the separation
from Slovakia and strong positions occupied by the KSCM in that matter. At the
same time, throughout the entire post-communist period, the KSCM employed
with priority the constituency representation rather than being animated by
electoral catch-all strategies (Hanley 2001; 2002).
Furthermore, its organizational legacy allowed the party to build on
solid bases and to enhance its membership. The KSCM managed to create a
strong linkage with its members and thus create a relatively stable mass
membership on which it relied for many years (Ishiyama 1999; Grzymala-Busse
2002b). Despite such mobilizing effects, the party witnessed a continuous
exodus of party members starting in the second part of the 90s. In
approximately two years, between 1996 and 1998, the party lost almost
200,000 members, a disproportionate share compared to what happened with
the other four relevant parties in the system where gains and loses were
considerably less (Mair and Van Biezen 2001, 17). The membership dropped to
approximately 77,000 members around the 2006 elections and it is likely that
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those remaining loyal to the party organization to belong to the older
generation, with a strong leftist ideology (McAllister and White 2007).
Table 4.4: Party membership in the Czech Republic
Absolute numbers
1992 1996 1998 2002 2006
CSSD 11,500 13,000 18,000 17,079 17,569
KDU-CSL 80,000 100,000 62,000 55,306 38,312
KSCM 222,000 350,000 160,000 128,346 77,115
ODS 22,000 22,000 19,000 18,432 29,429
Percentage of the electorate
1992 1996 1998 2002 2006
CSSD 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.21
KDU-CSL 1.03 1.25 0.76 0.67 0.46
KSCM 2.87 4.38 1.97 1.55 0.93
ODS 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.35
Sources: Lewis (2000), Mair and van Biezen (2001), Kopecek (2002), van Biezen
(2003), Toole (2003), and van Biezen and Mair (2009).
The KDU-CSL has the second strongest membership roll with an apogee
coinciding with that of the KSCM (1992-1996). With an ideology dominated by
Catholicism, this party is quite similar to the Communists with respect to its
traditionally well-developed organization (it is a revived party) with solid grass-
roots foundations at local level and material assets from the past (Klima 1998,
498). These resemblances may justify why these two political actors are the
only that can be considered mass parties in the Czech Republic (Vlachova 2001;
Kopecky 2006, 132-133). With a continuous increase of electoral support
between 1992 and 2002, the KDU-CSL could rely on the eve of the 2006
elections on approximately one third of the members it got ten years before.
Apparently, the initial stronger ties between the party and its members ended
up in a less severe drop of membership compared to that of the KSCM.
However, this situation had some downsides during the post-communist
period, the party being less flexible in the negotiations with coalition partners
due to wishes of its members (Deegan-Krause 2006, 105-106).
The two other parties from the Czech party system have minimal
membership and there were a few occasions in which this issue influenced their
recruitment procedures. For example, the ODS and the CSSD had to fill their
lists with independent candidates (van Biezen 2003, 143). High problems
occurred in the local elections where independents dominate (Brokl and
Mansfeldova 1995; Kopecky 2006; Linek and Outly 2009). For example, in 1994,
the KDU-CSL and the KSCM fielded candidates in more than 2,300
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municipalities. In comparison, the ODS fielded candidates in nearly 1,700
municipalities, whereas the CSSD in nearly 800 municipalities (Deegan-Krause
2006, 261). The organizational procedures can contribute to this general
problem: the local branches of the ODS and the CSSD meet less often than
those of KSCM (van Biezen 2003, 143).
The emergence of the CSSD as an alternative to the KSCM (Hlousek and
Kopecek 2008) and its stable success (Hanley 2004; Deegan-Krause 2006) did
not increase significantly its membership organization. Instead, its rank-and-file
stabilized around 18,000 for the last decade. The low electoral volatility and
high stability of the CSSD membership partially explains the correlation
coefficient for the Czech Republic in table 4.2. The ODS has a similar story of
electoral success and weak membership organization. Although its initial
number of members was twice higher than that of the CSSD, it slightly
decreased until 2002 to approximately 18,000. The 1997 split of the party may
have affected the initial membership roll, noticing a loss of 3,000 members
between 1994 and 1998. The four years spent in the “real” opposition43
between 2002 and 2006 did not only secure the winning of the subsequent
elections, but also allowed a relevant increase of the membership organization
with more than 50%.
Hungary
The Hungarian political parties are characterized by low and extremely low
membership rates that sometimes raise difficulties in filling lists of candidates
(Ilonszki and Kurtan 1995; Ilonszki 1999; van Biezen 2003) or in the penetration
of local politics in villages (Enyedi and Toka 2007, 149). The membership figures
from 2006 are not very different from those of 1990 with no great fluctuations
in between. This picture indicates a general lack of mass membership; voters
are reluctant to get involved in the internal working of the institutions they
vote for.
The two parties dominating the Hungarian political life – the MSZP and
the FIDESZ – have in 2006 the highest membership rolls. Although the MSZP
built on the organizational grounds of the former communist party, it was
usually second until recently. The hesitant electoral start, mainly caused by the
difficulty to shake off its communist image, coincides with a loss of members.
The difference between the 1990 and 1994 rolls has a few alternative
explanations. On the one hand, the initial reported figure includes some of the
people who were enrolled in the former communist party and did not have
time to withdraw until the official figures were released. On the other hand, it
is possible to have members dissatisfied by the way in which the MSZP shaped
43 In 1998-2002, ODS was also in the opposition, but signed the Opposition Agreement through
which it provided support to the CSSD government of Milos Zeman.
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its ideology in the post-communist period and thus left the party. Irrespective
of the reasons, it is quite clear that the MSZP can count on a low but stable
membership organization between 1994 and 2006 (e.g. oscillations of 1,600
people).
Table 4.5: Party membership in Hungary
Absolute numbers
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
MSZP 50,000 36,000 37,000 37,600 36,000
FIDESZ 5,000 15,000 13,000 16,500 39,932
SZDSZ 15,000 35,018 16,000 27,000 20,000
MDF 21,000 27,000 23,000 25,000 11,000
FKGP 40,000 64,378 98,000 120,000 n/a
KDNP 3,500 28,203 26,500 n/a 17,000
Percentage of the electorate
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
MSZP 0.64 0.46 0.46 0.62 0.71
FIDESZ 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.27 0.79
SZDSZ 0.19 0.45 0.20 0.45 0.40
MDF 0.27 0.35 0.29 0.42 0.22
FKGP 0.51 0.82 1.22 1.99 n/a
KDNP 0.04 0.36 0.33 n/a 0.34
Sources: Agh (1995), Toka (1995), Balazs and Enyedi (1996), Korosenyi (1998),
Toka and Enyedi (1999), Mair and van Biezen (2001), van Biezen (2003), Toole
(2003), Spirova (2007), and the Annual Official Report of Political Parties (2001-
2006).
The membership of the FIDESZ follows a similar pattern with its electoral
success. Founded in 1988 by 37 young intellectuals as a liberal alternative to the
communist regime (Batory 2007, 268), the FIDESZ grew rapidly and by 1990 had
79 candidates for 136 single-member districts (Lomax 1996: 35; Millard 2004:
159). At that moment, the party could practically rely on 5,000 members. The
party approached the second elections with a membership organization of
15,000 (Spirova 2007: 128). It gained popularity with the ideological shift
towards conservative positions until the 1994 elections, but this caused also a
split with the opponents of this measure leaving the FIDESZ before the 1994
elections (Lomax 1996: 38).
As a result of the shift, the FIDESZ occupied the MDF’s previous place
on the political scene (Lomax 1999) and became successful in the consequent
1998 elections when it also led the coalition government. When holding office
its membership slightly increased to 16,500 members. Its changes of labels in
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1995 into the FIDESZ-MPP and the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Union (MPSZ) in
2003 went along with the formation of a centre-right identity capable of
attracting voters from multiple societal segments (Enyedi and Toka 2007, 150).
The latter modification is accompanied also by a relevant increase in the
membership rolls: the FIDESZ double the number of members between 2002
and 2006 although it was in opposition.
The MDF, the FKGP, and the KDNP formed the first government of post-
communist Hungary. In less than a decade, their electoral fortunes knew a
dramatic shift with the MDF and the KDNP being able to get into Parliament
only after coalitions with other parties. The initial membership of MDF and
FKGP was among the highest in the initial elections. The conservative-
nationalist MDF attracted a reasonable amount of members due to its protest
discourse in 1989. Its membership organization was relatively stable for more
than a decade. A split of the party – with most MPs leaving the party – before
the 2006 elections reduced the number of members to less than half.
Although the figures indicate the FKGP as the party with the largest
membership in Hungary, there are at least two problems. On the one hand, the
part had a regionally concentrated membership base that did not allow it to
field candidates in every single-member district (Enyedi and Toka 2007, 151). On
the other hand, its reports are suspected of gross inflation. For example,
according to these figures, not even half of their 2.2% members in the
electorate cast its vote for the party as it got 0.8% in the legislative elections.
Re-emerged after the fall of communism as a historical party, the FKGP was
characterized by internal conflicts that eventually led to splits in 2001 (Sitter
and Batory 2004). The KDNP started with the smallest organization and things
did not alter dramatically since then – in 2006 only the MDF has a smaller
organization than the KDNP. The stable electoral support in the first two
elections was accompanied by a steady increase in membership to slightly less
than 30,000 members. The failure to enter parliament and the necessity of a
coalition with the FIDESZ is reflected in a loss of members to the level of 17,000
in 2006.
The SZDSZ started as a party opposing the communist regime and the
second place received at the 1990 elections suggests its strong appeal. It is the
party characterized by continuous oscillations in terms of membership. Until
the 1994 elections the SZDSZ doubled its number of members, but got to the
initial level four years later. The party is characterized by two periods of
electoral stability: one at a relatively high level around 20% in 1990 and 1994 and
another at low level of success around 5% between 1998 and 2006. The
oscillations of membership appear to be indifferent to such stability trends.
Instead, the SZDSZ losses members when it governs. Both increases of
membership took place when the party was in opposition and whenever it was
incumbent the losses were as relevant as the previous gains.
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Poland
The Polish parties surveyed in this book pursue rhetorical commitments to
developing party membership bases and establishing basic organizational
networks on the ground (Szczerbiak 2001b). However, none of them had
organized a central membership recruitment drive nor had explicit
development strategies at national level (Szczerbiak 2001a, 113). Only the
isolated case of the PSL is empirically consistent with claims related to mass
membership. Formed in 1990 as the organizational successor of the United
Peasant Party (ZSL), a satellite of the former communist party, the PSL traced
its tradition to the peasant movement dating back in the 19th century
(Szczerbiak 2001c, 96). Thus, the party combines organizational assets from its
communist-era predecessors with a relevant rural base ending up with the
most impressive membership roll within the Polish party system. Moreover, the
party maintains strong connections with the Voluntary Firemen Association, a
network that represents a stable the source of votes and members (Jasiewicz
2007, 103). Stability appears to be the characteristics of the PSL not only in
terms of votes – its performance evolves around 8-9% with quite low volatility –
but also in terms of membership. This was relatively constant above 150,000
members with a drop in 2005.
Table 4.6: Party membership in Poland
Absolute numbers
1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007
PIS 2,500 6,000 22,000
PO 5,000 15,000 32,000
PSL 180,000 190,000 150,000 150,000 120,000 160,000
PD 15,000 18,000 14,000 22,000 10,000 1,800
SLD 60,000 60,000 60,000 87,000 80,000 72,000
Percentage of the electorate
1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007
PIS 0.01 0.02 0.07
PO 0.02 0.05 0.10
PSL 0.65 0.69 0.53 0.48 0.40 0.52
PD 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01
SLD 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.26 0.24
Sources: Gebethner (1996: 130), Mair and van Biezen (2001), Szczerbiak (2001a;
2001b; 2001c), Grzymala-Busse (2002a), and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2003).
The SLD was initially a conglomerate – dominated by the Social Democracy of
the Republic of Poland (SDRP) – including several trade unions, youth,
women’s, and social organizations that enjoyed benefits during communism
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(Zubek 1995; Szczerbiak 2001c, 95-96). Its membership was built on this cluster
of various organizations and on the inherited organizational structures from
the communist Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). Apart from the human
resources, the SLD also took over the infrastructure (e.g. buildings) of the PZPR
(Grzymala-Busse 2002a). On these grounds, the SLD could rely on a significant
roll of members driven by their interest to avoid change (Szczerbiak (2001c,
116), but still did not reach a comparable level with the PSL. Its ideological
monopoly on the left of the political spectrum for over a decade (Jasiewicz
2008) may explain the relatively stable amount of members. The organizational
transformation and change of name in 1999 marked an increase in the
membership rates with almost 50%. This was the last increase of the number of
members as the following elections of 2005 and 2007 witnessed gradual losses.
Rooted in the Solidarity trade union, the PD did not persuade relevant
amounts of voters to become members. The numerous splits and
organizational transformations made unlikely a major boost of the membership
in the PD across time. There are minor oscillations in the membership rolls until
2006 when it dropped dramatically to 1,800. Its merger in 1994 with the Liberal
Democratic Congress (KLD) affected the already low number of members that
decreased below the initial level. Although the following period – coinciding
with a term in government – marked a slight increase, in the eve of the 2001
elections a few prominent members left the party to join the PO. The PD failed
to enter Parliament in 2001 and its membership decreased to less than half until
2005. A new restructuring of the party in 2005, when it got its current name,
appears to have lead to a severe loss of members until 2007. Emerged in 2001
from parts of the AWS, the PIS and the PO have a remarkable positive evolution
in terms of membership between elections with figures in 2007 nine and six
times higher than the initial levels. Both parties dominated the Polish arena in
the most recent decade and this may be an explanation of their rapid
development in terms of membership. Despite this trend, the levels are still
very low compared with the performers PSL and SLD.
Romania
The Romanian political parties are characterized by various approaches
towards the issue of party membership. With the most specific regulations
about members in the CEE region, the absolute figures of membership are
among the highest in the region. This situation is influenced by the fact that the
successor party (FSN) split early in the transition and thus generated two
organizationally strong competitors: the PSD and the PDL. By 1996, both
parties had more than 300,000 members. However, their different approaches
towards organization were visible from the separation. FSN’s split in 1992
followed the divergence of opinions within the bloc: Petre Roman, recently
dismissed from the prime-minister position at that time, won the elections
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against president Iliescu’s ideological group. Roman’s party remained FSN
(further PD and PDL), whereas the losers of the FSN internal elections formed
the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN, later PDSR, and finally PSD)
(Crowther 1998; Pop-Elecheș 1999).
In theory, the PDL inherited FSN’s organizational structure and
membership. In practice, the departure of key figures of FSN determined a
massive migration of members and local organizations to the splitter (PSD).
The latter proactively worked to form its organization and was oriented
towards the enlargements of its membership base. The result was a slow
increase of the membership rate until 2004, the following four years being
marked by a sudden drop. The PDL was less active, being satisfied with the
remnants of the FSN membership. The consequence was a severe decrease of
their membership with two thirds in a period when they governed the country.
Table 4.7: Party membership in Romania
Absolute numbers
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
PDL n/a 330,000 135,288 148,992 153,333
PNL44 n/a n/a 120,115 73,185 116,134
PRM 15,000 72,000 218,002 210,827 106,797
PSD 60,000 309,000 304,713 385,481 290,116
UDMR45 301,000 267,000 145,000 110,000 85,000
Percentage of the electorate
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
PDL n/a 1.92 0.76 0.81 0.84
PNL n/a n/a 0.68 0.40 0.63
PRM 0.09 0.42 1.23 1.14 0.58
PSD 0.37 1.79 1.72 2.09 1.58
UDMR 1.84 1,55 0.82 0.60 0.46
Sources: Ishiyama (2001), the Official party Registry (2003; 2007), Preda (2005),
Soare (2007), and data supplied by parties’ headquarters.
In fact, with the exception of the UDMR that registers constant decrease of
membership from its creation, the 1996-2000 period is the only time when a
party in government losses members in Romania. For example, the second
term of the PDL in government (2004-2008) marked a small increase of
approximately 5,000 members. Their level of membership stabilized starting
44 In the process of data collection for this book, the PNL officials declared that they were not
aware of their membership levels for 1992-2000 since no central national register of members
was maintained.
45 UDMR had 500,000 members in 1990 when it was formed.
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2000 when the party was reformed and a new leader – successful in getting
two terms in office as president of the country – replaced Roman.
Consequently, in 2008, the first two parties in terms of membership size are the
PSD and the PDL with the former having twice as many compared to the latter.
The troubled organizational history of the PNL during the 90s (see
Chapter 3) explains why records of membership were hard to keep. The first
figures are available since 2004, one year after the most recent merger. The
party was reorganized in 2001, with a new president who was supposed to
avoid low electoral results like the one from 2000. Although not much was
done explicitly with respect to the approach towards membership, the party
became attractive in the eve of the 2004 elections and registered an increase
with 50% of its membership organization while in government (2004-2008).
The remaining two political parties display contradictory patterns. On
the one hand, for previously explained reasons, the UDMR dropped from half a
million members in 1990 to less than 100,000 in 2008. This happens also on the
background of not many formal requirements imposed by the UDMR to its
members, the regulations being the most relaxed in CEE. On the other hand,
PRM started with the smallest membership organization that increased five
times by 1996, being also favored by a short-term presence in government. Its
apogee of membership organization coincides with the best electoral result
obtained by the party in 2000. Such increase is fueled by the discourse of its
leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor who considers large membership as a source of
legitimacy. Following those elections, the MP floor-crossing were accompanied
by many local organizations changing together with their members the political
affiliation. In 2008 when the party failed to reach the electoral threshold the
membership was reduced to less than half compared to 2000.
Slovakia
The Slovak political parties have similarly low records of membership to the
Hungarian parties. With the exception of the HZDS and the SDKU, the Slovak
parties have in 2006 less members – both in absolute numbers and percentage
of the electorate – than in the beginning. Half of the Slovak surveyed parties
display constantly decreasing trends in the percentage of their members from
the voting population (SDKU, SNS, and SDL). In this respect, Slovakia is unique
across CEE as none of the previously examined countries had so many parties
with continuous losses of members over time. Similarly to the successor parties
in other CEE countries, SDL started with the largest membership roll due to its
organizational legacies. However, throughout the 90s, the party was
characterized by tensions between the intellectual modernizing leadership and
old membership base (Haughton 2004a, 180). The evolution of membership in
relation to the internal struggles and electoral performance is discussed in
detail in the following section.
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Table 4.8: Party membership in Slovakia
Absolute numbers
1992 1994 1998 2002 2006
HZDS 30,000 40,000 72,200 40,000 35,370
KDH 26,352 27,888 29,541 27,400 15,297
MKP 40,000 11,600 12,034 10,500
SDKÚ 5,489 5,396 8,569
SNS 7,000 2,000 11,500 13,000 1,370
SDL 48,000 27,600 22,482 21,233
Percentage of the electorate
1992 1994 1998 2002 2006
HZDS 0.79 1.03 1.79 0.96 0.83
KDH 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.66 0.37
MKP 1.03 0.29 0.29 0.25
SDKÚ 0.15 0.14 0.13
SNS 0.19 0.05 0.32 0.31 0.03
SDL 1.27 0.71 0.53 0.38 0.37
Sources: Malová (1997), Haughton (2001), Ishiyama (2001), Kopecek (2002),
Deegan-Krause (2006), Rybar (2006), and Rybar and Deegan-Krause (2008).
Notes: The number is from 1993.
The number is from 1999.
The HZDS started with the second membership organization and had the
largest in 2006. The longitudinal distribution of membership is symmetrical
having the year 1998 as a peak. That is the year that coincides with the end of
the HZDS domination in Slovak politics. Membership rates are related to the
practices of the HZDS when in government: the party recruited numerous
employees from the state administration with the promise of securing their
jobs (Deegan-Krause 2006, 33). Such an explanation of the membership
augmentation is plausible as the following four years when the HZDS ended up
in opposition the level of membership decreased to the value of 1994.
Although in 2002 the HZDS was the largest single party in elections, it
got into opposition mostly dues to its lack of coalition potential – apart from
SNS there was not political party in Slovakia willing to get into a coalition with
Meciar’s party. This isolation was not beneficial for the membership rolls that
continued to decrease. In fact, the nationalist and populist approach
characterizing the HZDS (Carpenter 1997) and the SNS (Ramet 1997; Cibulka
1999; Mudde 2005) do not appear to attract numerous members. SNS has a
modest membership organization that reached in 2006 a minimum of 1,370
members. The party claims to be the ideological heir of the historical party with
the same name active from the second half of the 19th century until 1938. Not
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even its continuous presence in Parliament (only in the 2002 elections SNS did
not pass the electoral threshold) and terms in office helped improving the
membership figures.
These country insights indicate various developments taking place
within and across the party systems. Membership gains or loses can be
associated to multiple events in the life of parties: organizational changes,
incumbency, electoral alliances, splits or mergers etc. Overall, three general
conclusions can be drawn. First, there is at least one party in each political
system to pursue the enlargement of its membership base or to maintain the
existing one within reasonable variation. Dramatic increases are rare in all
examined countries especially in the direction of increasing membership. The
attractiveness of political parties remained generally low and without specific
incentives voters do not join parties.
Second, no systematic factor appears to be connected to the size and
variations in size of the membership organizations. For example, although it
explains the evolution of membership for particular parties, incumbency does
not make a great difference across CEE. The statistical test (see chapter 6)
reveals no empirical relationship between membership and incumbency.
Furthermore, parties to the left do not appear to have necessarily more
members than those to the right. It is more a spurious relationship in which the
real cause is represented by the past of those parties. Connected with the last
observation, there is a general tendency of the parties starting off with a large
membership to maintain along the way. Most of the times, these parties are
those with an organizational heritage (the successor parties). More
importantly, the relationship between membership and electoral volatility
appears to be weak. This was indicated both by the statistical analyses and
cross-party comparisons from this section. What are the reasons for such a
weak linkage? The following section tries to provide an answer by exploring the
development of two successor parties with different electoral evolution and
approaches towards membership.
Where Does the Mechanism Collapse?
The Introduction to this book explained that the purpose of the case study
sections is to reveal how the statistically identified relationships work in
particular contexts. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicated
only marginal support for one of the two hypothesized relationships between
party membership and electoral volatility. Accordingly, this section aims to
illustrate how and why the membership organization was eclipsed by other
organizational (e.g. leadership style or splits) and systemic factors (e.g. party
competition) in shaping the stability of electoral support. Each party history
illustrates how membership longitudinal development coincided only to a
limited extent to that of the electoral volatility.
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The two political parties presented in this section were chosen on the
basis of their different levels of success in securing large membership
organizations. Both BSP in Bulgaria and SDL in Slovakia are successor parties
and inherited similar organizational assets. However, the former managed to
maintain a high number of members and to remain an important actor in a
system characterized by numerous entries and exits. On the contrary, SDL
gradually lost more than half of its members and eventually disappeared from
the political scene after a merger with a party created by one of its factions.
BSP: Between Members and Voters
Starting with the early days of transition, the BSP has been one of the most
influential actors in the Bulgarian post-communist politics. Apart from the PSD
in Romania, the BSP was the only successor party in CEE winning the first
elections following the regime change. Since then it showed a remarkable
capacity to persist as a main contender on the political stage despite harsh
defeats in three rounds of elections (1991, 1997, and 2001). Despite winning the
first elections, it lost power after being toppled by a general strike in late 1990;
then lost the early elections of 1991. It spent three years in opposition, returned
in government between 1994 and 1997, and ousted again in the context of poor
economic performances. However, it showed considerable capacity to rebuild
and returned to government in 2005.
The BSP’s link with the Bulgarian Communist Party brought both
advantages and disadvantages in the newly created context. The first years of
transition saw the BSP trapped in the discourse of its predecessor, unable or
unwilling to distance itself from its legacy. After Todor Zhivkov was ousted in
late 1989 following an internal rebellion of the reformers, the new leadership
broke ties with the former elite of the party, but did not embark a decisive path
towards “social democratization”. Until losing the elections of 1997, the
discourse and program of the BSP maintained numerous references to the
benefits of state economy, attacked capitalism, and developed a significant
nationalist dimension. Moreover, the party made ambiguous references to
NATO and EU membership (Spirova 2005; 2008). It was labeled as partly
reformed (Ishiyama 1999, 97) and considered to adopt a leftist retreat strategy
(Ishiyama 2006, 24).
The BSP took over the bulk of membership and infrastructural
resources of the former communist party (Spirova 2008, 483). Among the 42
parties competing in the 1990 elections, only the BSP had consistent
organizational structures throughout the entire country (Karasimeonov in
Spirova 2005, 603). The transfer of membership organization did not happen
by default. During the transformation phase (from a communist to socialist
party) there was a renewal of membership affiliation to the party through the
148
participation in the referendum to decide the name change46 (Baeva 2001, 245).
This referendum illustrated a decline in membership – in April 1990 the party
kept 73% of its members compared to 1989 – but remained nevertheless very
significant in numerical terms: 726,000 members (Kumanov and Nikolova 1999,
122); this was almost 10% of the country’s total population.47 However, figures
from the next year, when the party also lost the legislative elections, indicate a
sudden drop to approximately half of this number (see Figure 4.4).
The inherited organizational infrastructure and membership of the
former communist party provided the BSP leverage compared to all the other
Bulgarian parties. Despite a constant loss of members, as Figure 4.4 illustrates,
the BSP still maintained a higher number of members compared to any other
political actor – 210.000 in 2001, 191.000 in 2005. It continued to be the
wealthiest in terms of properties and financial resources (Spirova 2005, 606-
608; Spirova 2008, 486). Moreover, newly-emerged Bulgarian parties saw the
strong organizational structure as a successful strategy to win elections or at
least to maintain political influence (Spirova 2005). Accordingly, they perceived
the BSP as a trend-setter in the early stages of multiparty politics in Bulgaria.
The dynamic of membership organization can be divided in two
different periods according to the amount of loss. The year 1997 appears to be
the critical juncture. Prior to 1997, there is a dramatic decrease in the share of
members – the party loses approximately one third of its membership
organization. The harsh defeat in the 1997 elections forced a decisive change in
leadership and style. A new reformist and pragmatic team of leaders, led by
Sergey Stanishev, took the top seat in 2001 (and is still of the party today), after
the former chairman, Georgi Parvanov48, was elected as president of Bulgaria,
and gradually set the party on the path towards real transformation into a
European-style social-democratic one. This evolution was acknowledged by the
Party of European Socialists that accepted the BSP in its ranks, after rejecting it
since 1990 (Spirova 2008, 491-492).
The BSP benefited from this newly created public profile by slowing the
pace of membership loss and regaining votes that promoted them in
government in 2005. In this respect, an essential element meant to diminish the
drop in membership was to change the way it regarded the form of
membership. The BSP maintained the “traditional” members as a base for the
46 In March 1990, the new leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party asked all members of the
party to vote in an internal referendum concerning the change of the name into “Socialist”.
47 We should also mention a second successor party in Bulgaria: the Bulgarian Agrarian National
Union. It had been a satellite of the communist party before 1990. However, the party was
affected by no less than 11 splinters in the first decade of democratic politics; therefore its
relevance is minimal compared to that of the BSP (Spirova 2005, 604-605).
48 Previously, the party had only two other presidents after the post-communist transformation
began: Aleksandar Lilov (1990-1991) and Zhan Videnov (1991-1996).
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party, but also tried to build around it a more flexible group of supporters
(Krusteva 2003 cited in Spirova 2008). The decisive re-orientation of the party
towards European-style social-democracy and the confirmation of this trend
through gaining PES membership made the party more appealing to the
younger generation and intellectuals. These new orientations contrasted with
the nostalgic leftist discourse from the 90’s and thus provided new ideological
sources to potential members, activists, and voters. Moreover, the party
appeared to benefit from the eight years spent in opposition (1997-2005) with
respect to its relationship with the youth. By 2005, a small share of the young
electorate remembered the Socialists for their poor economic performance or
previous nationalist discourse during the early 90’s. Instead, many became
familiar to its image as an exponent of European social-democracy.
Nevertheless, according to the Bulgarian media outlet Dnevnik, in 2005 only
9.4% of the BSP’s members were aged below 35 (Website Dnevnik).
A supplementary organizational feature may further explain the
dynamics of party membership. Such a feature is particular to BSP among the
Bulgarian parties and refers to the creation of ideological platforms or factions
within the party (Krusteva 2003 cited in Spirova 2008). One of these factions
was DEMOS that caused the only splinter within the BSP. It left the party in
1993 and later became the Bulgarian EuroLeft, the only competitor alongside
the BSP on the left side of the political spectrum. However, it did not manage
to threaten the position of the official successor party, but gained additional
defectors from the BSP, beside the initial members of the faction (Spirova
2008, 490). Millard (2004, 55) also notes that the internal divisions within the
party have always been high, yet it managed to keep its unity. A potential
explanation for the constant high number of members, compared to its
internal opponents, is the undisputed dominance of the BSP over the left side
of the ideological spectrum.. With the notable exception of the EuroLeft in the
mid-90’s, no other party came close to challenging the BSP’s strong position.
Furthermore, the electoral strategy of the BSP prevented any major internal
dissent and migration towards other political parties. It participated in broad
electoral alliances with smaller parties, it facilitated their access to Parliament,
and consolidated its position as the main voice of the Bulgarian left.
The hypothesized relationship between membership organization and
electoral volatility is well illustrated by the BSP in the first decade of its
existence. Between 1991 and 1994 both the membership organization and
electoral performance of the BSP were stable. The party gained 5,000
members between the two elections, a small number compared to the total of
370,000 displayed in 1994. The BSP had slightly better results in the 1994
compared to the 1991 election, with very low volatility. The large membership
decrease from 1994 and 1997 is associated with a large volatility in the 1997
elections (39.22). The dramatic loss of members – almost one third of the total
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share – corresponds to weakened support in society. The electoral support
dropped to 22% for the alliance formed around BSP; thus, the electoral appeal
of the party was even lower. As the membership organization continued to
shrink from approximately 250,000 to 210,000 members, the party also lost
electoral support. The 2001 electoral result was the worst in the entire post-
communist history of the BSP. Summing up, for more than a decade the party
membership and electoral support for the BSP followed similar trends. Major
changes in the membership organization coincided with high levels of electoral
volatility.
However, following the 2001 elections the leadership changes and
discourse modifications were the measures that interrupted this linkage. Until
2005, the membership decreased to a level of approximately 190,000
members; according to the previous trend, the electoral volatility for the 2005
elections was expected to be smaller than in 2001. However, it increased given
a boost in the electoral support for the BSP. Together with its allies, the BSP
obtained 31% votes and formed the coalition government. The 2005 volatility is
also the highest registered by the party. It was for the first time when the
electoral performance improved on the background of decreasing
membership.
Overall, the case of the BSP allows three relevant observations. First,
despite a continuous loss of members, it secured the largest membership
organization in Bulgaria and in CEE. In this respect, the party ensured the
continuity of its organizational legacy. Second, the membership rates appear to
influence the electoral performance of the party. Between 1991 and 2001 there
was an immediate reaction of the voters to the changes in the membership
organization. As soon as other elements got in the picture (e.g. leadership
change), the size of membership could no longer predict volatility. At the same
time, the relatively large membership organization (3-5% of the voting
population) prevented the party from obtaining poor electoral results. The
members developed social networks on which the party could rely even when
the competition was fierce (e.g. 2001). Moreover, it ensured a solid electoral
base on which the party could start building its comeback on the political scene
in 2005.
SDL: The Lost Legacy
For the communists in Czechoslovakia, the end of 80s was marked by the rise
of reformists among party’s leadership. Peter Weiss, who later became one of
the exponents of the Slovak social democrats in the ‘90s, was one of the main
vectors of internal reform. In January 1990, his faction pushed for a significant
change in the name of the party, adding the acronym SDL to the official
communist label of the Slovak component (KSS). A year later, the party
dropped the communist part of its name completely and remained as SDL,
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while the KSS continued to exist as a radical communist splinter. The SDL broke
all ideological ties with its communist predecessor and centralized its decision-
making mechanism. It asked all the nostalgic elements of the former
communist party to join its radical splinter – the KSS (Grzymala-Busse 1999).
Weiss pushed for a reshuffling of the party’s leadership, narrowing the
membership of the Central Committee from 260 to 90 and later on
concentrating the power in the hands of just 11 people, coordinating the entire
local infrastructure (Grzymala-Busse 2002b, 94; Haughton 2004a, 179).
This structural reform was easier as the SDL took over the formal
organization from communists. The centralized decision-making allowed the
SDL to rapidly change its position on matters such as the economy or
secularism when it felt that this would bring better electoral results. This
change in discourse took place faster than in the case of other successor
parties, such as those in Bulgaria, Poland, or Romania. SDL had initially a
moderate position towards the free market in 1990. It switched to an openly
liberal vision in 1993 and then back to a more critical discourse in 1995
(Grzymala-Busse 2002b). The SDL promoted through its discourse and
programs the idea of a strong commitment to democratic values, in order to
distinguish itself from the ruling HDZS, seen as populist, anti-minority and with
authoritarian tendencies.
The membership organization had a special story. As part of the effort
to break away from the past, the SDL leadership initiated a process of re-
registration of the former communist party’s members and to sign a
declaration of support towards democratic values (Rybar and Deegan-Krause
2008, 504). For the BSP the re-registration was automatic for those members
who participated in the referendum for the name change. The SDL opted for a
different re-registration process based on the expressed willingness of the
people to get involved. Following the re-registration, the SDL managed to
attract less than a quarter from the members of the communist party (Kopecek
2002, 253). Thus, in 1992, it had 48,000 members (1.27% of the voters), the
largest in Slovakia at the time.
Although the membership organization was not directly inherited,
almost all SDL’s members have also belonged to the communist party
(Kopecek 2002). In this respect, the organizational and leadership heritage of
SDL influenced people’s decision to join the party. However, the fact that the
re-registration took place on voluntary basis would suggest the existence of a
rather stable number of members in the years to follow; this was not the case.
By 1994, this number shrank to almost half and registered continuous decrease
until 2002 when the number of members was around 21,000 (see Table 4.8). In
absolute terms this number is not high, but it remains one of the highest in
Slovakia. In 1998 and 2002, the SDL was the third party in terms of membership,
following the HZDS and the KDH.
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The SDL followed a sinuous path within the Slovak party system, itself
marked by a high degree of instability. This is reflected in the volatility scores
from the first 1992 elections until its ultimate failure in 2002: 70.59 in 1994,
70.86 in 1998, and 82.57 in 2002. Starting 2004 the SDL steadily transferred its
membership and properties towards SMER (Rybar and Deegan-Krause 2008,
501).49 At a glance, there is a relationship between the decreasing number of
members and the increasing electoral volatility. The party relied on fewer
members every election and this predicted its ultimate failure. However, there
are two empirical dilemmas. First, there are other Slovak parties with more
dramatic loss of membership (e.g. MKP) and still survived the electoral
competition. Second, the loss of members does not always coincide to loss of
votes, but with volatility (which marks also major gains). The severe decrease
of membership organization between 1992 and 1994 (from 48,000 to 27,600)
coincided with a major loss of electoral support. The explanation consistent
with the statistical findings from this chapter is that the few members left in
SDL were not able to mobilize a stable core of voters and that is why the party
registered major oscillations. In practice, there were at least two intervening
variables that can explain the instable electoral performance of SDL: the
context of competition and the internal divisions.
The electoral performance in the 90’s was heavily influenced by the
strong position of the HDZS within the party system (Haughton 2004, 180-184).
For instance, the ideological proximity to a party benefiting of large popular
support could only harm SDL. In economic terms, the SDL’s discourse was very
similar to that of HZDS: the privatization combined with social equilibrium. In
addition to what claimed by the SDL, the HZDS promoted a much more
aggressive nationalist dimension that resonated with the population’s newly
discovered sense of identity. This originated in the independence and in the
ongoing quarrels with the 10% Hungarian minority concentrated in the South of
the country. SDL’s strategic decisions to form a coalition with three other small
left-wing parties were not fortunate. They did neither strengthen its role on the
political scene nor establish it as the main voice of the left. The “Common
Choice” coalition gained 10.41%, barely crossing the 10% electoral threshold for
coalitions, the electoral input of the smaller parties being insignificant. An
additional element that hampered the SDL’s ability to evolve in a strong actor
within the Slovak post-communist party system was the “more hard-line nature
of the communist regime” in Czechoslovakia (Fisher 2002, 116). The population
was reluctant to the SDL’s appeals because of more negative feelings
associated with the former regime and distrust transferred towards the SDL as
49 Following the merger between the SDL and SMER, in 2005 a new Party of the Democratic Left,
with the same acronym – SDL – was formed. This party is brand new, it cannot be considered the
successor of SDL; it failed to gain any seats in the 2006 elections.
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the main successor party. This may be also one reason for which almost half of
the members left the party in less than two years following the independence.
Apart from the HZDS dominated structure of competition in the early
‘90s, the electoral performance of the SDL was also affected by the ongoing
internal struggles. In 1994, before the early elections called by a new caretaker
government dominated by the right, but in which the SDL was part, the first
post-independence splinter took place, after Jan Luptak, a popular SDL figure,
chose to leave the party and form the Workers’ Association of Slovakia (ZRS).
In only a few months after its birth, the new party gained 7.34%, presumably
taking over part of the SDL’s potential voters. In this context, the membership
dropped by 43% compared to 1992. There were numerous internal divisions
within the SDL emerging by the mid 90’s. Peter Weiss, Robert Fico, Brigita
Schmognerova, and Jozef Migas, who succeeded Weiss as president of the
party in 1996, led competing factions within the SDL (Deegan-Krause 2006, 264-
265). Migas’ win in the party elections in 1996 illustrated a different distribution
of power within the party: while Weiss’s reformist win promoted centralization,
Migas’ support relied on strong influential local organizations (Deegan-Krause
2006). This de-centralizing trend within the party continued towards the end of
the ‘90s, as the divisions within the central leadership deepened (Borz and
Enyedi 2007; Rybar and Deegan-Krause 2008, 504).
These internal tensions continued after the 1998 entrance in the
Christian-Democratic dominated government, a bitter personal struggle
emerged between Weiss’s pro-European camp and leftist hardliners. Robert
Fico left the party in 1999 and formed Smer, who later became the main party
in government, following a similar pattern of discourse as the HZDS’s in the
‘90s. In November 2001, a new president, Pavol Koncos was elected, and forced
Schmognerova, the finance minister, to resign, despite having the support of
the prime-minister. Following her resignation in February 2002, she joined Peter
Weiss in the formation of a new party, called the Social Democratic Alternative
(SDA). Smer managed to gain 13.46% of the vote in the 2002 elections, taking
over a quarter of the SDL’s electorate from 1998, while the SDA failed to pass
the threshold, with only 1.79%. However, the SDL performed even poorer,
receiving only 1.36% of the votes (Haughton 2004, 186-187). Rather
paradoxically, despite the two splinters between 1998 and 2002, the party lost
only 1.000 members, counting 21.233 members at the time of the 2002
elections. Surprisingly, the first splinter of the SDL, the radical communist KSS,
which had a poor performance during the ‘90s, managed to gain over 6% of the
vote and enter Parliament. Between 1994 and 1998 the SDL continued to lose
members, despite not undergoing another splinter within the party. At the time
of the 1998 elections, it counted only 22.482 members.
These competition and organizational factors transformed the SDL in a
unique case among the successor parties in CEE. It is the only successor party
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that did not manage to persist on the national political stage. Its organizational
legacy got lost along the way. The SDL did not adapt to the political
competition, took wrong political decisions, and faced numerous internal
divisions. On top of these features, the membership organization slowly
shrunk. With its decision to re-register members, the SDL severely reduced the
membership organization. The SDL practically traded size for legitimacy and
active involvement of the interested citizens. Such a strategy was not helpful
and the party registered weak electoral performance in 1994 and vanished in
the aftermath of the 2002 elections. Unlike the BSP, the SDL’s inability to
cultivate its organizational heritage - including the initial amount of members
originally in the communist party – lead to its failure in elections.
Conclusions
The analysis of party membership in CEE allows several empirical observations.
The most general refers to the fact that the CEE political parties are far from
the mass membership organization. The vast majority of the 29 investigated
parties do not have an average share of members (calculated as a percentage
of the electorate) larger than 1%. At the same time, the longitudinal study
indicates that more than two thirds of the CEE parties are characterized by a
non-linear development of their of the membership organizations. Oscillations
in the share of members are common. There are very few parties that manage
to increase their membership organizations over time. Usually, the increases
are marginal. There is an equal proportion of parties (14%) that register
constant increase or decrease during the entire post-communist period. Such
development trends are neither country specific nor depending on the
membership size.
In spite of these low levels, there is variation in the extent to which
parties grow their membership organizations across countries and parties. The
country-level figures indicate large discrepancies between the countries with
most (Romania) and least (Poland) party members. Regarding the variation of
membership organizations within the same party system, it appears to be no
contamination effect. In each country there is at least one party that has a
much more developed membership organization than the rest of the actors.
There are rare instances in which political parties imitate the forerunner and
start building similar membership organizations.
The statistical analysis indicates very weak empirical support for the
one of the two hypothesized relationships. In general, the political parties with
large membership organizations have slightly lower electoral volatility
compared to the rest of political actors. The correlation lacks statistical
significance. The strength of the relationship varies across countries; its
extreme values appear to be related to the share of party membership in the
population (Figure 4.3). The relationship between party membership and
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electoral volatility is the weakest in the country where few people become
party members (Poland). The strongest relationship is observed in the country
with the highest percentage of party members in the population (Romania).
Apart from these observations, one country deviates from the general trend. In
Hungary, the relationship goes in the opposite direction: the MSZP and the
FIDESZ are the political parties with relatively small membership rates and low
volatility.
There is no discernible difference in terms of electoral volatility
between the parties that experience dramatic variations in the size of their
membership organizations and the rest of political actors. The cross-party
comparisons within the countries reveal mixed results that increase the
difficulty of substantial conclusions. One possible explanation for these
statistical results is represented by the small differences in membership
organizations. The majority of the CEE political parties have small membership
organizations and their variations are often marginal (see Tables 4.3-4.8). The
only partial exceptions are represented by those parties with relevant
organizational heritage (i.e. the successors).
The quantitative tests were complemented by qualitative insights into
the longitudinal evolution of membership organizations and the relationship
with electoral volatility. The comparative assessment highlighted several
relevant distinctions between parties from the same political system. These
differences explain the size and variation of membership size across time. In
some instances, the evolution of membership organization was somewhat
related to the electoral support for the party. This marginal influence is best
observed in the detailed analysis from the case study section where the
electoral volatility of both BSP and SDL – parties with contrasting membership
tracks – was influenced by other factors.
Unlike the centralization of candidate selection for national elections,
the membership organization marginally explains the variation of electoral
volatility at party level in CEE. The following chapter tests the relevance of the
MPs’ renomination rates for the electoral volatility. Whereas this chapter
emphasized the role of members in creating an extensive social network within
the electorate, Chapter 5 shifts the focus towards party elites. The empirical
testing departs from the argument that the visibility and continuity in the
public office can lead to stable preferences of voters over time.
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Chapter 5 The Continuity of Representation:
MP Renomination Rates and Electoral Volatility
Introduction
The low levels of confidence vested by citizens in the legislature and the
effective loss of its competencies in favor of executive agencies (Mishler and
Rose 1994; Newton and Norris 2000; Loewenberg et al. 2002; 2010; Mezey,
2008, 181) does not alter the importance of parliamentary representation for
democracy. Following the breakdown of communism, most CEE countries
placed Parliaments at the core of their institutional setting (Lijphart 1992; Elster
et al. 1998). In this sense, previous studies reveal the dominance held by the
legislature in relationship with the other state actors (Gherghina 2007; Elgie
and Moestrup 2008). Two features of the post-communist legislatures are
observable. First, they start as transitional legislatures: with the exception of
Poland, they were in place before the drafting of constitutions. They lacked
regulations on internal procedures and their effects on behavior and policy
occurred at a later stage. Second, as a consequence of the central role played
by Parliaments in the institutional design, the CEE legislatures became the
major stage where politicians met and where political parties made their
presence visible (Olson 1998b). In the words of Polsby (1975) – who
differentiates between Parliaments as transformative institutions and as arenas
– the newly emerged CEE legislatures appear to be part of the latter category.
Whereas the transformative legislatures imply that the internal institutional
structures and procedures influence MPs’ behavior and the legislative
outcomes, the Parliaments as arenas offer platforms for governments and
political parties to exert their influence.
The importance of Parliaments in the decision-making process raises
the stake of representation for political parties. They are more interested to
secure their presence into powerful legislatures than in those playing symbolic
roles. Such incentives are even stronger as the CEE Parliaments appear to be
stable and consolidated institutions in an environment characterized by
turbulent political and economic developments. Rich literature focuses on the
institutional determinants of turnover – electoral system (Rosenthal 1974;
Niemi and Winsky 1987), term limits (Francis and Kenny 2000), and separation
of powers (Persson et al. 1997) – and on economic failures or decisions of the
incumbents (Chubb 1988; Sobel 1998). All these factors lead to specific
quantities and qualities of information that reach the voters and influence their
choice. Additionally, there are numerous studies (see Chapter 1) emphasizing
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the linkage created between voters and MPs to ensure the reelection of the
latter. However, earlier research ignored the potential influence of incumbent
MPs on voters’ choice. On the basis of the theoretical arguments outlined in
Chapter 1, this chapter tests the hypothesis according to which political parties
that renominate more MPs are likely to have lower levels of electoral volatility
than the parties renominating less MPs (H3).
The first section operationalizes renomination and proposes a formula
for its measurement. The formula is sensitive to both the total number of
candidates in elections and to the number of MPs from which the party
renominates. The second section uses aggregate data to discuss the patterns
of competition and renomination rates at country level. The following section
includes the statistical analysis of the relationship between renomination rates
and electoral volatility at party level. Drawing on an original dataset including
more than 5,000 MPs and 60,000 candidates, it shows empirical support for
the hypothesized relationship. Departing from the results of the quantitative
analysis, the fourth section discusses the differences between political parties
from the same party system. The final section includes two single case studies
meant to shed light on the way in which renomination can influence electoral
volatility in specific contexts.
The Renomination Rates: Operational Issues
The renomination rate refers to the percentage of MPs that candidate for their
parties in the elections following their term in office. As the size of parties and
number of candidates differ, the operationalization of this concept needs to be
relative. Accordingly, the renomination rate is calculated as the simple average
of two ratios: 1) that of incumbent MP candidates from the total number of
candidates selected by the political party in the subsequent election and 2) that
of incumbent MP candidates from the total number of MPs that party had in
the previous term.
The formula (2) reflects these issues and uses two different weighting
measures to control for biases. First, the number of incumbent MPs is divided
by the total number of candidates as the latter varies greatly among parties.
Some parties have lists with more candidates than seats and others do not
have enough people to run for every available seat. In fact, with the exception
of Slovakia in 2002, the political parties within the same country do not have an
equal number of candidates. Additionally, the cross national variation in the
number of candidates is also covered. Second, the number of seats accounts
for the size of the party, thus standardizing the obtained rates. Consequently,
the formula is sensitive to both the total number of candidates in elections and
to the number of MPs from which the party re-nominates. Such an index
produces values on a 0-1 scale with the maximum value corresponding to the
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situation in which a party uses as candidates for the coming elections only its
MPs – all of them – from the previous term.


























Rj = renomination rate for party j,
ICt = the total number of incumbent MPs renominated by party j in election t1,
TCt = total number of candidates of party j in election t1,
St-1 = number of seats held by party j in the previous term t0.
This rate is calculated for each term in which the party had access in Parliament.
Its value ranges between 0 and 100 and it is interpreted in the analysis in
percentage points. The reference point for the incumbents is the previous
election.50 Formula (2) is the basis for the statistical analysis from this chapter
and for all the graphical representations with the exception of Figure 5.1 that is
calculated on the basis of another formula (see below).
When employing Formula (2), there are two methodological aspects
that require special attention. First, the incumbency can be calculated only if
the party secures seats in consecutive terms. However, there are instances in
which although the party did not gain access to Parliament, the incumbency
rate can still be calculated. It is usually the case of parties resulting from a split.
Using the same complicated example of the Romanian FSN and its 1992 split, it
secured 263 seats in the 1990 national election. The parties resulting from the
split (PSD and PDL) promoted in the 1992 elections MPs from the previous
legislature. Although both parties were new from an institutional point of view,
they relied on old representatives to earn votes. Second, the calculations take
into account the initial political affiliation of the MPs and the number of
mandates at the beginning of the legislative term. In doing so, I avoid the
switches in political affiliation and the modifications of seats. Using the same
example of the PDL, during the 2004-2008 term it jumped from 48 initial seats
to 67 seats.
Before testing the hypothesis, a macro-perspective on the
development of the CEE Parliament in the past two decades is useful for two
50 I refer to the MPs renominated on the candidate list in the election following their mandate.
Absolute incumbents (i.e. with a continuous presence in all post-communist legislatures) are not
considered.
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reasons. On the one hand, it describes the dynamics of the process of
representation within the legislatures. The number of parliamentary parties
discussed in the next section accounts for the longitudinal and cross-country
variations.51 On the other hand, such an approach allows substantial
observations about the process of representation. In this respect, the following
section accounts for the re-nomination rates at country level and compares
them with the dynamic of competition.
Aggregate Dynamics of Competition and Renomination Rates
In general, the fragmentation of the political space in the CEE countries
decreases with every new election. The composition of the legislature clearly
reflects such a pattern. Previous studies indicate the existence of a decreasing
trend from the first post-communist decade, the effective number of parties
being on a descending slope (Fillipov 1999). Table 1 illustrates that in four of the
examined countries the number of competitors diminishes over time from
extreme values – 29 parties in the 1991 Polish Parliament and 17 in the 1990
Romanian legislature to approximately six political parties in the second post-
communist decade. In part, this dynamic is determined by the electoral
threshold – inexistent in the initial Polish and Romanian elections – which
require political competitors to achieve electoral support to gain access to seat
distribution. In many post-communist countries the threshold was repeatedly
modified and quite often it differentiates between political parties and
coalitions. For example, the Czech threshold for the 1996 and 1998 elections
used a threshold of 5% for one political party, 7% for a coalition of two or three
parties, and 11% for a coalition of at least four parties. In 2002, even the
coalitions of multiple parties were discouraged by changing the thresholds: 10%
for a coalition of two parties, 15% for a coalition of three parties, and 20% in the
case of a coalition made of at least four parties.
However, the restrictions in the form of electoral threshold are feared
mostly by small and less popular parties that decide to run into electoral
alliances or coalitions. This justifies the genesis of the Liberal Social Union (LSU)
coalition in the Czech 1992 elections (formed by parties failing to gain access in
the 1990 elections) or the appearance of the AWS in the 1997 Polish elections
following the failure of five parties to gain access in the 1993 Parliament. A
similar example is the SDK formed by Christian-democrats, Social-democrats
and Greens out of which solely the KDH survived in the subsequent elections. In
fact, this is the major problem of most CEE coalitions. Once they dissolute – and
it happens almost all the time – there is only one party that manages to gain
access to Parliament on its own. Quite often, other parties of the coalitions
51 This indicator is preferred to the effective number of parliamentary parties as the following
section focuses on the decreasing number of competitors - not on their strength.
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reorient after disintegration and form new alliances. This is the case with the
Common Choice (SV) formed in 1994 by the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL),
the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), the Farmers Movement of the
Slovak Republic (HPS), and the Green Party of Slovakia (SZ). In the 1998
elections, only the SDL ran independently, whereas SDSS and SZ joined the
emerging SDK.
Table 5.1: Number of Parties in the CEE Parliaments by Term
Parliamentary Terms
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
Bulgaria 3 5 5 4 7
Czech Republic 8 6 5 5 5
Hungary 7 7 6 5 4
Poland 29 7 5 7 6 6
Romania 17 8 6 5 6 5
Slovakia 5 7 6 7 6
Notes: Electoral alliances and coalitions are treated differently when calculating
the number of parties in Parliament: for alliances I account for the number of
component parties, whereas the coalition is considered a monolith.
The terms are: Bulgaria (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005), the Czech Republic
(1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, and 2006), Hungary (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006),
Poland (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2007), Romania (1990, 1992, 1996,
2000, 2004, and 2008), and Slovakia (1992, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006).
All over the region, the reduced number of parties in Parliament implies either
the existence of umbrella organizations (the case of the elections in the first
term) or the formation of electoral alliances and political coalitions with the aim
to increase the chances for representation (starting with the second term).
There were special circumstances in which the presence of umbrella
organizations, in the absence of an electoral threshold, did not limit the
number of parties (e.g. Poland and Romania). Bulgaria and Slovakia are marked
by oscillations of the number of parties in the legislature. The surprising fact,
compared with the other four countries, is that they both start with quite
reduced numbers (three in Bulgaria and five in Slovakia) and progressively
increase the number of parties up to seven in the case of Bulgaria, the highest
from the fifth term and among the highest in the region from the second term
onwards (only Romania had eight parties in its 1992 elections). Their trends can
be explained by analyzing the domestic structure of competition.
In Bulgaria, the 1991 elections were marked by the rivalry between the
BSP and the ODS clustering the anti-communist parties (SDS was part of it).
Preferences were thus divided between these competitors, the third actor
being the party representing the Turkish minority. By 1994 two other political
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formations - the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) and People’s Union (NS) –
managed to channel particular preferences drawing their success particularly
on people disappointed with the successors. They have both played episodic
roles in the Bulgarian politics, NS being solely an electoral coalition that failed
to exist for a longer period of time. The presence of short-term alliances in
Parliament reduces the number of successful competitors and provides an
impression of stability. However, the situation changes if we consider that only
three parties secured seats on a continuous basis in the Bulgarian legislatures.
Moreover, when we account for the structure of consecutive Parliaments, the
numerous entries and exits are quite striking, the most in the CEE region.
Around 14 parties and coalitions were part of the Parliament between 1991 and
2005, figures contrasting sharply with eight parties in Romania between 1992
and 2008 or seven parties in Hungary between 1990 and 2006.
Aggregate Renomination Rates at Party Level
Although the number of parties in Parliament is a useful indicator of the
dynamics of representation, it has inherent limitations. For example, it does not
capture the composition of the legislature, being insensitive to entries and
exits. As a result, there is an overestimation of the stability of competition.
These are the reasons for which the renomination rate adds information about
the dynamic of competition within and across party systems. In this respect, it
accounts for the extent to which successful candidates are supported by their
parties on a continuous basis.52 As this analysis is broader than the party level,
formula (3) is useful. It reflects a relative renomination rate at legislature level
by dividing the number of incumbent MPs renominated as candidates in the
coming elections by the total number of MPs belonging to the analyzed parties.

















Rp = renomination rate at parliamentary level (aggregated),
ICj = the number of incumbent MPs renominated by parliamentary party j,
St-1 = the number of seats held by party j.
52 For reasons connected with the employed mechanism at theoretical level, my
operationalization excludes those MPs elected in consecutive terms that belong to different
parties.
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Based on Formula (3), Figure 5.1 depicts the evolution of the aggregated
incumbency rates in the Parliaments of the investigated countries. Each bar
represents an election and they are arranged chronologically: Each country,
with the exception of Poland with five elections, has four elections ordered
from left to right. For example, in each country the dark grey bar to the left
marks the first election (see the note under the graph), the light grey bar to its
right the second election and so on. At the same time, the colors are used to
reflect similar moments of elections in each country. For example, the above
mentioned dark grey bar corresponds to the first term in each country.
Figure 5.1: Levels of Renomination Rates in the CEE Parliaments in







Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
Notes: The terms are: Bulgaria (1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005), the Czech Republic
(1996, 1998, 2002, and 2006), Hungary (1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006), Poland
(1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2007), Romania (1992, 1996, 2004, and 2008), and
Slovakia (1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006).
There is a similar evolution of the aggregated renomination rates in four out of
the six countries. The Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, and Romanian parties
increase the rate of MPs they renominate for a new seat in legislature with
every new election. There are cross-country differences in the percentage of
renominated MPs with Bulgaria and Romania at a low level and the Czech
Republic peaking in 2002 and 2006 when more than 80% of the existing MPs
were placed on lists for reelection. With the exception of Romania where we
observe progressive increase, the other three countries display a small
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drawback between their third and fourth election. At a glance the time factor
appears to be relevant, being visible a positive association between the periods
passed from the first elections and the renomination rates. However, the
decreasing number of competitors presented in Table 5.1 may also represent a
valid explanation.
A dual connection can be identified between the number of parties in
Parliament and the incumbency rates. On the one hand, political parties often
rely on the same candidates for numerous reasons: the quality of
representation, the candidates’ capacity to attract votes, the network
established by the MPs within the party (e.g. their positions within intra-party
politics). High rates of incumbency may structure the competition by limiting
the share of available votes. In other words, by proposing the same MPs as in
the previous elections, parties encapsulate preferences of specific voters –
those who voted with the candidate in the previous term are expected to cast
a similar vote – and thus decrease the available voting basis for the rest of the
parties.53 On the other hand, experienced MPs may represent the life vests of
parties in the insecure electoral environment especially when competitors
gradually disappear.
The Slovak and Polish legislatures deserve closer inspection as they
have particular dynamics. Both countries have a symmetric situation in their
elections. In Slovakia, out of the four elections the first two terms are marked
by an increase of the renomination rates, whereas the most recent two
elections show a steady decrease in which the levels are the lowest in the
region. In Poland there is a descending trend of renominations until 2001
followed by dramatic increases with a peak reached in 2007 of almost 95%. The
previous high level was registered in 1993, whereas the minimum point of
around 42% corresponds to the election in which two important parties
emerged on the political scene (PIS and PO) and one disappeared (PD). This is
the country in which different parties were successful in different decades.
Until 2001, the SLD, the PSL and the PD were the prominent political actors. PIS
and PO emerged and in 2005 they have both gathered more than 50% of votes.
This sudden shift in which the SLD lost numerous MPs and the PIS and the PO
promoted new faces in Parliament resulted in the lowest incumbency rate in
post-communist Polish legislatures. As a comparison, it is lower than in the 1993
term when reelection was quite small due to the previously fragmented
Parliament (with 29 parties). Despite such oscillations, the Polish Parliament
has among the highest renomination rates in the CEE region.
This country level perspective provides an accurate assessment of the
longitudinal evolution of the renomination rates. However, it overlooks the
53 The entire reasoning is based on the assumption that parties seek to maximize their votes and
offices and their candidate renominations are not often driven by corruption incentives.
165
similarities between political parties either within the same party system or
across countries. Figure 5.2 depicts the average renomination rates for each
analyzed party.54 Most CEE political parties nominate more than one third of
their MPs on candidate lists for future elections. There are a few political
parties (e.g. KDNP, FKGP, MDF, or SDS) that rely on approximately one quarter
of their MPs in the future elections. Similarly, there are a few parties that place
approximately half of their MPs (e.g. KDU-CSL, PIS, PSL, SLD, or FIDESZ) on the
lists of candidates.
Aggregate Renomination Rates at Party Level
There is great variation in the degree to which MPs are renominated by parties.
Such variation is observed both across parties from different countries and
within the same party system. Figure 5.2 graphically depicts the aggregated
levels of renomination rates, using Formula (2) as a basis for calculus. The
Czech and Romanian parties partially cluster more than the rest in terms of
their renomination rates. The broadest variation is observed within the Polish
and Slovak party systems. Some young CEE parties renominate more MPs than
the rest of political actors. They have to do so for a number of reasons such as
credibility or continuing with the elite that formed the party. For example, PIS
and PO have among the highest rates of renominated MPs. At the same time,
some traditional parties (KDNP and FKGP) or political parties with origins in the
last days of communism (MDF) have the lowest renomination rates. One
motivation for higher renewal rates among the old parties is the desire of such
political actors to send their voters a message of openness (i.e. different from
an oligarchic organization) and adaptation potential.
One further theoretical reason behind this empirical observation is
related to the recruitment pool. Old parties are likely to have a broader
recruitment pool than the new ones since they generally benefit of larger
membership organizations (see Chapter 4). In this situation, they are able to fill
in the candidate lists without appealing to their MPs especially if these were
unsuccessful during their term in office. One final observation refers to the
level of renomination within countries. In general, in each party system, the
parties with large presence in Parliament during the post-communist period
renominate more MPs on their lists of candidates compared to the rest. In this
respect, the BSP in Bulgaria, the FIDESZ and the MSZP in Hungary, and the PIS
and the PSL in Poland are the political parties with highest renminationrates.
One exception to this trend is Romania where the PSD relies the least on its
MPs when drafting the lists of candidates. A similar situation is observed in
Slovakia where the HZDS – with major electoral performance in the ‘90s –
comes after the MKP and the KDH.
54 The average percentages are calculated based on the results from Tables 5.3-5.8.
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Summing up, this section revealed three general tendencies. First, the number
of competitors in the legislatures decreases across the CEE countries with
voters being oriented towards fewer parties. Second, the percentage of MP
renominations on the lists of candidates generally increases as time passes by.
Third, political parties use at least one third of their MPs in drafting the
electoral lists for the next elections. There is great variation in the percentages
of renominated MPs across parties. The following section builds on these
observations to identify the statistical relationship between the renomination
rates and electoral volatility.
Renomination Matters
This section includes the empirical results of the hypothesis testing both at
general and country level. The analysis takes into account more than 5,000 MPs
and 60,000 candidates from six countries over the past two decades. The data
about the candidates from the legislative elections from Romania in 2000 are
not available. At the same time, for Hungary in 1994 I had access only to those
candidates renominated for 176 out of the 386 seats of the Parliament. It had
to be standardized in order to provide comparable data with the rest of the
years. The most common problem was encountered in the case of the MPs
who got elected at the beginning of one term, but ended their term in office –
for various reasons – before the next elections. Their replacements were
considered incumbents. Figure 5.3 reflects the distribution of the political
parties from each country based on their renomination rates (Tables 5.3-5.8)
and electoral volatility. On the renomination dimension, most parties have
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average rates situated between 0.4 and 0.6, with very few parties having less
than 0.2. The maximum renomination rate is close to 0.8. One such example is
of the Czech KDU-CSL in 1996 and 2002 that got a relatively constant number of
seats in Parliament and renominated many of the former MPs. In fact, quite a
few of those are the same over a sequence of elections.
Figure 5.3: The Distribution of the CEE Political Parties According to the
       Renomination Rates and Electoral Volatility
Overall, the clustering of points indicates that higher renomination rates
correspond to lower electoral volatility. Such a negative relationship provides
empirical support for the formulated hypothesis. These visual components are
complemented by the results of the statistical analysis (Table 5.2). There are no
parties with high volatility and high renomination rates. However, there are a
few outliers with high levels of volatility and low renomination rates. One such
example is the FKGP in 2002, after joining for four years the coalition
government, decided to renominate less than half of its MPs (20 out of 48), but
suffered a major electoral loses. Thus, it failed to enter Parliament and never
returned on the Hungarian political scene ever since.
Table 5.2 includes the correlation coefficients between the
renomination rates and electoral volatility. The general correlation between the
two variables is -0.30, statistically significant at the 0.01 level; it indicates a
medium and robust relationship between the two. The sign of the coefficient
168
indicates that parties renominating more MPs have less volatility compared
with the rest. The strongest correlation is observed in Poland (-0.50) and
Slovakia (-0.39).
Table 5.2: The Correlation between the MP Renomination Rates and Volatility











Notes: The partial correlations included the government incumbency as control
variable.
** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
* Statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
The correlation coefficient for all the parties in the region indicates empirical
support for the hypothesized relationship. There is a moderate negative
correlation between the renomination rates and electoral volatility. Parties that
place more MPs on their electoral lists have more loyal votes compared to the
rest. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Within each
country, with the exception of the Czech Republic, there is empirical evidence
in the same direction. The strongest is in Poland where the relationship is quite
high (-0.50), statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the Czech Republic the
relationship is weak (0.16) and goes against the initial expectation. One
empirical explanation for this result may be the structure of the Czech party
system in which greater parties renominate less MPs but are more stable from
an electoral perspective than the minor parties (see Table 5.4). This aggregate
picture indicates that small and large parties have contrasting approaches
towards renomination in the Czech Republic. Small political parties renominate
a large percentage of their MPs to send a message of credibility and unity to
their voters. The Czech parties with high electoral performances renominate
less candidates to ensure a similar message of credibility; in their case, the elite
renewal is at the core of the message.55
55 A parallel can be drawn between this observation and the case in which age created a
difference between political parties (the previous section).
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The observation at aggregated level indicates the presence of a
mediated or non-linear relationship between renominations rates and electoral
volatility. The statistical analysis and longitudinal descriptions from the
following section illustrate that this seldom happens at party level. To
statistically test for mediation, I run partial correlations56 to observe the
intervening effect of age or party size on the hypothesized relationship. The
results indicate that none of the two variables influences the strength or level
of significance of the relationship. The statistical test for non-linear effects
involved the comparison of linear and non-linear models (e.g. curvilinear, cubic,
quadratic etc.) for the effect of renomination rate on electoral volatility. The
cubic model appears to be the only that predicts slightly better (with marginally
higher parameter estimates) than the linear model; this comes at the cost of
lower statistical significance. Empirically, this non-linear effect was mainly
driven by a few outliers visible in Figure 5.3. When including the cubic effect in
the multivariate analysis from Chapter 6, its results are similar to those of the
linear effect. On the basis of these methodological observations, the concerns
regarding the existence of a non-linear effect should be minor. Moreover, such
an effect does not add substantial knowledge to the already described linear
effect. To further clarify the developments taking place at party level, the
following section discusses in detail the differences between the parties from
the same country.
Insights into the Party Systems: Comparing the Renomination Rates of
Political Parties
The aggregate renomination rates (Figure 5.2) indicated some general trends
observable between the CEE political parties. Insights into the party systems
are useful for the longitudinal and cross-party comparison of renomination
rates. This section reflects the extent to which political parties relied on their
MPs when drafting the lists of candidates. In doing so, it provides details
regarding the relationship between renomination and electoral performance or
volatility; thus, it complements the general picture observed in Figure 5.1. A
supplementary reason to analyze the developments of political parties within
the same party system is the possibility to observe different manners in which
parties react to the similar constraints of the political environment.
Bulgaria
The three Bulgarian political parties investigated in this study reflect different
approaches towards the renomination of their MPs. This difference is visible at
aggregate level: the BSP is among the parties with the highest renomination
rates in CEE, the DPS has an average position, whereas the SDS is among the
56 For details regarding the use and interpretation of partial correlation, see Field (2009).
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political parties with the smallest number of MPs running on candidate lists in
the subsequent elections (Figure 5.2). In this respect, the distribution of the
Bulgarian parties on the renomination variable is representative for the post-
communist world. Table 5.3 nuances this observation by providing
supplementary information regarding the decision of the Bulgarian political
parties in each election. The longitudinal trend of renomination rates differs
across parties. The BSP starts with a high rate of 40%, drops to 32% in the year
marking its first major electoral defeat and increased to 45 and 46% in 2001 and
2005. The DPS is characterized by an oscillation of its renominations: an
increase from 35% in 1994 to 42% in 1997, followed by a decrease to 33% in 2001,
and an increase to 37% in 2005. The SDS reached the apogee of its
renominations in 1997, the only time when it was in government. The following
two elections marked a severe drop of the renomination until a level lower
than the one from the beginning of the ‘90s.
Table 5.3: The MP Renomination Rates of the Bulgarian Parties (%)
1994 1997 2001 2005
BSP 40 32 45 46
DPS 35 42 33 37
SDS 21 42 32 15
Based on these different longitudinal developments, time does not influence
the variation in renomination rates. Similarly, the presence in government does
not explain the variations across parties. For example, when the BSP was
incumbent (i.e. before the 1994 and 1997 elections) it put less MPs on the
candidate lists then when it was in opposition. The DPS renominated more MPs
when it was a government party before the elections. The percentage of
renominated MPs in 2001 (i.e. the party was in opposition) is the smallest
compared to the other years. When in government, before the 2001 elections,
the SDS has an intermediary percentage of renominated MPs, situated
between the value recorded before the 1997 win of elections and the 1994 and
2005 poor results.
One possible explanation for the variation of renomination rates is the
performance of individual MPs and their relationship with the party. For
example, some MPs were notorious for corruption acts or formed a negative
image throughout the years in office; both situations resulted in no
renomination. In other cases, mostly encountered at the SDS, the MPs were
undisciplined in crucial votes and they were no longer supported by the party
for reelection. MPs with controversial statements and activities were also
punished by their parties and not being offered a position on the candidate
lists. These reasons are often encountered for other countries. However, the
occurrence in Bulgaria was higher than usual. Especially in the mid ‘90s there
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were numerous politicians involved in corruption scandals and controversial
activities.
In addition, the variation of renomination over time for each political
party has particular causes. As explained in the case study section in Chapter 4,
BSP underwent a major internal change. Starting 2001, the organization and
discourse started to differ. This also coincides with the starting moment of
increased renomination of MPs. In the case of the SDS, the initial low rate of
renominated MPs (1994) corresponded to a reorganization of the party.
Following the 1991 failure to enter government, the SDS modified its strategy
and hoped that new candidates will bring more benefits. DPS is known for its
centralized decision making evolving around the leader of the party. This
concentration of power and the pursuit of an image of disciplined party lead to
the exclusion of those MPs who did not toe the party line during the terms in
government or even opposition. In spite of all these reasons to change the
composition of candidate lists, the placement of party leadership or high
echelon elites on candidate lists was not subject to variation. It appears almost
as a sufficient condition for an MP to be part of the party elite in order to get
the renomination. All three Bulgarian parties filled the first positions of their
lists in elections with prominent members of their parties.
Although the quantitative analysis indicates a weak relationship
between the renomination rate and the electoral volatility of Bulgarian parties,
the reasons presented above follow the theoretical arguments of this chapter.
With a few exceptions, the Bulgarian parties place more than one third of their
MPs on the lists of candidates in elections. They tried to keep away from the
public eyes those candidates who – with their deeds in office – could have
harmed their electoral appeal. One empirical reason for the weak statistical
relationship is that the party with a moderate renomination of its MPs (DPS)
has lower electoral volatility compared to the other two parties. Why? The
rewarding and punishing strategies can be based more on MPs behavior and
performances than in the other two parties. Quite often, the high positions in
the intra-party hierarchy are not affected by such decisions. An MP who is
among the leaders of the party has an almost ensured renomination. For
example, the BSP placed a few problematic MPs on its lists of candidates in the
2001 elections although some of them were involved in scandals during the
1997-2001 period.
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is the only political system in which the relationship
between MP renomination and electoral volatility is positive: A high percentage
of MPs on the lists of candidates implies more electoral volatility. The
aggregate figures can be misleading as they indicate the contrary. Table 2.2
indicates that the KDU-CSL has the lowest electoral volatility within the Czech
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Party system throughout the post-communist period. At the same time, figure
5.2 illustrates that the KDU-CSL has the highest rate of renomination among all
the CEE political parties. Consequently, we might expect that the Czech
political parties placing more of their MPs in the next electoral competition to
have lower volatility. The examination of the longitudinal development of
renomination rates makes clear why this is not the case. For the KDU-CSL the
highest renomination rates (79% in 2002 and 73% in 1996) correspond to its
highest volatilities. Moreover, the CSSD, the Czech party with the highest
electoral volatility (see Table 2.2), has among the highest rates of renomination
in CEE.
Table 5.4 shows that the CSSD makes regular use of approximately half
of its MPs to fill the lists of candidates. Moreover, the ODS has low volatility
throughout the post-communist period, comparable to that of the KDU-CSL,
and displays lower renomination rates than the CSSD or the KSCM. At the same
time, the high renomination rates brought with them high volatility. For
example, the 2002 and 2006 elections were the most volatile for the ODS
(6.26% and 18.23%). They also correspond to the highest percentages of MPs
running in the following elections.
Table 5.4: The MP Renomination Rates of the Czech Parties (%)
1996 1998 2002 2006
CSSD 46 50 45 46
KDU-CSL 73 62 79 51
ODS 40 26 53 50
KSCM 19 54 49 53
Although it goes in the opposite direction than hypothesized, the statistical
relationship between renomination and electoral volatility is not strong. This
happens primarily due to the mixed evidence in the case of most parties. For
example, the KSCM has a similar level of renominations for two elections with
completely different volatility – the 1998 (low) and the 2006 (relatively high).
The same happens with the ODS and the KDU-CSL. Moreover, the Czech parties
are quite homogenous in terms of volatility (Table 2.2) and renomination rates
(Figure 5.2). Such observations are valuable for the broader comparisons at CEE
level. However, problems occur when attempting to differentiate between
these parties with the help of party level data (Table 5.4). This is where the
theoretical underpinnings appear to collapse. The only similarity between them
is that the renomination rates oscillate – every increase in the percentage of
renominations is followed by a decrease. It is puzzling that this dynamic does
not follow a general pattern. Similarly to Bulgaria, time and government
incumbency are not valid explanations for differences in renomination rates.
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Apart from the broad framework of using their MPs for a better
communication with their voters, the Czech parties have specific decisions that
make the difference. One such example is represented by the different
strategies of parties before the elections. On the one hand, the CSSD,
irrespective of its electoral performances, constantly relies on approximately
half of its MPs when making the candidate lists. On the other hand, mostly
resulted from the split (as in the SDS case in Bulgaria), the ODS dramatically
altered the percentages of renominated MPs. Another explanation for the
reverse relationship is that the size of the parties limits the possibilities for
renomination. In the case of the KDU-CSL, its electoral support increased
whenever the party used a high percentage of its MPs on the lists of
candidates. As the party has a relatively small support in the electorate
(approximately 10%), the floor-crossing of a few MPs makes impossible the high
renomination rates in the following elections. \
A further reason for the direction of the linear relationship between
renomination rates and electoral volatility is weak in the Czech Republic is
represented by the approach towards candidate lists in times of internal
reform. When the KDU-CSL undertook such a reform – before the 2002
elections – it relied heavily on its MPs to draft the lists of candidates (79%).
However, the KSCM before the 1994 elections and the ODS before the 1998
elections decided to use as few as possible of their MPs, promoting instead
new figures on the lists. Although it had renomination rates, the volatility of the
KDU-CSL was higher than that of the ODS or the KSCM.
Hungary
The Hungarian political parties are characterized by low renomination rates at
the beginning of the transition to democratization. On average, one out of five
representatives from the legislature elected in 1990 ran for the 1994 elections.
An exception to this share was the FKGP that renominated only 3% of its MPs.
This represents by far the lowest percentage in CEE and has a particular cause.
The FGKP lost 40 of its deputies elected in 1990 – 36 switched to the EKGP. As a
result, the few MPs who were left in the party received were renominated for
the 1994 elections. The general low percentage of renominated MPs had a few
general causes across the Hungarian parties. First, most political parties
decided to alter the composition of their lists of candidates to alter the
relatively poor electoral result from 1990. For example, the FIDESZ and the
MSZP underperformed. The former, as one of the fierce opponents of the
communist regime, expected to win more seats in the first post-communist
elections. The MSZP is a successor party and its initial failure was mostly based
on the negative attitudes of the Hungarian voters towards the communist past.
As the party spent the first term in opposition, a change was initiated among
the candidate composition.
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Second, the numerous party switchers in the first Hungarian legislature
affected a few parties such as the FKGP (losing 40 MPs), the MDF (losing 39
MPs), and the SZDSZ (losing 10 MPs) (Nikolenyi 2011, 24). Finally, related to the
second cause, there is the issue of a relatively weak relationship between the
party and its representatives (Chiru 2010). Apart from floor-crossing, one
feature of such a relationship was the voting unity. The first post-communist
government of Joszef Antall had a surplus member in the coalition government
(i.e. large majorities) 57, MPs could defect from the party line without a visible
effect for the passing of the laws. Some controversies within the small
governing parties (FKGP and KDNP) in the 1990-1994 legislative term
(Korosenyi 1998) indicate that there were problems related to voting unity.
Table 5.5: The MP Renomination Rates of the Hungarian Parties (%)
1994 1998 2002 2006
MSZP 22 54 49 51
FIDESZ 25 39 69 52
SZDSZ 20 40 53 52
MDF 20 n/a - 32
FKGP 3 47 23 -
KDNP 22 25 - -
Following these observations and the gradual increase of renomination rates in
the subsequent elections from Table 5.5, time appears to play a role in the
decision of Hungarian parties to use more MPs to fill their candidate lists. In the
next elections of 1998, the renomination rates differed significantly. Some
parties were witnessed dramatic increases of their renomination rates (e.g.
MSZP, FKGP). The other parties had a progressive increase of their share (e.g.
KDNP, FIDESZ and SZDSZ). Further differences can be observed with respect to
the trajectories followed by parties. Some did not gain seats in all the elections
and thus no renomination was possible (MDF, FKGP, and KDNP); the MSZP was
characterized by oscillatory percentages of renominations; whereas the FIDESZ
and the SZDSZ registered a continuous increase of the percentages of MPs
running on candidate lists in the first three elections, having a drop to a similar
level of 52% in 2006.
One further observable difference between the levels of renomination
is that parties in government have the tendency to renominate more MPs than
the parties in opposition. Similarly, when a party is in government, it
renominates more MPs than when it is in the opposition. For example, in the
1998 elections the FIDESZ had 39% of its MPs running for a new term in office.
Until then, the FIDESZ was in opposition. Four years later, following a term in
57 In fact, the first three Hungarian cabinets had surplus members in the coalition governments.
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government, the FIDESZ had 69% of its MPs on the ballot. In 2002, following a
new term in opposition, this percentage decreased to 52%. A similar trend is
observable for the other large party in Hungary – the MSZP – and partially for
the SZDSZ and the FKGP. Moreover, size appears to make a difference in
renominating MPs. The large Hungarian parties rely on a much higher
percentage of their MPs in the subsequent elections compared to the small
parties. Apparently, this is a key for increased electoral stability. Unlike the
small KDNP and FKGP, both FIDESZ58 and MSZP have low volatility and continue
to persist on the political scene.
These are the reasons behind the sign and strength of the quantitative
analysis from the previous section. The aggregate percentages from Figure 5.2
and the previous descriptions of party trajectories in Chapters 3 and 4 also
pointed in the direction indicated by the correlation coefficient. The medium
relationship between renomination and electoral volatility could have been
stronger if the SZDSZ, the political party with the lowest level of volatility,
would have renominated more MPs. On the average, its renomination rates
come after those of the FIDESZ and the MSZP.
Poland
In general, the Polish parties have among the largest renomination rates in CEE.
Four out of the five examined political parties have averages above 45% (Figure
5.2). The fifth, the PD – extensively discussed in the case study section of the
chapter – had until 2001 a similar renomination rate. In this particular case, the
explanation is straightforward: the PO split from the PD and the renomination
rates of dropped dramatically. Two other general similarities are observable at
the Polish parties. First, unlike in Hungary, they start with high renomination
rates. In the 1993 elections, following a very divided legislature, the PD, the
PSL, and the SLD placed approximately half of their MPs on the candidate lists.
Second, the dynamic of the renomination rates across time indicate
large discrepancies between elections. The longitudinal trajectories are rarely
linear (e.g. PD), the most visible feature being the high discrepancies between
the percentages of MPs placed on candidate lists. For example, even in the
case of the parties formed after 2000 – the PIS and the PO – the renomination
rate increased by approximately 10% between the 2005 and 2007 early
elections.59 This finding is counter-intuitive given the exchange of political elites
58 In 2006, KDNP ran on the lists of FIDESZ and this is how it made it into Parliament after a break
of eight years.
59 This increase can also be caused by the features of the 2007 elections. The early elections are
the usual suspect for high renomination rates. The MPs hold strategic positions and political
parties rarely have the time and capacity to mobilize candidates that may turn successful. This
mechanism does not discriminate between government and opposition parties, it is applicable to
both.
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between the two parties at that time. The reason behind the increase of
renomination rates may be the character of elections. Without having time to
prepare the selection of candidates, both parties relied more on the prominent
members of their parties – those remaining after the desertions.
Table 5.6: The MP Renomination Rates of the Polish Parties (%)
1993 1997 2001 2005 2007
PIS 46 59
PO 40 49
PD 48 41 16 - -
PSL 44 50 30 52 51
SLD 52 60 26 35 48
In longitudinal terms, there is a moderate tendency of some Polish parties to
have higher renomination rates when they are in government. For example, the
PSL in 1997 renominated more MPs than in 1993. The same happened in 2005
compared to 2001. However, there are more contextual explanations that
justify the differences rather than general factors. In the case of the SLD the
modification of renomination rates between the 1997 and 2001 elections may
be due to its transformation from coalition to political party. During this
transformation, the legitimacy of the SLD was questioned by some members
(political parties) of the former coalition. To diminish discontent, the SLD
allowed these parties to propose their own candidates in the upcoming
elections. Consequently, the renomination rate was low in the 2001 election.
Figures were again low in 2005 due to two reasons: 1) the split of the
SDPL (the party of Marek Borowski) from the SLD and 2) the departure of
leading party elite to the PD. These low renomination rates coincide with large
oscillations in electoral support and high levels of volatility. The 2001 situation
brought a steady increase of the electoral support. Apart from the failure of the
AWS government, the SLD’s composition of candidate lists contributed to this
result. The party promoted promising candidates and did not renominate some
MPs with negative image. In 2005, the low percentage of MPs from the lists of
candidates was the result of migrations and splits. These also lead to a
decrease of the electoral support.
Overall, there is a high negative correlation between the renomination
rates of the Polish parties and their electoral volatility. This means that political
parties that use more MPs to fill in their lists of candidates are less volatile than
the rest. The relationship appears to be driven by three concurrent factors.
First, the newly emerged parties rely more on their elite (also because they do
not have a large pool of recruitment, see Chapter 4). They are less volatile than
the parties established at the beginning of the transition to democracy.
Second, the relationship is connected to the density of splits and desertions.
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Under such circumstances, parties are forced to use new candidates. They can
hardly choose for re-election candidates who can be recognized by voters;
thus, they present a less credible continuity of representation. Finally, there is a
tendency of Polish parties to renominate numerous MPs. This formed certain
expectations of the public. When these expectations are no longer met (i.e.
parties renominate less MPs than usual), the voters can shift their electoral
preferences.
Romania
The Romanian parties have similar averages of MP renomination during the
post-communist period (Figure 5.2). This relative homogeneity is observable
also across time at party level. As shown in the lines to follow, size,
government status, and time do not explain the variations in renomination
rates. Similarly to the Hungarian parties, the initial levels of renomination were
lower than those from the following elections. The two successor parties were
differentiated by more than 10%: the PSD had less than a quarter of its MPs
running in the 1992 elections, whereas the PDL promoted approximately one
third of their representatives in the subsequent elections.
The UDMR started with a 30% renomination rate that was gradually
increased to an average of 40% for the other three observed elections. Overall,
there is no clear tendency of the Romanian parties to increase their
percentages of renominated MPs over time. Three out of five parties are
characterized by oscillations, as it was the case with most parties from the
previously discussed party systems. The PSD and the PRM display contrasting
trends over time. The PSD has a linear increase over time with renomination
percentages ranging from 23% in the 1992 elections to a peak of 44% in the most
recent elections from 2008. The PRM had its peak in the 1996 elections,
following its only months in government. Since then, the party constantly
reduced its renomination rates reaching a minimum level of 18%.
Table 5.7: The MP Renomination Rates of the Romanian Parties (%)
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
PSD 23 24 n/a 38 44
PDL 34 38 n/a 22 46
PNL - - n/a 30 41
PRM 49 n/a 34 18
UDMR 30 38 n/a 43 39
The most volatile political party in Romania is the PRM (Table 2.2). The large
variations in terms of electoral support coincide to the most dynamic evolution
of the renomination rates. Given the highly centralized decision making and the
few political elites held by the PRM, the expectation was to have the same
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people as candidate in all elections. However, the strategic behaviors of
candidates and elected MPs influenced the list composition. There were
candidates running under the label of the party with the sole purpose of
getting elected. The reasons for such a behavior varied from the absence of
opportunities in other parties to the identification of the electoral potential of
the PRM in specific elections (Gherghina 2008; Sum 2010). As soon as they got
elected, the defection was imminent. This is the reason for which in the
aftermath of the 2000 elections the parliamentary party group of the PRM
reduced by one third in less than half a year after elections. This migration was
often accompanied by exclusions of key members by the party leader for
reasons ranging from indiscipline to the pursuit of private interests.
The PSD relies on a core of MPs in consecutive elections. These MPs are
constantly renominated and most of them are highly disciplined in their voting
(Gherghina and Chiru 2011). It is one of the political parties with most MPs
present in almost all legislatures during the post-communist period. These MPs
are usually the leaders of county organizations or politicians with strong
electoral support in the territory. The emphasis on the territorial strongholds
was especially visible in the 2008 elections when a new electoral system with
voting in single member districts was in place. The primaries organized in 2004
to select the candidates for the legislative elections removed only a few of
these core MPs to be renominated. All of those who lost their positions on lists
in 2004 were allowed to run in the 2008 elections and most of them got
reelected. This core of MPs may secure the stable electoral support that the
PSD enjoys. In the most recent three elections its volatility is very small, having
a high support around 35% of the votes.
Although it is also a successor party like the PSD, the PDL displays a
different pattern. The dynamic of renomination has two phases separated by
the organizational reform (leadership change). The first, until 2001, was
characterized by a stable core of MPs who got reelected in consecutive
elections. Following the leadership change, the renomination rates dropped to
22%. This critical juncture interrupted the communication established between
parties and its voters; consequently, the electoral volatility increased. This
moment represented the formation of a new core of stable MPs who were
renominated in the 2008 elections, to a greater extent than before.
The UDMR is the party with the most stable electorate and
renomination rate across time. The party constantly renominates one third of
its MPs, most of them being the same across time. Similarly to the PSD, the
UDMR has among the highest rates of absolute incumbents renominated (i.e.
MPs in consecutive terms). This core of representatives established strong
connections with the voters. Sometimes, these linkages were suspected of
being formed on clientelistic bases generated mostly by the absence of
contestation for many years.
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Slovakia
The Slovak parties are heterogeneous in terms of their renominations. This is
suggested by the aggregate data from Figure 5.2 and by the longitudinal
evolutions captured in Table 5.8. Unlike other party systems, the level of
renominations in the first studied elections varies greatly from 14% in the case
of the SNS to 42% for the SDL. The common feature of the renomination rates is
their oscillatory trends across time. With the exception of the SDL that displays
a continuous decline over time, the other Slovak political parties alternate the
low and high renomination rates.
Table 5.8: The MP Renomination Rates of the Slovak Parties (%)
1994 1998 2002 2006
HZDS 25 47 46 19
KDH 27 33 31 48
MKP 39 46 47 37
SDKU60 49 17 34
SNS 14 41 23 -
SDL 42 28 22
Most of these oscillations were due to the internal splits or attempts to reform
the party. The HZDS had low renomination rates before the 1994 elections due
to a series of defections in 1993 and 1994 (Szajkowski 2005, 529). Its high
renomination rates came as a result of a political domination of the HZDS in the
Slovak politics. The HZDS won both the 1994 and 1998 elections although it was
in opposition starting 1998. The “old guard” of the party was conservative and
managed to keep dissent to a minimum despite the public scandals in which
Meciar was involved (e.g. the open conflict with the President of Slovakia, his
arrest etc.). The drop of renominations from 2006 was mainly the effect of the
splits after the 2002 election. The attempt to re-brand the party by softening
the nationalist discourse determined a few departures from the party.
For the SDKU, the dramatic drop of renominations in 2002 compared to
1998 was the result of the KDH leaving the coalition. This happened when the
leaders of the former The SDK coalition decided to transform it into a political
party. Most MPs belonging to the KDH and being elected in 1998 under the
label of the SDK followed their party. This is the main reason for which the KDH
renominated a similar percentage of MPs in the 1998 and 2002 electons.
Returning to the SDKU, in 2006 the renomination rates were influenced by
splits and MPs leaving the party. Similarly, the SNS witnessed a party split
60 SDKU was founded in 1998 under the name of SDK and included five parties. The renomination
rate is calculated on the basis on the founding members’ MPs. The reference number of MPs for
the 1998-2002 term was calculated after subtracting the number of MPs who returned to KDH.
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before the 2002 elections and the renomination percentage dropped to half of
its previous percentage.
More important, the relationship between the MP renomination rates
and electoral volatility is quite relevant in Slovakia. The evidence indicates that
high renominations lead to low electoral volatility. This is immediately visible if
we refer to the most volatile party in CEE: the SDL. Its volatility increased with
every election following also a dramatic drop in the renomination rates. The
KDH and the MKP are the least volatile Slovak parties and their renomination
rates are among the highest. Also, longitudinal comparisons indicate this
relationship. The detailed case of the HZDS points in that direction. The high
renomination rates from 1998 and 2002 coincide to electoral volatilities that are
much lower than in 2006.
These detailed discussions regarding the reasons behind MP
renominations indicate mechanisms through which these can be connected to
electoral volatility. For example, the internal splits and MP departures heavily
influence the communication with voters. This section has shown how
discontinuity of representation has consequences in the plan of electoral
support for many parties. The following section takes this analysis one step
further and illustrates how the renomination of MPs can influence the electoral
volatility in two specific cases from different party systems.
Loyal Elites and Voters
The two political parties analyzed in this section – the Czech KDU-CSL and the
Polish PD – share a common feature: they are small parties, with an electoral
support that rarely exceeds 10%. This limited electoral appeal did not allow
them to play leading roles in government coalitions or to represent solid
opposition actors. Nevertheless, their presence in the political life of their
countries cannot be neglected. Given such a similar profile, their different
persistence within the party systems of their countries raises a question mark.
The following two sub-sections show how a combination of factors led to
different outcomes: the KDU-CSL continued its existence in the Czech political
life, whereas the PD gradually disappeared from the important political actors
between 2001 and 2007.
These diverging trajectories were not indicated solely by the electoral
performances, but also by the level of electoral volatility. The KDU-CSL is on
average the least volatile Czech party (Table 2.2). On the average, the electoral
volatility of the PD is three times larger than that of the KDU-CSL. This does not
represent a surprise as the least volatile Polish party has higher volatility than
the most volatile Czech party (see Chapter 2). One determinant of these
different trajectories is represented by the MP renomination rates. As
illustrated in Figure 5.2, the KDU-CSL is the champion of renominations in CEE
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with an average situated around two thirds. The PD has one of the lowest
renomination rates.
Figure 5.4 graphically depicts the distribution of the two parties
according to their renomination rates and electoral volatility. The dark circles
mark the position of the KDU-CSL, whereas the light gray squares represent the
PD. The numbers represent the election years (e.g. 02 is 2002). In all elections
the KDU-CSL has considerably higher renomination rates and lower electoral
volatility than the PD. In terms of renomination rates, the KDU-CSL has used
consistently more than half of its MPs to fill the lists of candidates. For the PD
there is a clear negative relationship between renominations and electoral
volatility. Starting 1993, the percentage of renominated MPs decreases
considerably from approximately 50% to less than 20% in 2001. At the same
time, the electoral volatility increases from 7.5% in 1993 to 66.4% in 2001. In 1993
and 1997, the electoral volatility of the PD was comparable to that of the KDU-
CSL. This coincided with the fact that the renomination rates were still high,
around 40%. Each of the following two sub-sections explores in detail the paths
followed by the two parties and tries to explain the persistence of KDU-CSL and
the temporary disappearance of the PD.
Figure 5.4: The Positioning of KDU-CSL and PD on the Renomination and
 Volatility Dimensions
The KDU-CSL: Shaping a Loyal Elite
The KDU-CSL is the successor of the Czechoslovak People’s Party (CSL) that
was created in 1919 out of the merger of numerous Czech Catholic parties
(Linek and Lyons 2009, 3). With a constant presence in all interwar
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Czechoslovak government between 1921 and 1938, CSL was allowed as a
satellite party under the communist regime. In the attempt to reaffirm its
Christian Democratic ideology and to escape accusations of cooperation with
the communist regime CSL joined in 1992 the Christian Democratic Union (KDU)
to form the KDU-CSL. It soon became a relevant party on the political scene by
having three presences in government between 1992 and 1998 and from 2002
(Saxonberg 2003).
The KDU-CSL registered consecutive increase of its electoral support
until 2002. In the 1992 election the KDU-CSL obtained 15 seats and joined the
government coalition. The following election from 1996 provided the party 18
seats and allowed its presence in the ODS governments (Klaus and Tosovsky).
Although its 20 seats from 1998 allowed the party to get in government, the
failure to reach a consensus with the CSSD sent the KDU-CSL in opposition next
to the US, the DEU, and the ODA. The 2002 election brought 31 seats to the
coalition formed by the KDU-CSL and the US-DEU (that merged before the
election for reasons related to threshold). The KDU-CSL had 21 out of the 31
seats (Szajkowski 2005, 163). Both members of the coalition were included in
the CSSD government. Although in 2006 the KDU-CSL obtained only 13 seats it
still managed to participate in a coalition government next to the ODS and the
SZ.
These results indicate a relatively stable electoral support for the KDU-
CSL situated between 7 and 14% of the votes – corresponding to the described
range of received seats. This stability was partially the result of a large
proportion of candidates promoted in consecutive elections by the KDU-CSL
(Table 5.4). Three main mechanisms lead to such high renomination rates: the
involvement of MPs in the internal life of the party, reduced internal dissent in
the party, and the usual presence in the government coalitions. Let us examine
closely each of these factors.
First, the executive committee of the KDU-CSL incorporates five
members of parliament, speakers and vice-speakers from the legislature, and
all its government ministers (van Biezen 2003, 149; Linek and Lyons 2009, 7).
Moreover, the leaders of the parliamentary party groups are granted full
membership in the congress. All these reveal a thorough involvement of the
high profile elite of the party in the decision making of the party organization.
Apart from MPs in the national executive board and the national executive
committee, the presidium consists almost exclusively of MPs (Linek and Lyons
2009, 7). The process of candidate selection explored in Chapter 4 revealed two
different phases for the KDU-CSL. The first, until 1996, included a general
control of the national executive committee over the candidates to be on
party’s lists. Practically, MPs and members of the cabinet were in charge of
deciding upon the lists of candidates. The second phase includes primaries or
decision reached by committees at local or regional level. Even under these
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conditions, given the key role held by MPs in the central office, there is informal
influence going on. Thus MPs had no difficulties in placing their names on
eligible positions (Linek and Lyons 2009, 8).
Second, the existence of the KDU-CSL was marked by isolated internal
dissent. The most dynamic period was before the 1992 formation of the KDU-
CSL; the KDS left the KDU to form an alliance with the ODS. The few voices
against the leadership of the party either did not leave the party or if they
deserted it was not in an organized manner. For 14 years between the 1992 and
2006 elections the KDU-CSL witnessed no splits. The inclination of the KDU-CSL
to favor cooperation with one of the two large actors from the Czech party
system – the ODS or the CSSD – depended mostly on the style of leadership.
For example, Cyril Svoboda was a known opponent of Vaclav Klaus and during
his leadership the KDU-CSL entered the coalition government led by the CSSD.
Four years before, when the party was chaired by Jan Kasal, the KDU-CSL
refused cooperation with the CSSD due mostly to the ideological orientation of
their leader. Despite these ideological turns, the elite remained loyal and did
not question publicly the leaders’ decisions. The situation of 1998 was one of
the best moments to do so. The party gained more votes than in 1994, but
decided to stay in the opposition. However, no voices were heard within the
KDU-CSL. The high renomination rates can be a reward fur such a behavior.
Third, the high coalition potential of the KDU-CSL provides confidence
both to the core electorate of the party and to the elite. For citizens, it is crucial
to see that their votes are not wasted. The KDU-CSL often met their
expectations having only one term outside government. When it was
incumbent, the party lost support only in the 2006 election. With such
governing presence, the party elite has supplementary reasons to be
disciplined and loyal. This may partially justify the already discussed low level of
dissent.
The KDU-CSL appears to be a typical case in which elite loyalty shapes
the electoral stability of the party. The loyalty of the elite provides the
organizational stability, allows homogeneity of actions, and ensures continuity
and professionalization of representation. All these increase voters’ confidence
in the potential of the party to implement its promises. They contribute to a
positive image of the party in the eyes of the voters. The reaction of voters is
observable in the relatively stable core of supporters. These votes allow the
party to play a pivotal role in the Czech party system. The primary reward for
their behavior consists of renomination. Through loyalty MPs are able to
continue the political game. This holds true especially in the situation of the
KDU-CSL elites who can clearly envisage the results of their behavior.
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PD: Strong Factionalism and Disloyal Elite
Similarly to many Polish parties present on the political scene in the ‘90s, the
PD has its roots in the Solidarity movement. Its history is characterized by name
changes, numerous internal fights, and elite loss. Its foundation took place in
1990 under the label of Democratic Union (UD). The political party was crucial
for the first years of Polish transition to democracy and market economy. It
was often identified with the person of the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazoviecki and supported the economic shock therapy of Leszek Balcerowicz
who proposed numerous reforms aimed to put an end to the hyperinflation
occurred after the fall of communism and to balance the national budget. UD
won the 1991 elections with a vote share of 12.3%, but given the failure of its
leader (Bronislaw Geremek) to form a government coalition, the party got into
opposition. In 1992, the SLD government led by Jan Olszewski fell and the
caretaker government of Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) failed to gain a vote of
confidence (Szczerbiak 2001a). Consequently, a seven party coalition led by PD
supported Hanna Suchocka as prime minister. The 1993 early elections –
generated by the fall of suchocka’s cabinet – were won by the SLD (20.4%) and
the PSL (15.4%) that formed the new government with Pawlak as prime
minister. Coming after the failure to maintain a government, the UD got third in
elections with 10.6% of the votes and had to move again in the opposition.
In March 1994, the UD merged with a small party called Liberal
Democratic Congress (KLD) and created the Freedom Union (UW). The newly
created party obtained 13.4% of the votes in the 1997 elections and joined the
government coalition led by the AWS. However, the UW left the government
due to the opposition of the AWS’ populist wing against Balcerowicz’s
economic plans (Szajkowski 2005, 481). Until 2001, the UW witnessed
numerous internal clashes between factions that eroded the perception of
stable and enduring party with a core electorate (Millard 2004, 63). The first
frictions occurred since UW’s formation in 1994. The faction of Wladyslaw
Frasyniuk and Zofia Kuratowska, the Democratic Forum, emerged within UW as
a left wing faction. As the party statute prohibited internal factions, the UW
leaders asked the executive council not to recognize the newly formed group.
Such a decision found opposition even among some key leaders of the party
(Geremek and Jan Lytinski) (Bugajski 2002, 177).
This first division was followed by subsequent fights for supremacy in
the party as the leaders of factions took turns in leading the party. The faction
led by Balcerowicz promoted a liberal socialism similar to that visible in the
economic reforms proposed by him whenever in government or as President of
the Polish Central Bank. When replacing Mazowiecki in 1995, Balcerowicz had
the initial support of the liberal (right) wing of the party led by Jan Maria Rokita
(Bugajski 2002, 176). A rupture intervened also within this initially unitary
faction. In the aftermath of the 1995 presidential elections, Balcerowicz
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accused Rokita of hurting Jacek Kuron’s campaign – the presidential candidate
of UW. Rokita was expelled from the presidium despite the fact that most
leaders from the right wing faction threatened with their resignations.
Following this decision, a split occurred in the party: the UW organizations from
Gdansk formed a bloc with five other post-Solidarity parties to run
independently in the 1997 elections (Bugajski 2002, 178).
Geremek and Mazowiecki, leaders of the party for a long time even
when it was called UD, had an inclination towards Christian democracy, often
promoting Catholic values in their discourses. Although not leaders of the
party, Kuron and Donald Tusk (acting as a deputy chairman) had influence in
the UW with their views and formed strong factions. Tusk, originating in the
KLD, supported free market economy with minimal government interference.
Such ideas were not supported within the UW and Tusk lost the competition
for party’s chairmanship against Geremek in the aftermath of the UW’s
departure from the government in 2000.
These internal fights, combined with the prospects of an electoral
defeat for the parties in government since 1997, determined a massive exodus
of the members from Tusk’s faction. Tusk joined some members of the AWS to
form the PO. As a result of these defections, in the 2001 general elections, the
UW got 3.1% of the votes; it failed to cross the electoral threshold and thus did
not gain entry to Parliament. Voters followed the well-known leaders who
deserted the party and thus abandoned the UW for new offerings (Millard
2004, 101). UW did not recover since then. The immediate resignation of
Geremek led to the election of Frasyniuk as chairman. Under the new rule, the
UW abandoned its structuring as catch-all party (Jasiewicz 2007, 113) and
continued to exist as a minor political actor outside Parliament. In 2005, it
changed its name into the PD, but this did not improve its electoral result in the
legislative elections from the same year (it got 2.5% of the votes). In 2007, it run
into a broader coalition called Left and Democrats (LID) next to the SLD, the
SDPL, and the UP.
During its existence, the PD behaved like a pragmatic party grouping
people and factions of different ideological backgrounds (Bugajski 2002, 176). It
managed to accommodate these internal fights for one decade. Once torn
apart, the party did not recover. On the background of numerous factions,
internal struggles, leadership changes, elite defections, and organizational
reforms, the PD could hardly use the same candidates in consecutive elections.
The apogee was reached in the 1993 elections when almost half of the MPs
elected in 1991 were placed on the electoral lists for the 1993 contest. Until
1997, this proportion dropped by 10%. This percentage is somewhat impressive
given the internal dynamic of the party with factionalism becoming stronger
and elites leaving the party or being expelled. The term in government was not
benefic to PD. On top of the negative perception held by voters on the parties
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from the governing coalition, the departure of Tusk and other prominent
leaders created irreversible damage. As most MPs left the party, the PD could
use only 16% of its representatives when drafting the electoral lists for the
upcoming elections. Following these developments, in the eve of the 2001
elections the PD remained with the hard legacy of a bad perceived government
and very few known politicians to determine the voters to maintain their
previous preferences. As a result, the party failed to cross the electoral
threshold: the same situation was observable in the 2005 elections.
To conclude, the PD is the illustrative case of the manner in which
internal struggles and deserting elites can harm a party that looked good in the
mid-‘90s. Its broad ideology and central position on the political spectrum had
the capacity to encapsulate voter preferences on the long term. Voters did not
appear to be troubled by its name changes or partial failures in government
(the early ‘90s). The leaders of the party had the capacity to mobilize the
electorate on a regular basis. However, as soon as some of these readers no
longer belonged to the PD, there was a change of preferences. The increased
electoral volatility (see Figure 5.4) and the low result in the 2001 elections
accurately reflect this drop.
Conclusions
The findings of this chapter are threefold. First, it shows a great diversity in
renominating MPs across the CEE political parties. The averages of these rates
range between 25% and 67%. Most parties renominate at least one third of their
MPs as candidates in the following elections. At country level, the renomination
rates increase with time. Both findings illustrate strong ties between parties
and their representatives. Second, there is a moderate statistical relationship
between the renomination rates and electoral volatility. Its direction indicates
that political parties that use more MPs on the lists of candidates are less
volatile than the rest. The chapter presented three intertwined mechanisms
through which this connection is achieved: instrumental, communication, and
socialization. Third, the comparative case studies brought empirical evidence
that illustrates the ways in which MP renominations shape electoral volatility.
In substantial terms, the analysis of KDU-CSL and PD show how the loyalty of
elite enforces the loyalty of the voters.
There are two major implications of these results. In theoretical terms,
this analysis adds new valences for the process of candidate nomination. Earlier
research focused on the process, costs, and pressures faced by political parties
when nominating the candidates for elections. The advantage brought by
renominations in the form of stable electorates provides a new perspective.
This may contribute to the rethinking of the advantages to promote the same
representatives in consecutive elections. At empirical level, the renomination
rates can be considered a useful explanation for variations of electoral volatility
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across parties and even party systems. The relationship is observable in
different electoral settings (e.g. within the party systems). At the same time,
the correlations differ across countries and this may represent a fertile soil for
further investigation.
The empirical testing of the relationship between the renomination rate
and electoral volatility concludes the series of bivariate correlations started
with Chapter 3. This series is complemented in the following chapter by a
multivariate statistical analysis that includes all components of party
organization – candidate selection, membership rates, and renomination rates
– in a more complex assessment of their impact on electoral volatility. Based on
theoretical expectations, I control for three additional variables (see Figure 1.3)
that may also influence the variation of electoral volatility.
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Chapter 6 A Multivariate Analysis of the Electoral Volatility at
Party Level in CEE
Introduction
How can electoral volatility in the new European democracies be explained?
This general question drives the comparative analysis of this book. The key
explanatory variable is the party organization. Each of the previous three
chapters analyzed on a bivariate basis the empirical relationships between the
components of party organization (i.e. candidate selection, membership rates,
and MPs’ renomination rates) and electoral volatility at party level in CEE. This
chapter complements the bivariate correlations with a multivariate statistical
analysis. The components of party organization are introduced into the same
model (OLS with robust standard errors) to observe their impact on volatility
while other variables are held constant.
The multivariate analysis adds relevant methodological and empirical
value to this study. First, it tests for causal relationships. The theoretical
expectations, formulated hypotheses, and qualitative assessments pointed in
the direction of causality. Second, next to the main hypothesized effects, there
are theoretical reasons to control for three additional variables: party system
volatility, electoral turnout, and government incumbency of the party (Figure
1.4). Political parties evolve and develop within an environment where similar
actors perform comparable actions. Despite the focus of this analysis on
individual parties, the possible systemic influences (i.e. party system volatility
and turnout) have to be controlled for. Government incumbency, discussed
also in Chapter 2, can influence the electoral volatility: elections often serve as
visible milestones that reflect voters’ tendencies to hold incumbents
responsible for the domestic situation. The survival in office often depends on
parties’ performance (Przeworski et al. 1999; Gherghina 2011).
The first section includes a discussion of the systemic control variables.
It includes the evolution of the party system institutionalization and electoral
turnout across time and countries. The following section conducts bivariate
correlations between all independent and control variables to show the
existing relationships. The third section includes the results of the multivariate
analysis. The findings strengthen the conclusions reached in the previous
chapters: the candidate selection for the legislative elections and the
renomination rates are important determinants of the electoral volatility. The
evidence shows little impact of the control variables on the party level
volatility.
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The Evolution of the Systemic Components
The two systemic control variables – party system volatility and electoral
turnout – display oscillations over time; they depict a rich picture with relevant
cross-country variations. Figure 6.1 reflects the evolution of party system
volatility and electoral turnout in CEE. The horizontal axis represents the
elections for which the volatility can be calculated (e.g. the first number
corresponds to the second election as this is the first moment in time when
vote shifts can be measured). The party system volatility ranges between
minimum values around 10% for the Hungarian elections in 2006 and Romania in
2000 to a maximum around 50% in the 2001 Bulgarian elections.























In general, this figure indicates oscillatory trends with similar levels in the first
and most recent elections. Hungary displays a continuous decrease of volatility
starting 1998 that coincides with the orientation of voter preferences towards
two very large political parties (FIDESZ and MSZP). Slovakia registers a slow
increase of the party system volatility starting with the same year, 1998 when
the domination of the HZDS ended and new parties mobilizing relevant
portions of the electorate emerged on the political scene (e.g. SDK in 1998,
SMER in 2002). Bulgaria is the country where the level of volatility in the most
recent election of 2005 is considerably higher than that of 1994 although the
over-time trend is characterized by ups and downs. As a final remark, the six
countries can be clustered in two groups according to the values of their
volatility: Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania have visible lower levels than
the rest of the countries.
Figure 6.2 depicts the longitudinal evolution of turnout levels in CEE.
The electoral turnout is generally characterized by descending slopes. The
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enthusiasm of voters in the aftermath of the communist breakdown was
gradually reduced and most of the countries witnessed increased absenteeism.
This is clearly visible in the Romanian case where the percentage of over 75%
turnout in 1992 dropped to less than 40% in 2008. In a similar situation, Czech
Republic and Slovakia had turnout losses of 15 to 20 percentage points
between the first and the last elections in the graph. Until recently, Poland
registered a similar decrease, but the electoral stake of the 2007 elections
brought citizens to the polls; the turnout exceeds the previous peak – the 1993
elections. Hungary and Bulgaria are characterized by oscillatory trends in which
the latter ended up with a much smaller level of turnout than in the 90s.

















The longitudinal development of these two systemic control variables may
influence the variations of electoral volatility at party level in CEE. However,
before taking a close look at their actual explanatory potential, I investigate the
statistical relationships between all variables included in the multivariate
analysis – the independent and control variables.
Correlations between Variables
This section explores all correlations between the independent and control
variables. The correlation coefficients from Table 6.1 show the existence of
generally weak linear relationships between these variables (and thus no
concerns for multicolinearity). The only moderate correlation is observed
between the size of membership and the variations in the size of membership.
The positive coefficient (0.55), statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicate
that large member organizations have wider oscillations in terms of
membership. For them it is difficult to maintain a stable organization: they
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either lose or gain a lot of members. At the same time, political parties with a
low number of members rarely alter dramatically the dimension of their
organizations. They remain small. This observation strengthens the conclusions
from Chapter 4 about the low variation in the size of most membership
organizations across time.



























































Candidate Selection - -0.08 -0.02 -0.14 0.22* -0.08 -0.08
Membership Size - 0.55** -0.05 -0.04 0.22* 0.02
Variations in




Party System Volatility - -0.35* -0.11
Turnout - 0.08
Incumbency -
Notes: Reported coefficients are Pearson’s r. N = 112.
** statistical significance at 0.01 level.
* statistical significance at 0.05 level.
The coefficients in Table 6.1 allow a few general observations. First, there is a
weak negative linear correlation (without statistical significance) between the
candidate selection for legislative elections and the renomination rates of the
MPs. It indicates that political parties with more decentralized mechanisms of
candidate selection renominate more MPs. There are three interconnected
explanations for this process: the limited recruitment pool, the prominence of
local leaders, and the focus of parliamentary activity. The recruitment pool of
the local and territorial organizations is limited. If the local branches can
renominate a person with experience, proven loyalty towards the party, or
positive image acquired during the term in office, they are likely to do so.
Moreover, for most CEE political parties, the leaders of the local organizations
are in place for a long time. When the local organizations have a word to say in
the candidate selection for the legislative elections, they are the usual suspects
for nomination. If such leaders served a term in office, the likelihood of their
renomination is large. Furthermore, the intensity and focus of parliamentary
activity can represent another relevant explanation. The MPs belonging to
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parties in which the selection process takes place mainly at regional or local
level have higher incentives to allocate resources and concentrate on their
constituency in the attempt to convince the local organizations to support
them with future nominations.
Second, there is no relationship between the MP renomination rates
and government incumbency of the party. There are theoretical reasons to
expect incumbent parties to rely more on their previously successful
candidates; these candidates benefit of the advantages of the term in
government of their party (e.g. higher access to financial resources). Moreover,
candidates of the incumbent parties can be more visible than those of the
opposition and people can recognize them better. The empirical evidence from
CEE suggests that no such logic is employed by the examined parties: those in
government renominate their MPs on lists of candidates to a similar extent
with the parties from opposition.61 This result complements the qualitative
description from Chapter 5. The analysis of renomination oscillations at party
level revealed isolated cases in which government parties relied on more MPs
in the subsequent elections compared to the opposition parties.
Third, there is a statistically significant relationship between the
decentralization of candidate selection and party system volatility. The positive
correlation indicates that the countries in which political parties have more
decentralized selection of candidates are less volatile than the rest.
Corroborating this result with the findings from Chapter 3, the decentralization
of candidate selection for the legislative elections is related to the electoral
volatility both for individual parties and party systems. As the measurement is
done at different levels (i.e. the party system volatility is constant across
parties in the same country at a given moment in time), the substantial
conclusions to be derived from such a relationship are limited.
Fourth, there is a negative correlation between the renomination rates
and party system volatility. This shows that the electorate is more stable in
those systems where parties are characterized by high renomination rates.
Similarly to the previous observation, this is also in line with the findings of the
hypothesis testing in chapter 5. it is worth noting that the correlations between
each component of party organization – candidate selection and MP
renomination rates – and electoral volatility are much higher at party (Chapter
3 and Chapter 5) than at party system level.
Fifth, there is a weak positive correlation, statistically not significant,
between the candidate selection and the size of membership. This indicates
61 There is a direct link between this observation and the previous correlation. MPs do not have
higher chances of renomination if their party is in government. Instead, in the context of more
autonomy enjoyed by the local organizations in selecting candidates for the legislative office, the
constituency service and the position within the local organization (e.g. being part of the local
elite) can ensure the renomination.
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that parties with more decentralized selection mechanisms have slightly larger
membership organizations compared to the rest. This result is mainly driven by
the successor parties that benefit of communist organizational legacies and
often maintained the large membership without keeping the highly centralized
decision making that characterized the communist parties. This organizational
reform took place in the aftermath of regime change when most successor
parties tried to persuade voters about their discontinuity with the past. The
credibility of their message relied also on the intra-party formal arrangements.
That is why, with the exception of the SDL in Slovakia, the successor parties
decided to allow at least partial autonomy to the local branches in selecting
candidates for the legislative elections.
Finally, the moderate correlation between the two control variables
examined in the previous section provides useful information for the general
picture of electoral volatility in CEE. The negative value of the correlation
coefficient (-0.35), statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicates that lower
turnout favors increased volatility. In theoretical terms, the low turnout is an
indicator of voters’ protest against the representation provided by political
parties. Discontent often leads to absenteeism. Under these conditions, vote
shifts between the components of the system are more likely to occur when
less people are present at the voting booth.
This happens for two concurrent reasons. On the one hand, those who
decide to vote are willing to express their discontent on the ballot. In doing so,
they do not vote with the same party as they did in the previous elections. On
the other hand, if all those who vote maintain their preferences, the party and
party system volatility can still change. As explained in Chapter 1, if a political
party has the same voters in election t0 and t1, the percentage of people who
vote changes the share of votes that this particular party receives. Empirically,
large parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and more recently Romania
usually mobilize large numbers of voters. Thus, small variations in turnout do
not alter their support. However, small parties are the main beneficiaries or
victims: when the electoral support is close to the electoral threshold, the
entries and exits from the party system are partially due to the oscillations in
turnout.
The statistical analysis of the relationships between the independent
and control variables provided a few insights in the characteristics of the
parties and their environment. The following section moves to the multivariate
analysis used to explain the variation of the electoral volatility at party level in
CEE.
The Multivariate Analysis
Chapter 1 and the introductory section of this chapter mention two multivariate
models: one with the main effects for which I formulated hypotheses (model 1)
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and one including also the control variables (model 2). A few brief
methodological clarifications are necessary before conducting the analysis. The
use of OLS requires the satisfaction of four model assumptions: independence,
normality, homoskedasticity, and linearity. To correct for the violation of the
third and third assumption, I use OLS with robust standard errors.
Table 6.2 includes the regression coefficients of the two OLS models.
Model 1, including only the main effects, explains 21% of the variation in
electoral volatility at party level. This percentage is not high, but it should taken
into account that it is the statistical result of only two variables: the
decentralization of candidate selection and the renomination rates. The other
two variables – both related to the size of membership organizations – have
little if any explanatory power.
Table 6.2: The Multivariate Models Explaining Electoral Volatility at Party Level in CEE
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 25.74** (7.74) 27.48 (14.09)
Candidate Selection 38.84** (12.52) 33.76* (13.91)
Membership Size -2.16 (2.29) -1.14 (2.06)
Variations in Membership Size -1.66 (4.30) -0.59 (4.40)
Renomination -43.17** (14.11) -38.66** (13.53)
Party System Volatility 0.24 (0.23)
Turnout -0.07 (0.17)
Government Incumbency -9.47* (3.77)
R2 0.21 0.28
N 101
Note: Reported coefficients are not standardized (robust standard errors in brackets)
* statistical significance at 0.05 level.
** statistical significance at 0.01 level.
All hypothesized relationships are supported by empirical evidence. According
to the regression coefficients62, if we compare the political parties using the
most decentralized with those parties using the most centralized candidate
selection process, there is a 39 percentage points decrease of volatility. This
result is generalizable with a confidence interval of 99%.
Regarding the membership organizations, the effect on electoral
volatility is almost non-existent. A comparison between the political parties
with the highest membership organizations and the political parties with the
smallest percentage of members in the electorate, there is slightly more than 2
percentage points increase of electoral volatility. Similarly, if we compare the
parties with less fluctuation in the size of membership organization with those
62 For an easier interpretation of the regression coefficients, I standardized their values on a 0-1
scale.
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parties with large variations in the percentages of members, there is almost 2
percentage points increase of volatility. The lack of statistical significance
points in the same direction: the membership organizations and their
fluctuations have no explanatory power for the variation of electoral volatility
at party level. As illustrated in Chapter 4 the absence of an effect may be due to
the low variation in terms of membership organizations across time and
parties.
The MP renomination rates is next to candidate selection for the
national elections the variable that influences the electoral volatility at party
level to a considerable extent. The comparison between the political parties
that renominate more MPs and those parties that renominate few MPs reveal a
difference of 43% between the two; high renomination rates lead to less
volatility (Figure 6.6). This indicates that MP renomination has a similar effect
to the decentralization of candidate selection.
These results confirm the findings from the bivariate analyses regarding
the strength and direction of the relationships. The effect of membership
organizations (both size and variations in size) on electoral volatility is the
smallest among the ones hypothesized. They are sample specific and cannot be
generalized to a broader population. The effects of candidate selection and MP
renomination rates have comparable effects, both being generalizable to a
broader population.
The inclusion in Model 2 of the control variables does not increase its
explanatory power. The model explains 28% of the variation in electoral
volatility at party level in CEE. Such an increase is minimal given the fact that
three new variables were introduced. At the same time, the control variables
do not diminish to a relevant extent the predictive potential of candidate
selection and renomination rates. With the exception of the variation in size of
the membership organizations the impact of the main variables is stronger than
that of the controls. The candidate selection and the renomination rates
continue to explain best the variation in electoral volatility at party level.
Turnout is the weakest predictor among the controls.
These findings have two implications. First, the results of the bivariate
relationships are robust; they do not change when we have all variables
together or when we control for the environment factors. Second, at the core
of this endeavor, the party system volatility is a separate process from that of
the party volatility. Although the party system represents the sum of the party
level volatilities – calculated differently than the measurement employed in this
book – the variation of party volatility is explained to a small extent by what
happens at systemic level. Among the control variables government
incumbency has the highest impact on party volatility. From a methodological
perspective, this outcome is not surprising as it is the only control variable
measured at party and not systemic level. From an empirical perspective, the
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descriptive statistics in Chapter 2 have already pointed to a different
distribution of volatility between incumbent and opposition parties. Results
indicate that incumbents are more volatile than the rest of parties.
Conclusions
The evidence provided by the multivariate statistical analysis of this chapter
strengthens the conclusions reached in the previous chapters. The components
of party organization have a relevant effect on electoral volatility at party level.
At the same time, there is a hierarchy of these effects. The most important
predictors of electoral volatility are the candidate selection process and the MP
renomination rates. The membership organization (both the size and the
variation in size) is the variable with no effect.
Overall, the control variables have little effect on the volatility. The
model that includes them does not add much explanatory power to the
variation of volatility. The government incumbency is the only control variable
that predicts the values of volatility. This means that there is no evidence to
illustrate that any systemic factor – party system volatility or turnout – has an
influence on the electoral volatility measured at party level. These empirical
results strengthen the theoretical approach from Chapter 1 that clearly
differentiated between factors determining volatility at multiple layers (Figure
1.1). The quantitative multivariate analysis represented the final step of this
study. The concluding chapter wraps up the analysis and emphasizes the most
relevant findings. It also discusses the implications of the results and indicates




The political change in post-communist Europe involved a multi-faceted
transformation of the polity, society, and of the political actors engaged in the
competition for representation. The re-emergence of multiparty competition
generated high electoral volatility, a situation which contrasted starkly with
that of Western Europe. The large number of vote shifts was not only
observable at the party system level, but also amongst political parties from
the same country. The main goal of this study was to explain the variations in
electoral volatility at party level across Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia between 1990 and 2008. The analysis included
political parties with a relatively continuous presence in the legislature. The
main contention of my analysis has been that the organizational features of
political parties can influence the extent to which parties achieve stability
within the electorate. More specifically, it was argued that a decentralized
process of candidate selection for national elections, the size and stability of
membership organizations, and the extent to which political parties re-
nominate their MPs on candidate lists have an effect on electoral volatility.
These features have the capacity to ensure good communication between
parties and voters, create a broader social network in support of the party,
provide continuity of representation, and have a socializing effect on citizens.
Consistent with previous research focusing on the role of external
factors in shaping long-term electoral preferences (e.g. the electoral system,
the degree of democratization etc.), this study indicates the existence of a
response from the voters to the way in which parties organize. The importance
of internal settings to diminishing electoral volatility appears to hold under
various circumstances. The explanations provided are not country or time
specific, they do not refer to specific types of parties, nor are they limited to
particular events in the political evolution of CEE. Instead, the mechanisms
identified here appear to explain the broad range of electoral volatility
observable for all selected parties across various elections.
The Complex Picture of Electoral Volatility
This book introduced a systematic approach to electoral volatility at the party
level across several new European democracies. Volatility was measured by
calculating vote gains and losses relative to the electoral support of the
political parties; any bias related to the party size was thereby diminished. The
empirical findings presented here add nuance to and complement the picture
drawn by previous research on electoral volatility at the party system level
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(Lewis 1996; 2001a; Agh 1998; Toka 1998; Krupavicius 1999; Moser 2001; van
Biezen 2003; Millard 2004; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005; Casal Bertoa and Enyedi
2011). The nuances were found when comparing the countries based on the
volatility of their most relevant political parties.
The dynamic of electoral support for these political actors reveals two
country-specific features: the volatility range, and the homogeneity of party
distribution on this range. In four out of six countries studied, there are political
parties with almost no volatility at specific moments in time. This indicates the
potential of some political parties to maintain a stable core of voters in
consecutive elections. Out of these four countries, Hungary and Slovakia have
the broadest dispersion. They are the only countries in which political parties
register values of electoral volatility above 80%. This empirical observation
reveals similarities between two party systems that were often considered to
fall under different categories of electoral volatility – Hungary being one of the
most stable party systems in CEE, and Slovakia being one of the systems with
relatively large volatility.
In Bulgaria and Poland, there are no parties close to the minimum
extreme value. Moreover, these are the countries with the fewest political
parties with low volatility in CEE. Conversely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Romania are the countries in which most political parties have low volatility in
various elections. These conclusions are in line with earlier research that placed
Bulgaria and Poland in the same category of volatile party systems (Szczerbiak
2001; Spirova 2007), whereas the Czech, Hungarian, and Romanian party
systems are among the least volatile in CEE. The distribution of political parties
across the volatility continuum allows for a deeper exploration of the cross-
country similarities and differences. For example, Bulgarian and Polish parties
display a similar pattern of clustering around certain values of volatility.
However, there is a difference between the two countries in terms of the
number of parties, the concentration, and their respective volatility values.
Bulgarian political parties cluster in three groups: a small group situated around
3%, a larger group around 20%, and the largest group around 40%. Polish
political parties have are clustered in reverse: most parties are positioned
around the 15% value, slightly fewer around the 50% value, and the smallest
cluster resides close to 65%. Furthermore, Polish parties approach the
uppermost extreme of electoral volatility compared to the parties in Bulgaria.
Apart from these country-level differences, the general observation is
that the vast majority of CEE political parties are dispersed across a broad range
of electoral volatility. This dispersion exists irrespective of the timing and party
system in which the parties compete. Although there is some concentration in
the 0-20% range of volatility, the variation in electoral volatility is high. The
range is broad with a minimum value of 0.11% and a maximum of 89.21%. The
analysis found no effect of time on electoral volatility. A comparison of the
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1990 and 2000 decades revealed no relevant differences between the volatility
values and distribution of parties. The empirical evidence contradicts existing
research underlining the consolidation and stabilization tendencies of the CEE
party systems (Olson 1993; Agh 1998; Chan 2001). Instead of a uniform decline
of electoral volatility in CEE, these results indicate that voters continue to
change their electoral preferences to a similar extent across time. This is
consistent with the oscillatory pattern identified by Sikk (2005) for the electoral
volatility at party system level. In the context of the party level analysis
conducted in this book, a specific conclusion can be drawn on the basis of
these empirical observations. Even after several elections, volatility remains a
salient issue for most CEE political parties.
If the time does not reduce electoral volatility, the presence in
government appears to play a role. CEE incumbent parties are, on average, less
volatile than opposition parties. Such findings complement the existing
research from Western Europe (Muller and Strom 2000; Strom et al. 2003)
pointing that incumbents are likely to display higher levels of electoral change
compared to the opposition parties. Moving beyond the electoral loss or gain,
this book illustrates that in CEE incumbent parties have a more stable core of
voters compared to the opposition parties. This happens in the context of
continuous alternations in government. However, the advantage of the term in
government is not very high and is nuanced by a supplementary empirical
observation. Incumbent parties do not display moderate volatility; they have
either low or high levels of electoral volatility.
In addition to these general differences, there is significant variation in
electoral volatility within the same party system. The variation is visible both
across parties and across time for the same political party. The average
volatility indicates large discrepancies between the least and the most volatile
parties within a political system. Moreover, there are isolated examples of
political parties that maintain a stable core of voters across several elections.
Most parties do not even display a linear trend (decreasing or increasing) over
the years; periods of low volatility rates are followed periods of high volatility
and vice versa. In light of these empirical observations, CEE continues to
represent fertile soil in which to investigate electoral volatility. In many
respects, this complex picture was generally left unexplained by variables
included in previous analyses. There are isolated instances in which the ethnic
cleavage or the networks established by political parties with non-political
organizations can explain the variation in electoral volatility at party level.
However, general explanations are missing. To fill this gap, the central
argument of this book was that the organizational features of political parties
were likely to explain the variation in electoral volatility.
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The Relevance of Candidate Selection
The way in which political parties select their candidates is relevant not only to
those directly involved in the internal decision-making. So far, an extensive
body of literature has focused on the implications of this process for members,
leaders of local or territorial organizations, as well as the central elite of the
party. There are a number of reasons for which candidate selection can
influence electoral support and its long-term stability. The underlying
mechanism at work here relates to the establishment of a better connection to
the voter. Most political parties in CEE are hierarchical institutions with three
decision-making layers: central, territorial (e.g. regional, county, or municipal),
and local. Decisions made at the central office that are simply imposed on all
local organizations run the risk of reflecting only the one-sided perspective of
the central elite on the issue at hand. Decisions made at the highest level of
interaction between most voters and the party – the local organization – are
more likely to be based on citizens’ priorities and needs. Local organizations
can mirror citizens’ day-to-day issues into policy issues, thereby demonstrating
the potential for adaptation. In this way, the autonomy of local organizations in
reaching relevant decisions within the party can provide the basis for a strong
connection to the voters.
This general argument gets stronger when the decision making refers
to candidates. Voters are more familiar with those candidates nominated at the
constituency level. By providing the local organizations a voice in the process of
candidate selection, political parties send a clear message: they care about
voters’ opinions. Moreover, a candidate selected at the local level contributes
to a psychological effect within the electorate: people believe that candidate
represents them. From a candidate’s perspective, earlier studies have shown
that politicians exhibit the greatest loyalty to the locus that influences their re-
election. The selection of candidates in a decentralized manner (in territorial
organizations) is therefore likely to enhance deeper connections between
elected candidates and citizens.
The empirical relationship between the centralization of candidate
selection and electoral volatility confirms these theoretical expectations. The
statistical analysis revealed that political parties that allow the local
organizations more room for maneuver in selecting candidates are less volatile
than the rest. The centralization of candidate selection for national elections,
measured using an index adapted to the CEE realities, reveals a diverse
approach on the part of political parties towards the selection of their
candidates. Most CEE political parties prefer the involvement of the central
office in reaching decisions. However, this involvement takes various shapes.
For more than one third of the parties, control of the central office is reactive
and involves the use of the right to oppose or veto initial proposals. Selection
takes place at the local or regional level and the list of candidates (as most
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countries use list PR) is subject to the approval of the central organization. One
fifth of the parties opt for mixed selection of candidates in which both the local
and central level make proposals until a final decision is reached. A similar share
of parties opts for a totally centralized decision making process in which local
organizations have practically no say in the selection of candidates.
One implication of this categorization of parties according to their
candidate selection procedures is empirical. It adds nuance to the conclusions
drawn on the basis of previous research that dealt with the centralized
character of political parties in CEE (Szczerbiak 2001a; Deegan-Krause 2006).
The general tendency of centralization is visible. However, the degree to which
the centre is involved in decision-making differs considerably. In many cases,
the control of the centre does not limit the opportunities for involvement of
the local level. In addition, centralization does not characterize the entire
universe of cases. One fifth of the parties examined have decentralized
selection: the local organizations have autonomy in choosing the candidates.
The fact that parties connect with their electorates through the
decentralization of candidate selection for national elections has an impact on
theories about voting behavior and intra-party decision making. The existence
of such a relationship adds one more analytical dimension: voting can be the
response to internal decisions of the political actors. So far, a large number of
studies considered voting to be mostly the result of parties’ activity on the
political arena (see Chapter 1). However, the linkage identified in this book
indicates that voters can react positively when local organizations – the primary
unit of interaction between voters and parties – have a greater word to say in
the selection of candidates for national elections. The recognition of
candidates, the willingness to adapt to specific features of local politics, and
the responsiveness to voters’ priorities are among the most important
messages sent by parties. Furthermore, with such effects in place, the locus of
selection may influence the behavior of candidates once they reach office.
Thus, this may constitute an incentive for successful candidates to push
towards further decentralization of the decision making within their party.
The Limited Role of Membership
The theoretical arguments from Chapter 1 explained how membership can
create social networks in society; at their turn, these networks can ensure a
certain degree of voter encapsulation and allow the formation of party identity
among members and their acquaintances. Moreover, communication with
voters between elections gives citizens signals that their opinions are
important and are being addressed as such. Members can make the process of
representation more palpable. In this way, party members are able to close the
gap between parties and voters that originates in the tenuous relationship
between parties and society in CEE. On these grounds, the size of membership
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organizations and its stability over time were expected to diminish electoral
volatility.
The results indicate that the political parties with numerous members
have slightly lower levels of electoral volatility than the parties with small
number of members. The strength of this relationship varies across countries.
Extreme values appear to be related to the share of party membership in the
population. In this sense, the size of membership has the strongest influence
on electoral volatility in the country with most party members (Romania) and
the weakest in the country in which only very few people are registered party
members (Poland). At the same time, the variations in size are not related to
electoral volatility. Overall, membership appears to have a limited role in
explaining electoral volatility at party level in CEE. Consequently, the
enlargement of party membership can hardly represent e mechanism through
which parties can stabilize their voters in CEE.
Two general observations can explain the weak relationships and can
serve as bases for further research. First, the longitudinal analysis presented in
this book reveals that only a small percentage of parties (14%) consistently
increase their membership organizations over time. A similar percentage of
parties registered a consistent loss of members. In more than two thirds of the
cases, political party membership does not display a linear progression in one
direction or the other; its evolution is marked by oscillations. Second, on
average, the membership organizations continue to be small or extremely
small both in absolute and relative terms (compared to Western European
countries). Only eight parties have more than 1% members (calculated as
percentage of the electorate). Of these, only two parties have more than 2%,
both of which rely heavily on the organizational legacy of their communist
predecessors. These low levels of membership diminish the influence that party
members could have exercised on electoral volatility. Furthermore, given the
oscillatory trends of most membership organizations in the region, the stability
of membership rates does not influence volatility.
The Advantages of MP Renominations
MPs’ activities and performance in the legislature shape the image of political
parties in the eyes of the electorate. Due to their position, MPs have access to
resources that can bring benefits to those who voted for their party. The period
spent in office is often considered to be an indicator of professionalization and
expertise. These attributes enhance the credibility of MPs when they run for re-
election. MPs also have the resources (i.e. public allowances, free access to
media) to interact extensively with groups or individual citizens within their
constituencies. These features suggest that continuity in office may have a
positive effect on electoral volatility. Political parties using the same MPs in
consecutive elections are better able to establish a strong connection with the
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electorate and are thus more able to influence its voting loyalty. This nexus
functions on the basis of three complementary mechanisms. First, incumbent
MPs play an instrumental role using their high visibility, publicity, and name
recognition to their advantage. Incumbents act as recognizable elements of the
party that add a personal dimension to the organizational attachment of the
voters. Second, MPs are the guarantors of long-term communication between
candidates and voters to their mutual benefits. Third, there is a process of
voter socialization. Through their constituency service, MPs accustom voters to
issue of representation and responsiveness to their needs.
Given this, it is not surprising that the average estimation of re-
nomination indicates that CEE political parties use approximately one third of
their MPs to fill in the candidate lists for the upcoming elections. Due to a
variety of reasons ranging from floor-crossing to unwillingness of MPs to run
for re-election, there is a substantial discrepancy in MP re-nomination rates
across political parties. Consequently, the average re-nomination rates vary
between less than a quarter of MPs (as is the case with the KDNP in Hungary)
to more than two thirds (KDU-CSL in the Czech Republic). The statistical
analysis shows the effect of re-nomination rates for electoral volatility. The
political parties that re-nominate more MPs ensure continuity of
representation. This process is reflected in the stability of electoral support: the
parties with higher re-nomination rates exhibit lower electoral volatility.
These findings have an empirical implication. In the new European
democracies in CEE, the nexus between parties and voters involves the
legislators. They are the most visible representatives of the parties and their
continuity in office can encourage the stabilization of electoral preferences.
Continuity is relevant to electoral volatility without accounting for the MPs’
performance. The simple fact of being present in the legislature appears to
trigger more loyal voter behavior at polls.
Implications
This study revealed the importance of organizational components in shaping
electoral volatility at the party level. The centralization of candidate selection
and the MP re-nomination rate have a relevant effect on the stability of
electoral performance. The size of membership has little impact on volatility.
The multivariate statistical analysis controlled both for variables in the political
environment such as party system volatility and electoral turnout as well as for
government incumbency. Its results revealed that the effects of the
organizational components are the strongest; their impact is not weakened by
the presence of other variables.
The empirical evidence presented in this book has four major
implications. First, the effect of organizational structures and procedures on
the societal acceptance of parties (i.e. the stability of electoral support) has
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implications for the theory of institutionalization. Previous studies (Mainwaring
and Scully 1995) have considered these two components as indicators of
institutionalization. The analyses from this book, however, indicate that this
conclusion may be problematic. If there a cause-effect relationship between
these two variables, they are no longer components of the same concept
(institutionalization). Instead, as one partially explains the other, there is
conceptual tautology. Consequently, a new conceptualization of
institutionalization is required.
Second, these empirical results indicate the necessity to rethink the
linkage between parties and their electorates. So far, existing research
illustrate how parties react to existing constraints in society, to the electoral
market, or to a large number of external factors (Kircheimer 1966; Rae 1971;
Sartori 1997; Harmel and Janda 1982; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair et al. 2004;
Millard 2004). Some results of the analysis conducted throughout this book
indicated that political parties can be in the position to influence the
institutional settings in which they operate. Thus, political parties can also be
seen as agents that can structure people’s choices and model, to some extent,
their own electoral stability over time. The degrees of success in reaching this
outcome can set the theoretical premises for new typologies of political parties
in CEE.
Third, at the methodological level, this book provides a few indicators
to allow the comparability of party organization and further investigation.
Earlier studies provided several conceptualizations of party organization
(Harmel and Janda 1982; Panebianco 1988; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Randall
and Svasand 2002; van Biezen 2003) that allow little or no replicability as they
are based more on in-depth or contextual knowledge of the cases. This study
provided an analytical alternative to qualitative assessment of organization
components. The quantitative operationalizaton and the data provided may
represent useful tools for further comparative research.
The major empirical implication of these results is that electoral
volatility can have endogenous sources. This observation adds nuance to the
conclusions drawn in two different streams of literature. First, many studies
have focused on external determinants of volatility. The role played by the
internal selection of candidates, membership rates, and MP re-nomination
illustrates that this is not the case at the party level. Moreover, the prominence
of endogenous explanations – when included in the same model as some
exogenous explanations – strengthens these claims. Voters appear to react to
the behavior of political party. For example, if the party shows willingness to
respond to their demands or ensures continuity of representation, citizens do
not alter their electoral preferences. Second, earlier research has discussed the
adaptation of party organization to inputs received from the electorate. This
book has demonstrated that this process can be reversed and the internal
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organization can shape the electoral stability of the party. The process is
complex and is based upon three interconnected mechanisms by which a
stronger nexus with the voters is created. Further research can elaborate on
the propensity of parties to choose to either adopt one of the two stances
(adaptation or influence) or to combine them for political and electoral
success.
Directions for Further Research
This analysis opens the floor to three main avenues for further research. First,
the broad longitudinal and cross-party variation in electoral volatility may
inspire the quest to find further determinants. The multivariate statistical
analysis accounted for 20 to 30% of this variation. This leaves plenty of room for
future research to employ new variables that may explain volatility. Among
other organizational features to be considered, future studies may include
leadership changes or division of funding within the party as potential
explanatory variables for electoral volatility. As splits and mergers often
appeared to be useful variables in explaining some organizational processes, a
systematic investigation of such processes may prove valuable also, in direct
relationship with electoral volatility.
Second, the candidate selection process and MP re-nomination are
significant – both from a statistical and substantive perspective – determinants
of electoral volatility. Further research may contribute to these findings by
taking a closer look at the quality of selected candidates and the performance
of representatives. The effect of these two variables may become stronger
when the selected candidates are quality MPs who successfully fulfill their
representation function (i.e. they perform well as MPs). With such nuanced
information, government incumbency that appears to play a role in decreasing
volatility may become less relevant. In that case, the emphasis of future
research should be on the politics of representation and the qualities necessary
to perform it in a manner that may influence volatility.
Finally, departing from these results, further research may distinguish
between political parties that show general similarities in terms of organization
and volatility. Differences may be assessed through process tracing at the level
of each party. Organizational changes, modifications of membership rates,
leadership style, or loyalty of the elite may point to differences overlooked by
this study. Thus, future research may focus on further distinguishing the causal
mechanisms driving the effect of organization on electoral volatility at the
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De  politieke  veranderingen  in  postcommunistisch  Europa  omvatten  een 
veelzijdige  transformatie  van  politieke  stelsels,  maatschappijen  en  politieke 
partijen.  De  terugkeer  van meerpartijenstelsels  is  gepaard  gegaan met  een 
electorale  volatiliteit  die  in  vergelijking met West‐Europa  hoog  is.  Het  komt 
nauwelijks  voor  dat  dezelfde  partij  twee  opeenvolgende  periodes  regeert. 
Daarnaast  hebben  van  de  enkele  honderden  partijen  die  in  verkiezingen 




  Dit boek beoogt de  verschillen  in  electorale  volatiliteit op het niveau 
van  partijen  in  zes  Centraal‐  en  Oost‐Europese  landen  (Bulgarije,  Tsjechië, 
Hongarije,  Polen, Roemenië  en  Slowakije)  in  de  afgelopen  twee  decennia  te 
verklaren. De  focus  is gericht op partijen omdat  zij  als  actieve  spelers  in het 
vertegenwoordigingsproces directe interactie hebben met de burgers, van wie 
zij weer steun verlangen, terwijl ze direct worden beïnvloed door bewegingen 
in  het  electoraat.  Deze  focus  maakt  het  bovendien  mogelijk  om  de 
grootschalige, onverklaarde variantie  in electorale volatiliteit binnen hetzelfde 
partijsysteem  te  behandelen.  Het  empirisch  materiaal  in  deze  studie  laat 
namelijk  significante  variantie  in  electorale  volatiliteit  binnen  hetzelfde 
partijsysteem  zien.  Verschillen  zijn  niet  alleen  zichtbaar  tussen  partijen maar 
ook bij dezelfde partij door de tijd heen. De gemiddelde volatiliteitsscores laten 
grote  verschillen  tussen  de  partijen met  de minste  en  de meeste  electorale 
volatiliteit zien binnen een politiek stelsel. 
  Uit  vorige  studies  komen  twee  groepen  factoren  als  belangrijkste 
verklaringen  van  electorale  volatiliteit  naar  voren.  De  eerste  groep  factoren 
behoort tot de politieke sociologie. Partijvorming en –competitie vinden plaats 
langs  scheidslijnen  (cleavages)  op  basis  van  onder  meer  leeftijd,  onderwijs, 
professionele  achtergrond,  religie,  etniciteit  en  sociale  klasse.  In 
postcommunistisch gebied bieden deze groep  factoren een  relatief beperkte 
verklaring  voor  electorale  volatiliteit.  De  tweede  groep  factoren  omvat  de 
instituties die partijcompetitie bepalen alsook de rol van politieke actoren in de 
vorming van kiezersvoorkeuren. Mijn analyse sluit aan bij deze tweede groep. 
Ik presenteer  een  verklaring  van  stemkeuze  in nieuwe democratieën, waarin 





Partijen  kunnen  hun  kiezers  stimuleren  om  loyaal  te  blijven.  De  electorale 
situatie  in  Centraal‐  en  Oost‐Europese  landen maakt  dat  geen  gemakkelijke 
onderneming.  De  zwakke  maatschappelijke  wortels  van  partijen  maken 
partijidentificatie  en  –binding  onmogelijk.  De  onduidelijke  patronen  in  de 
competitie  tussen partijen maken beleid als basis voor partijkeuze bovendien 
weinig  relevant. Het gebrek aan  loyaliteit van elites aan hun partijen beperkt 
verder  de  continuïteit  in  leiderschap.  Postcommunistische  politieke  partijen 
hebben  niet  veel  instrumenten  in  handen  om  het  vlottende  electoraat  te 
mobiliseren. Partijen  vormen  echter  effectieve  communicatiekanalen naar  en 
van  het  electoraat,  die  ze  kunnen  gebruiken  om  hun  kiezerssteun  te 
stabiliseren.  Daarom  is  de  stelling  die  ik  ga  toetsen  dat  partijorganisatie 
daaraan  kan bijdragen door middel  van de ontwikkeling  van  een herkenbaar 
label waarmee  kiezers  zich  kunnen  identificeren op de middellange en  lange 
termijn,  aan  de  vorming  van  netwerken  onder  het  kiezersvolk,  en  aan  de 
promotie  van  herkenbare  kandidaten  waarop  ze  in  achtereenvolgende 
verkiezingen kan steunen. 
  Drie  verschillende  dimensies  van  de  partijorganisaties  zijn  hierbij 
betrokken:  de  besluitvorming  binnen  de  partij,  het  ledenbestand,  en  de 
herbenoeming  van  zittende  partijvertegenwoordigers.  Ten  eerste  kan 
decentrale  besluitvorming  een  partij  sterker  verbinden  met  haar  kiezers. 
Decentrale  besluitvorming  versterkt  namelijk  het  idee  onder  burgers  dat 
problemen  op  lokaal  niveau worden  aangepakt  en  dat  zij  in  het  proces  van 
representatie ook enige  inbreng  kunnen hebben. Ten  tweede, een partij  kan 
langdurige betrokkenheid kweken door het werven van  leden. Leden bouwen 
hun eigen netwerken op en daarmee verkrijgt de partij makkelijker toegang tot 
bredere  segmenten  onder  het  electoraat.  Ten  derde,  herbenoeming  levert 
herkenbare  kandidaten  op,  waarmee  een  partij  twee  onderling 
samenhangende  doelen  kan  bereiken  die  belangrijk  zijn  in  het  proces  van 
representatie:  a.  verspreiding  van  de  perceptie  van  continuïteit  onder  de 
kiezers; en b. politiek wordt minder abstract voor gewone burgers doordat er 
een  verband  wordt  gelegd  tussen  kandidaten  en  partijlabels.  Kortom,  de 
bronnen  van  electorale  volatiliteit  worden  voornamelijk  als  institutioneel 





verschillen  in  partijgrootte.  De  empirische  bevindingen  nuanceren  en 
complementeren  het  op  eerdere  studies  gebaseerde  beeld  van  electorale 
volatiliteit op het niveau van partijstelsel. De algemene waarneming in dit boek 
is  dat  politieke  partijen  in  Centraal‐  en  Oost‐Europa  een  grote  spreiding  in 
electorale  volatiliteit  kennen. Deze  spreiding  is  onafhankelijk  van  het  tijdstip 
waarop  en  het  partijstelsel  waarin  partijen  met  elkaar  concurreren.  Uit  de 








kandidaatstelling  en  daarnaast  het  percentage  van  herbenoemde 
vertegenwoordigers.  Electorale  volatiliteit blijkt  zich minder  voor  te  doen bij 
politieke partijen waarin lokale afdelingen meer ruimte hebben om kandidaten 
voor verkiezingen van wetgevende organen  te  selecteren. Kiezers zijn  in hun 
kiesdistrict meer bekend met de genomineerde kandidaten. Politieke partijen 
laten  duidelijk  de  boodschap  horen  dat  zij  zich  de  opinies  van  kiezers 
aantrekken door  lokale  afdelingen  zeggenschap  te verschaffen  in de  selectie 
van kandidaten. Bovendien draagt de  lokale selectie van de kandidaat bij aan 
het  psychologische  effect  onder  het  electoraat  dat mensen  van  kandidaten 
geloven  dat  zij  hen  vertegenwoordigen.  Eerdere  studies  gaven  aan  dat  de 
meeste  loyaliteit  van  politici  uitgaat  naar  het  niveau waar  hun  herverkiezing 
wordt  beïnvloed.  Het  is  daarom  aannemelijk  dat  de  decentrale  selectie  van 
kandidaten in lokale afdelingen de band tussen gekozen kandidaten en burgers 
versterkt. 
  Politieke  partijen  die meer  parlementariërs  herbenoemen  verzekeren 
zich van continuïteit in vertegenwoordiging. Dat wordt weerspiegeld in stabiele 
kiezersteun. Partijen met verhoudingsgewijs meer herbenoemingen vertonen 
minder  electorale  volatiliteit.  Dit  verband  is  gebaseerd  op  drie  elkaar 
aanvullende  mechanismes:  allereerst  zijn  zittende  parlementariërs 
instrumenteel door hun grote  zichtbaarheid, publiciteit en naamsherkenning. 
Zij  vormen  een  herkenbaar  onderdeel  van  de  partij  en  voegen  zo  een 
persoonlijke  dimensie  toe  aan  de  organisatorische  hechting  van  kiezers. 
Daarnaast  vormen  parlementariërs  een  garantie  voor  communicatie  op  de 
lange termijn in de uitruil met kiezers van stemmen voor dienstbetoon. Tot slot 
vindt er socialisatie van kiezers plaats via het dienstbetoon van parlementariërs 
in  hun  kiesdistrict.  Daardoor  kunnen  kiezers  gewend  raken  aan  de  manier 
waarop  het  proces  van  vertegenwoordiging  verloopt  alsook  de 
ontvankelijkheid voor hun behoeftes.  
  Het  veronderstelde  verband  tussen  partijlidmaatschap  (grootte  en 
variatie  in  grootte)  en  electorale  volatiliteit  blijkt  empirisch  zwak  te  zijn. De 
resultaten  geven  aan  dat  politieke  partijen met  een  groot  aantal  leden  iets 
minder electorale volatiliteit kennen dan partijen met een klein aantal leden. De 
kracht van dit verband varieert wel  tussen de onderzochte  landen. Variatie  in 
het aantal leden van een partij over tijd houdt geen verband met de electorale 
volatiliteit.  Al  met  al  lijkt  lidmaatschap  een  beperkte  rol  te  hebben  in  de 
verklaring  van  electorale  volatiliteit  op  partijniveau  in  nieuwe  Europese 
democratieën. 
  De bevindingen  in dit boek hebben  theoretische, methodologische en 
empirische  consequenties.  Het  feit  dat  organisatorische  structuren  en 
procedures effect hebben op de maatschappelijke acceptatie van partijen (i.e., 
de  stabiliteit  van  electorale  steun)  heeft  allereerst  consequenties  voor  de 
institutionaliseringstheorie.  Eerdere  studies  (Mainwaring  &  Scully  1995) 
beschouwden  partijorganisatie  en  electorale  volatiliteit  als  indicatoren  van 
institutionalisering. De analyse in dit boek laat echter zien dat dit problematisch 
kan  zijn. Als er namelijk een  causaal verband  is  tussen deze  twee variabelen, 
dan kunnen ze niet langer onderdeel van hetzelfde begrip (institutionalisering) 
zijn.  Omdat  de  ene  variabele  de  andere  verklaart,  is  een  nieuwe 
conceptualisering van het begrip institutionalisering nodig. 
  De bevindingen nopen ook om opnieuw de  relatie  tussen partijen en 
hun  achterbannen  te  doordenken.  Tot  dusver  toont  onderzoek  aan  hoe 
partijen reageren op beperkingen vanuit de maatschappij, de kiezersmarkt en 




hun  eigen  partijorganisatie  te  veranderen.  Politieke  partijen  kunnen  dus  ook 
actief de keuzes van mensen beïnvloeden en vormen zo, tot op zekere hoogte, 
hun  eigen  electorale  stabiliteit.  De  mate  van  succes  in  het  realiseren  van 
stabiliteit kan de basis zijn voor een nieuwe typologie van politieke partijen  in 
Centraal‐  en Oost‐Europa.  Tegelijkertijd heeft het  feit dat partijen  aansluiting 
vinden  bij  hun  kiezers  door  de  decentralisatie  van  kandidaatselectie  voor 
nationale  verkiezingen  gevolgen  voor  theorieën  over  kiezersgedrag  en 
besluitvorming  binnen  partijen.  Het  bestaan  van  bovengenoemd  verband 
voegt een analytische dimensie  toe. Stemmen kan ook een  reactie zijn op de 
besluiten binnen politieke partijen.  Tot dusver beschouwen  een groot  aantal 
studies  stemmen  echter  vooral  het  resultaat  van  partijactiviteiten  in  de 
politieke arena. 
  Methodologisch gezien verschaft het boek twee valide indicatoren van 
partijorganisatie.  Eerdere  studies  bevatten  diverse  conceptualisaties  van 
partijorganisatie  die  weinig  basis  voor  vergelijking  bieden,  omdat  ze  vooral 
gebaseerd  zijn  op  diepgaande  studies  van  individuele  gevallen  (Harmel  en 
Janda  1982; Panebianco  1988; Mainwaring en Scully  1995; Randall en Svasand 
2002;  Van  Biezen  2003).  Deze  studie  biedt  een  analytisch  alternatief  voor 
kwalitatieve  beoordeling  van  organisatieonderdelen.  De  kwantitatieve 
operationalisering  en  de  data  kunnen  bruikbare  middelen  voor  verder 
vergelijkend onderzoek zijn. 
  De belangrijkste empirische  consequentie  vloeit  voort uit het  feit dat 
electorale  volatiliteit  endogene  oorzaken  kan  hebben.  Deze  waarneming 
nuanceert  de  conclusies  van  twee  stromingen  in  de  literatuur.  De  eerste 
stroming betreft de vele studies die de focus richten op de exogene oorzaken 
van volatiliteit. Het gebleken belang van kandidaatselectie binnen de partij, de 
herbenoeming  van  parlementariërs  en  in mindere mate  het  ledenaantal  laat 
zien  dat  exogene oorzaken op partijniveau minder  relevant  zijn. Het grotere 
gewicht  van  de  endogene  verklaringen  in  een  model  waarin  ook  exogene 
verklaringen zijn opgenomen, onderstreept dat. Kiezers blijken te reageren op 
het  gedrag  van  politieke  partijen.  Als  een  partij  bijvoorbeeld  de  bereidheid 
toont  om  kiezersverlangens  te  beantwoorden  en  daarnaast  continuïteit  in 
vertegenwoordiging  garandeert,  dan  zijn  burgers  minder  geneigd  om  hun 
electorale voorkeuren  te wijzigen. De  tweede stroming omvat de discussie  in 
eerder  onderzoek  over  de  aanpassing  van  partijorganisaties  aan  de  inbreng 
vanuit het electoraat. Dit boek toont  juist aan dat het proces ook omgekeerd 
kan zijn. De interne partijorganisatie kan in zekere mate de electorale stabiliteit 
van  een  partij  vormgeven.  Dat  proces  is  complex  en  gebaseerd  op  drie 
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